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 My semester spent studying history and archaeology in Athens, Greece in the 
spring of 2015 was the first time that I, a Classical Studies and Government double major 
focusing largely on Roman politics, had been brought into sustained contact with the 
institutions, ideology, and political topography of Athenian democracy. Athens 
immediately struck me, as it has many others, as politically exceptional in contrast to much 
of the ancient and modern world. While far from the only democracy in the competitive 
world of Greek city-states, or poleis, during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.,1 Athens is 
notable in comparison to its contemporaries for the breadth of its franchise, strength of 
popular ideology and participatory political institutions that encouraged direct mass 
participation by a diverse citizenry.2  
 The Athenian democracy is traditionally described as having been founded in 
508/507 B.C. in part due to the reforms of the politician Cleisthenes, who instituted a series 
of complex institutional reforms that ended civil conflict created in the wake of the 
overthrow of aristocratic Peisistratid tyrants.3 While politics at the start of the fifth century 
was still dominated by aristocratic families ruling through claims of wealth, birth ties, and 
social status,4 having divided the Athenians into 139 demes, or townships, Cleisthenes 
expanded the power of the masses by making citizenship for every individual dependent 
on the vote of one’s fellow demesmen. In this way, he made the basic grant of political 
                                                            
1 Robinson (2011): 248 offers a list of other poleis in Classical Greece and Ionia that were 
democratic during the classical period, from the early fifth to late fourth century B.C. 
2 Ober (2008): 75.   
3 Ober (1989): 74; Ath. Pol. 22. 
4 Ober (1989): 70.  
 2 
rights dependent on community vote of elite and non-elite neighbors rather than 
aristocratic privilege, and based on political equality and consensus rather than deference.5 
The creation of a Council of 500 that had representation from every deme—initially elected, 
and later chosen by lot—was a crucial institution that eventually allowed non-elite 
Athenians to participate in the yearlong part-time process of managing some of the most 
important affairs of the state. The creation of ostracism—the ability for the whole populace 
to exile a figure deemed dangerous to the state—and the participation of the lower classes 
on juries heightened the power of non-elites and the citizen body as a whole vis-à-vis the 
governing elite.6 
 Over time, the institutions of political consensus put in place by Cleisthenes 
developed into full-fledged popular government. Property requirements were lowered and 
yearlong term limits were introduced for magistracies. Eventually magistrates were 
selected by lot rather than election, in order to ensure that power was not monopolized 
and the experience of administration was distributed amongst the citizen body.7 The 
popular assembly—open to all citizens—became the primary body where political decisions 
were made, and the prominence of the navy, Athens’ development of overseas empire, and 
development as a commercial center contributed to the political self-awareness and 
growing strength of the landless class of thetes, who worked as sailors on Athenian 
triremes, as well as lived and worked as banausic wage laborers, artisans, and craftspeople 
                                                            
5 Ober (1989): 71.  
6 Hansen (1999): 35. 
7 Hansen (1999): 52. 
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in the urban city center.8 By the end of the fifth century, following Athens’ defeat in the 
Peloponnesian War, civil strife, and the experience of two unsuccessful oligarchic coups, 
the democracy stabilized until conquered by the Macedonians in the 320s B.C. In the fourth 
century, the poorest Athenian citizens were subsidized for lost wages for attendance on the 
assembly and juries. 9 Most property requirements for magistracies were non-existent or 
ignored, functionally allowing Athenians of all classes to be eligible for the lottery-chosen 
administrative collegial boards and magistracies.10 The failed oligarchies notwithstanding, 
mass participation by non-elites was widespread and embedded in Athens’ political culture 
in the fourth century B.C.11  
For modern scholars, the Athenian experience raises important questions about 
representation (or the lack thereof), political expertise, and civic culture, which can inform 
debate and scholarship surrounding the modern phenomenon of representative liberal 
democracy. Modern American democratic academics treat the question of voter turnout 
and citizen participation in civic institutions as a problem to be solved.12 In the early 
twenty-first century, scholars have sounded increasingly dire notes about the state of civic 
participation in politics, with some noting steep declines over the last forty years not only 
in voting rates—the easiest and most common act of political participation—but also 
declines in interest in public affairs, current events, attendance at local government 
                                                            
8 Burke (2005): 8.  
9 For institution of assembly pay, see Ath. Pol. 41.3 ; for jury pay in the fourth century, see Ath. 
Pol. 62.2; for pay as allowing the poor to participate in public service see Markle (1985): 271.  
10 Hansen (1999): 227.  
11 Harris (2014): 4. 
12 Saunders (2012): 306.  
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meetings, and participation in political campaigns.13 Due to popular and controversial 
works like Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone, the topic of political action, individual 
engagement, and civic participation has focused on the role, connections, and activity of 
the individual citizen. The trope of the active citizen—someone involved in many political 
and civic associations at a higher level than the norm—has become a common one in social 
science and the rhetoric of contemporary political discourse.  
 For that reason, coming across the terms πολυπράγμων and ἀπράγμων in Athenian 
literature of the democratic period can be surprising. In contrast to the modern concern of 
citizens not doing enough, the πολυπράγμων could be described as the citizen who does 
too much, deriving from the words πολύ (many) and πράγματα (things, deeds, affairs, or 
business). On the other hand, the ἀπράγμων is the opposite—they could broadly be 
described as someone who refrains from being involved in πράγματα. These terms were 
actively employed in literature and political rhetoric during the fifth and fourth century in 
Athens to describe certain attitudes towards citizenship just as terms such as active, 
involved, apathetic, and disengaged are used in the modern day. My interest in making the 
characteristics of being a πολυπράγμων, known as πολυπραγμοσύνη, the focus of this 
project comes from my initial confusion as to how the figure of the overactive citizen was 
treated in contemporary Athenian discourse. Whereas our modern political context seems 
to popularly extol the virtues of the citizen who is politically and socially active above and 
                                                            
13 Putnam (2000): 46 offers broad (and negative) overview of declines in all these trends. See 
Skocpol and Fiorina (1999): 2-20 for an overview of similar trends and a broader perspective of 
scholarship in the field.  
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beyond their peers, in literature discussing and produced by the city of Athens—a vibrant 
participatory democracy—the view is decidedly mixed.  
  In Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, the politician Pericles, in his famous 
praise of Athenian democracy, claims that in Athens:  
“ἔνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια, καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα 
τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι: μόνοι γὰρ τόν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε 
μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ᾽ ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν…” 
 
“You will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and in 
public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business, you will 
find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes 
no part in public affairs not as one who minds his own business, but as good for 
nothing”14  
(Thuc. 2.40, trans. Smith)  
 
Upon first glance, one might expect such language to be abundant in the literature and 
rhetoric of a participatory political culture. However, in reviewing this quotation, the 
classicist A.W. Gomme claimed that in fact, Pericles’ criticism of the ἀπράγμων was unique 
amongst Athenian political rhetoric, and that “it is to be remembered that ἀπράγμων is a 
complimentary term, in Athens as in elsewhere.”15 Across the board, in elite-penned texts 
as well as rhetoric composed for mass audiences, the πολυπράγμων receives a negative 
portrayal as a meddler, a busybody, and officious individual. On the other hand, 
πολυπραγμοσύνη is also depicted as being a particularly Athenian characteristic, associated 
particularly with its democratic constitution. It is a fascinating discrepancy. 
Scholars of Classical Athens have investigated Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη in some 
detail, mostly from the standpoint of understanding political rhetoric and discourse. 
                                                            
14 Translations of Greek throughout this work, unless otherwise cited, are my own.  
15 Gomme (1956): 121.  
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Ehrenberg’s oft-cited 1947 study “Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics” presented 
πολυπραγμοσύνη (and its opposite, ἀπραγμοσύνη) primarily as terms used in the 
contemporary debate surrounding Athens’ aggressive foreign policy stances in the fifth 
and fourth centuries B.C. Largely neglecting domestic politics and social life, Ehrenberg 
saw πολυπραγμοσύνη as “a people’s daring and restless optimism,” which magnified the 
rapacity of Athens’ foreign policy goals during the Peloponnesian War.16 Ehrenberg treats 
these characteristics as exogenous, and is less interested in probing as to how and why 
such a “restless vitality” and “optimism” of Athens might have actually existed, and rather 
focuses more on its expression through international politics. 
On the other hand, Adkins, writing several decades later, sought to discuss “the 
reasons for being said to be a busybody.”17 By approaching the subject firmly on the level of 
discourse, he saw πολυπραγμοσύνη as related to the concept of “minding one’s own 
business” (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν) as a term of moral and political constraint, developing out 
of older, traditional language used by aristocratic classes to keep non-elites out of the 
sphere of politics and political action. Adkins’ work has informed this study by 
demonstrating that the term πολυπραγμοσύνη does not appear ex nihilo from the fifth 
century political ferment, but draws on far older societal conceptions of acceptable moral 
and personal behavior and terms of restraint which eventually become politicized.  
Finally, the most recent study on πολυπραγμοσύνη, Leigh’s From Polypragmon to 
Curiosυs: Ancient Concepts of Curious and Meddlesome Behavior, provides a useful overview of 
many of the term’s uses in fifth and fourth-century literary sources. Leigh’s concern 
                                                            
16 Ehrenberg (1947): 51. 
17 Adkins (1976): 301 
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(especially in his later chapters) is primarily how πολυπραγμοσύνη developed into a term 
of philosophic discourse both in later Latin and Greek literature, yet his early overview 
provides insight for the subject not covered by either Adkins or Ehrenberg. He notes that 
terms like πολυπραγμοσύνη were “profoundly subjective terms: nobody ever saw a 
polypragmon or a periergos on the streets of Athens, only someone he or others held to be as 
such.”18  
 What began as a study of the rhetoric surrounding citizenship, personal behavior, 
and conversations about meddlesomeness and “minding one’s own business” in Athens 
eventually opened up larger questions into an exploration of how Athenian political 
citizenship and social life came together on the street level, and the daily experience of 
social interactions in Athens. I will argue in this paper that the real and non-rhetorical 
behaviors of both doing many things (being an overinvolved, committed, or active citizen) 
and knowing many things (being a social busybody) which inspire the negative stereotype 
of the πολυπράγμων were actually important and useful behaviors to be manifested by 
citizens in a democratic regime like classical Athens, where information was decentralized 
and political authority was non-hierarchical.   
In my first chapter, I explore the historical antecedents of the πολυπράγμων and 
ἀπράγμων in Homeric and Archaic Greek literature before the birth of the Athenian 
democracy in order to demonstrate that both terms arise from elite conceptions about 
what is and what is not acceptable political behavior for non-elites. Such texts present 
political action by non-elites as socially disruptive behavior dangerous to the aristocratic 
status quo, and instead attempt to promote values of restfulness and quietude represented 
                                                            
18 Leigh (2013): 16.  
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by ἀπραγμοσύνη. Establishing a connection between such older phrases of social restraint 
such as “minding one’s own business” (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν) and πολυπραγμοσύνη is 
important for underscoring the inherently political nature of calling someone a 
πολυπράγμων in classical Athens.  
In my second chapter, I explore how such elite language of social restraint and 
“minding one’s own business” finds expression in the democratic literature and political 
context of fifth-century Athens, as well as at the same time defining the primary 
characteristics of the stereotypical πολυπράγμων. The composite πολυπράγμων appears as 
an overextended democrat, restless and perpetually active, frequently participating in—
and taking advantage of—political institutions such as the law courts and the assembly, 
while simultaneously investigating the details of the personal lives of their fellow citizens 
in an onerous fashion. In the fifth-century sources, critiques of πολυπραγμοσύνη are tied to 
critiques of the development of the Athenian democratic regime.  
My third chapter first seeks to use fourth-century legal rhetoric to resolve the 
contradiction between the presentation of πολυπραγμοσύνη as a particularly democratic 
characteristic, and the fact that it is a negative term in popular rhetoric that appealed to 
mass citizen audiences. I highlight the subjectivity of adversarial legal orations to 
demonstrate that the polypragmatic behaviors of inquisitiveness and meddlesome 
intrusion that litigants attempt to tar their legal opponents with are praised in other 
contexts by the political orators as defining positive Athenian attributes of intelligence, 
action, and patriotic duty.  
I then turn to the works of Plato, who ties πολυπραγμοσύνη to his strongest 
critiques of the Athenian capacity for good government. In arguing as a basic principle that 
 9 
an individual can only do one thing well, Plato attacks not only the figure of the 
πολυπράγμων but also the basic ideological principles of Athenian democracy, which 
institutionally and ideologically encouraged part-time governance by individuals who were 
not professionals, but instead laborers, farmers, and tradesmen. Plato’s dialogues raise 
powerful questions about how individuals and political regimes gather, define, and employ 
politically useful expertise and knowledge, a subject intimately connected to the inquisitive 
and curious side of the πολυπράγμων. The idealized cities presented in his Republic and 
Laws seek to limit and regulate the ways in which residents of all classes, citizen status, and 
occupational position interacted and generated common knowledge through social ties. 
Plato’s doubts about the political utility of knowledge embedded in social interactions—the 
kind of knowledge that specifically animates the πολυπράγμων—leads him to therefore 
limit the social conditions that allow for Athenian polypragmatic behavior.  
My final chapter seeks to employ modern theories of epistemic democracy, 
associational theory, and studies of the information-spreading potential of social networks 
and weak ties, to push back against Plato’s claims about social knowledge’s lack of utility 
for good governance and danger of πολυπραγμοσύνη to the polis. It seeks to argue that in 
an environment like classical Athens, where information, expertise, and knowledge were 
decentralized, dispersed and often only accessible through social relations, the individual 
who acted as did a πολυπράγμων was actually at a distinct advantage vis-à-vis his fellow 
citizens.  Those individuals with more connections, broader associational involvement, and 
who spent more time present in the common spaces of the city of Athens were more likely 
to be nexuses of socially valuable information. Thus, the πολυπράγμων can be considered 
as an informal mechanism—along with the institutional mechanisms of participatory 
 10 
politics—that helps explain the ways in which Athens was able to generate and marshal 
information and individual expertise effectively for use by the citizen body as a whole. 
Finally, I hope to have proven that the behaviors behind πολυπραγμοσύνη were not limited 
to a small group of the Athenian population but instead, were common attributes of 





















“Minding One’s  Own Business” in Homeric and Archaic Greek Literature 
 
 The first extant occurrence of the word πολυπραγμοσύνη or its derivatives appears 
in a text dating from the last quarter of the fifth century B.C. as the verb μὴ 
πολυπρηγμονέειν (Hdt. 3.15.2).19 However, the scope of one’s search is widely extended if 
one considers the synonyms (or antonyms) of πολυπραγμοσύνη in the dragnet.20 Scholars 
have taken various formulations of πολλὰ πράσσειν to mean synonyms for meddling and 
plotting21 and on the other hand, the formulation τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν is used as the 
opposite of πολυπραγμονεῖν (to meddle), and a synonym for the actions of an ἀπράγμων.22 
Yet, when one searches as far back as Homer, these words are not always present, and then 
the task is to discover—while not projecting a more modern conception of what it means to 
be meddlesome back into older texts—behaviors and attitudes that may have informed the 
definitions and attitudes of the classical Athenians.  
 The most pertinent example of meddlesome behavior in both a social and political 
sense—involving both questions of political power and class relations—can be found in 
Book II of the Iliad, involving the treatment of the dissenter Thersites in front of the 
Achaean assembly. At this point in the narrative, Achilles has withdrawn from battle, and 
                                                            
19 On the dating of Herodotus, see Asheri et al. (2007): 5 “We cannot even establish the year of 
his death: we can only fix a terminus ante quem non: 430 B.C.” adding that “Herodotus has no 
personal experience of the events of 480/79 B.C.”; Fornara (1981): 149 argues that Herodotus 
had knowledge of the Archidamian War, focusing on a reference at Hdt. 9.73.3.  
20 Allison (1979): 10 notably differs from other writers who seek to connect the terms in a 
“family of concepts” governed by or related to the substantive πολυπραγμοσύνη. However, 
hers is largely a minority opinion in the scholarship.  
21 Ehrenberg (1947): 46.  
22 Lateiner (1982): 11. 
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Agamemnon, in concert with the other “greathearted leaders” decides to test the troops’ 
dedication by lying to them. He claims that Zeus has prophesized disaster to him, and thus 
recommends that they give up the fight and return home. 23 When the πληθύς (the largely 
nameless mass of common soldiers) hears, they immediately begin a stampede towards the 
ships. Observing this, Odysseus performs crowd control with Agamemnon’s scepter, the 
symbol of royal authority.24 Odysseus’ treatment of the each chieftain (βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον 
ἄνδρα, Il. 2.149) is widely different from that of each soldier (δήμου τ' ἄνδρα, Il. 2.188). 
While the captains are met only with spoken rebukes, each common soldier, the δήμου 
ἀνήρ, is reproved with harsher language and struck with the staff. Each man is called 
cowardly and unwarlike (ἀπτόλεμος καὶ ἄναλκις, Il. 2.201-202) and is told at least 
individually, that he does not count in the assembly or in war (ἐν πολέμῳ ἐναρίθμιος οὔτ' 
ἐνὶ βουλῇ, Il. 2.202-203). For that reason, the correct role of the soldiers in this situation is 
to sit still and listen (ἧσο καὶ ἄλλων μῦθον ἄκουε, Il. 2.200) to their superiors —those that 
are better than them (φέρτεροί εἰσι, Il. 2.201). Quieted down by both Odysseus’ words and 
his force, most return to the assembly and listen in orderly fashion, with the exception of 
Thersites, who does the opposite. 
                                                            
23 The translation of μεγαθύμων ... γερόντων is literally “old men,” but used metaphorically 
here, as elsewhere, for the princes or leaders of the Achaeans; Lattimore (2011): 94 translates as 
“high-hearted princes.” While most of the time in the Iliad it seems to have the connotation of 
old, sometimes when used in the plural, as at 2.204, 4.344 it seems to refer to the leaders of the 
Achaeans.  
24 Odysseus’s claim at Il. 2.205-6, “εἷς βασιλεύς, ᾧ ἔδωκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω / σκῆπτρόν 
τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας,” not only appeals to royal and monarchic authority, but also divine sanction 
for the social-political order. Thomas (1966): 389 notes that kingship in Homer is more complex 
than being grounded simply in religion as a basis, but I do argue that it is used in this sequence 
and in the subsequent speeches as another way of enforcing the kings’ dominant authority.   
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 Thersites, who has the most detailed description of any character’s appearance in 
the Iliad,25 yet appears nowhere else in the poem, has been understood as either a common 
soldier, or a captain of a similar rank (albeit lower) to Odysseus and Agamemnon. Several 
late poetic traditions that date to the 2nd Century A.D. or later are known to describe him as 
part of the Calydonian royal house.26 Plato’s Socrates, (Pl. Gorg. 525d) however, specifically 
presents him as a private man (ἰδιώτης) in contrast to kings and dynasts (βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ 
δυνάστας). Plato’s contemporary Xenophon (Mem 1.2.59) argues that ancient writers and 
even the accusers of Socrates more broadly believed that the Iliad passages in question 
meant that “the poet approved of chastising common and poor folk.”27 In Homer Thersites 
is described as a physically un-heroic and atypical figure, characterized at length as the 
most ugly man who came beneath Ilion (αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε, Il. 2.216). Often 
in Greek literature, there is an assumed relationship between handsome physical 
appearance and one’s social status.28 Thersites has none of the telltale signs of political 
                                                            
25 Thalmann (1988): 15.  
26 The lost Aithiopis, which dated to the eighth or seventh centuries B.C., describes him as a 
relative of Diomedes. Marks (2005): 2 cites the bT scholia to Iliad 2.212, Apollodorus’s Bibliotheke 
1.7.7, and Pausanias 2.25.2 as textual evidence for this claim. While Apollodorus is dubiously 
dated to the 1st century B.C. or the 2nd A.D., Pausanias wrote in the 2nd century A.D. The dating of 
the scholia is difficult to determine.  
27 In this case, Xenophon offers that comment to say that Socrates did not quote those Homeric 
lines to endorse such a policy of chastising the poor, but had he quoted those lines as such, his 
accusers might have thought him to hold such a view.  
28Marks (2005): 4 n. 8 states that while there are some important contrary examples, like the 
Trojan Herald Dolon, “Positive correlation between physical beauty and social status is of 
course the norm.”; at Od. 4.63 Menelaus comments that Telemachus and Peisistratus must be of 
political nobility simply on the basis of their appearances, unaware of their parentage; also, at 
Od. 24.242 Odysseus notes that Laertes’ kingliness is not disguised through his rags; Iros the 
beggar in Od.18.2, like Thersites, is distinguished by his ugly, almost comical physical 
appearance.  
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nobility. He lacks any sort of patronymic,29 has no mention amongst the leaders in the 
Catalog of the Ships, and is given little backstory. He is typified by exaggerated physical 
appearance and personal characteristics, such as the “shrill cry” (κεκληγὼς) used to 
describe his speech. His words are disorderly (ἄκοσμα) and endless (ἀμετροεπὴς).30 
  From the perspective of the poem’s elites, and the poem’s narrator, Thersites 
directly interferes with the process of the reconstituted assembly. Whereas the trend 
imposed by Agamemnon and Odysseus had been to return the assembly to orderly silence, 
Thersites interrupts it with his loud voice, exaggerated characteristics, and seemingly 
endless disorderly energy. He turns his shrill critiques towards Agamemnon, and even if he 
is not solidly attributed to the soldiers’ class, he is at least channeling their anger. While 
the mass of soldiers feels this anger in their hearts, they are silent. Thersites, however, 
actually steps forward from the crowd and articulates the anger of the common soldiers. 
He loudly and publicly insults Agamemnon, and exhorts the troops to return home—
recognizing implicitly that while the members of the πληθύς are not individually 
comparable to the Homeric heroes as Odysseus remarked above, they are crucial for the 
war effort, and have a potent political heft.31  
                                                            
29 Thalmann (1998): 75 notes that even Eurykleia, the slave of Laertes and Odysseus’ nursemaid 
in the Odyssey is given a patronymic and a personal history, whereas Thersites, treated with 
contempt, is not. 
30 Il. 2.212-215. It is interesting that the depiction of Thersites as a speaker lines up with the 
depiction of what Carter (1986): 91 calls a “demagogue” in Euripides Orestes: “he is a man with 
an ‘unstoppable mouth’, impudent, persuasive, and bold.” The characterization of Thersites in 
this passage is not unlike the demagogues that also appear in Aristophanes.  
31 Raaflaub and Wallace (2007): 26: “Homer knows and assumes mass fighting by the people and 
considers it crucial for the success of battle.”  
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Regardless of whether Thersites is a member of the lower class, or simply 
elucidating an anger that they feel, most important for this study is the realization that 
“the principal objection to Thersites is his rocking of the boat, his constant urge to “quarrel 
with the princes” (ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν, Il. 2.214).32 Whether it is because of his class—that 
he argues against the leaders though being far worse (οὐκ ἂν βασιλῆας ἀνὰ στόμ' ἔχων 
ἀγορεύοις, Il. 2.215)—or because he argues for things that are unpleasing to Agamemnon’s 
honor (τίμη) and excellence (ἀρετή), Thersites is told that the debate is none of his 
business. Given the language used, he is essentially told that he is “out of order” (οὐ κατὰ 
κόσμον, Il. 2.214). As Adkins notes, κόσμον is part of a broader set of terms, such as μοῖρα, 
one’s fate or lot, which Homeric speakers use to describe what is correct or incorrect based 
on one’s station in society.33 Due to his class, his manners, or simply the fact that he is not 
Agamemnon, it is not within Thersites’ realm of competence to address the assembly, let 
alone advocate for a whole change in the Greek military policy. Thersites stands and 
meddles where he ought not.  
Rather than a threat, or even a spokesman for the πληθύς, Thersites is presented as 
neither. He is instead turned into a scapegoat for the tensions between the assembly 
(which might wish to disobey Agamemnon, but does not), and the princes (who might wish 
                                                            
32 Postlethwaite (1988): 126.  
33 Adkins (1976): 321: “What speech is or is not in accordance with kosmos and moira will be 
determined by the agathoi, whose values are accepted by all the characters in the Homeric 
poems: speech or behavior which the agathoi regard as being unbeautiful, unpleasing, 
inappropriate will be stigmatized as not in accordance with kosmos; and where such speech 
infringes the status of the agathos and slights his arête, its being not in accordance with kosmos 
will override the question of its truth.” 
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to further discipline their dissenting troops, but do not).34 Thersites is comically struck by 
Odysseus with the staff—the soldiers laugh even though they are grieved at heart (οἳ δὲ καὶ 
ἀχνύμενοί περ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, Il. 2.270)—and after being threatened with a public flogging, 
rejoins the πληθύς in anonymity. The brave braggart is turned into a frightened, helpless 
wreck.35 This scene sets the pattern for later literature, where individuals seen as politically 
or socially meddlesome are often treated with shame, and as comic relief. 
The political and social context of the situation is important in classifying this as an 
example of politically meddlesome behavior—an individual getting involved in something 
that they are said to not belong in—rather than simply disobedience. If Thersites was on 
the battlefield, disobeying military commands, or an outright traitor, the situation could 
not function this way. Yet, the context of this interaction is the assembly. As Raaflaub and 
Wallace note, assemblies are a constant feature of Homeric society.36 While the mob is 
accorded a function—largely communal approbation or criticism of their leaders’ 
decisions—it is the basileis who are the ones entitled to regularly speak as individuals at 
assemblies, and allowed to propose new courses of action.37 Even though the poem 
mentions that Thersites had spoken up before to insult Achilles and Odysseus (Il. 2.216), it is 
not clear that this was in the assembly, or whether it was to endorse such a drastic 
                                                            
34 Thalmann (1988): 17: “It is as a marginal comic figure that Thersites, through his defiance and 
the reaction that it provokes, involuntarily performs a healing function for his society.”   
35 Il. 2.268-9: ὃ δ' ἄρ' ἕζετο τάρβησέν τε / ἀλγήσας δ' ἀχρεῖον ἰδὼν ἀπομόρξατο δάκρυ, “and he 
sat down again, frightened, in pain, and looking helplessly about wiped off the tear-drops” 
(trans. Lattimore). 
36 Raaflaub and Wallace (2007): 28.  
37 Raaflaub and Wallace (2007): 28: “Only the leaders (basileis, sg. basileus) speak. The assembled 
men are limited to expressing their opinion collectively by shouting approval or displeasure, or 
else by voting with their feet…”  
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difference in policy from what the basileis desired. Thersites, moreover, was operating in 
the very arena in which one might question the king, or propose new plans for the 
Achaeans, which makes reading the scene as disobedience less tenable. Even within that 
social context, however, Odysseus’ reaction implies that he—Thersites—was not one of the 
individuals entitled to do that. 38    
 The idea of stepping outside of one’s own proper sphere, and subsequent criticism 
for it, may be in its most generalized form visible in another brief section of Homer, albeit 
perhaps less in a paradigmatic situation. When Aphrodite returns to Olympus after having 
been harmed by Diomedes during the fighting at Troy (Il. 5.340-1) she is told that she 
should not participate in battle, as that was limited to Ares and Athena. Aphrodite 
(although she has just demonstrated that she can participate in battle, Il. 5.314) is to be 
limited to “the works of marriage” (Il. 5.430). On first blush, this seem to be more of a 
mythological differentiation between the Olympian gods, or even a differentiation of 
gender roles between the most feminine of the gods, and the two others dedicated to 
different arts. However, the concept of each God doing what is proper to oneself also 
accords with the saying that is attributed to Pittacus of Mytilene: “may everyone look after 
his own things.”39 Asheri in turn connects these two ideas along with a third, the anecdote 
                                                            
38 Kalchas must be invited to speak at the assembly by Achilles, rather than speak up himself, 
although he knows exactly why Apollo is plaguing the Achaeans (Il. 1.62). On the other hand, 
even Achilles is told not to wrangle with Kings (ἐριζέμεναι βασιλῆϊ) during his dispute with 
Agamemnon. However, his treatment is entirely different from that of Thersites (Il. 1.277-281), 
although his language is largely the same, cf. Postlethwaite (1988): 126-134 
39 Leigh (2013): 17; Pl. Prt. 343a identifies him as one of the seven sages of Greece. Asheri et al. 
(2007): 82 notes that this quote is from the Palatine Anthology VII 89, and it is admittedly hard 
to verify the age of such quotations. However the phrasing of the quote does appear very 
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about Gyges, Candaules, and Candaules’ wife in the first book of the Histories. While 
Herodotus’ Histories themselves are a product of the fifth century, his Gyges claims that 
“men long ago invented rules” (πάλαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ ἀνθρώποισι ἐξεύρηται, Hdt. Hist. 1.8.4), 
one of them being to “consider one’s own things” (σκοπέειν τινὰ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ, Hdt. Hist. 
1.8.4). Gyges’ position is a complicated one because in his situation, he is being asked to 
look at another man’s wife naked, and that man is his social superior. There is not only a 
boundary of moral propriety, but also a social one—the fact that his own superior is 
pressuring him to do it initially makes no difference, on first blush—when quoting the 
proverb, Gyges refuses to transgress that line. That he eventually does so, and is caught by 
Gyges’ wife, perhaps only underscores the cultural power of such an admonition, even if it 
is folkloric. Breaking it invites consequences.40  
 The earliest extant appearance of a term directly linguistically related to the noun 
ἀπραγμοσύνη or πολυπραγμοσύνη occurs in a fragment of Archilochus. A fragment notes 
that, “the life of the ἀπράγμων is most suitable for the elderly, especially if they happen to 
be simple in their ways, are stupid, or speak nonsense” (βίος δ᾿ ἀπράγμων τοῖς γέρουσι 
συμφέρει, τύχοιεν ἁπλοῖ τοῖς τρόποις / ἢ μακκοᾶν μέλλοιεν ἢ ληρεῖν ὅλως, Archil. fr. 330, 
Loeb Edition). In this sense ἀπράγμων is a synonym for a retired and reserved life, and 
while not functioning exactly as an antonym of πολυπραγμοσύνη implies that for the 
elderly there is a proper behavior and attitude towards life, especially public life. The 
societal group of old men is praised for being retiring, withdrawn, and idle in public life, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
similar to the formulation of the phrase τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, which does become a synonym for 
ἀπραγμοσύνη.  
40 Leigh (2013): 17 calls this one of the antecedents of Plato’s description of πολυπραγμοσύνη in 
Republic 433a-b.  
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much as Thersites should be, and other groups in later literature will be blamed for their 
intrusion and participation. Thus, there are those who ought be active, and those who 
ought not. Although the political and social context of such a limited fragment is hard to 
define, it demonstrates an early proscriptive use of ἀπραγμοσύνη. Neither something to be 
blamed or praised outright, quietude is valued for a certain group of people, and 
presumably not praised for others.  
 Another antecedent and related term to ἀπραγμοσύνη identified by both Ehrenberg 
and Carter is the term ἡσυχία, which is roughly equivalent to the word quietude, 
peacefulness, and tranquility.41 It is used often to denote a peaceful or restful state of mind 
of an individual, as in Homer and the Homeric Hymns.42 It is used similarly by Pindar to 
refer not only to a state of inner peace and harmonious quiet for the individual, but also for 
the state and political community as a whole.43 In Pindar’s work, and in that of other Greek 
lyric poets in the seventh and sixth centuries, tranquility of both soul and of the state is to 
be desired and is praised.44 For, without it, according to Theognis, cities will be gripped by 
“public ills, discord, and inter-communal violence” (Thgn. 1.43-52). In this genre of poetry 
ἡσυχία is contrasted with ὕβρις—violence and ambition—and κόρος—surfeit and 
                                                            
41 Ehrenberg (1947): 46; Carter (1986): 42.  
42 Hymn. Hom. Merc. 356, 438; Hom. Il. 21.598; Hom. Od. 18.22.  
43 “Pindar becomes especially eloquent when he sings of hesychia: peace, tranquility, order, and 
stability; almost any good which can befall a city may be summed up in it” (Carter (1986): 42).  
44 Pindar praises ἡσυχία both as a personified characteristic, as well as an adjective of cities and 
individuals: “I praise a man who is most eager / in the raising of horses / who rejoices in being 
hospitable to all guests / and whose thoughts are turned towards city-loving peace” (ἐπεί νιν 
αἰνέω μάλα μὲν / τροφαῖς ἑτοῖμον ἵππων, / χαίροντά τε ξενίαις πανδόκοις / καὶ πρὸς ἁσυχίαν 
φιλόπολιν καθαρᾷ γνώμᾳ τετραμμένον, Pind. Ol. 4.16). 
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superfluity.45 ἡσυχία as a characteristic of a city as a whole is also presented as a 
complementary value to εὐνομία, a personified aristocratic “norm of good behavior” 
characterized by moderation.46  
 Pindar’s poetry, which honored victors in the Panhellenic athletic contests, both 
celebrates and reflects the values of the aristocratic social structure that provided for both 
the funding and training of the athletic victors.47 Much like the Homeric admonition to act 
in accordance with one’s lot or station (κατὰ κόσμον), Pindar’s work justifies an existing 
aristocratic ruling order and mindset. When he heaps praises on ἡσυχία and advocates for 
quiet in the city, it is because the opposite—violence and stasis—threatens that well-
maintained social order of peace and obedience to laws represented by εὐνομία.48 In some 
ways, promoting quietude—stillness, quiet and calm in an individual or place—can be seen 
as promoting quietism—acceptance of things as they are. Again, in this case, the praise of 
quietude does not apply equally to those who live in the city and those who rule it. In 
Pindar’s Pythian 4, he praises the youth who has learned both to hate ὕβρις and to not strive 
against the nobles (ἔμαθε δ᾿ ὑβρίζοντα μισεῖν ... οὐκ ἐρίζων ἀντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Pind. Pyth. 
4.284-285).49 The probable commissioner of this poem, Damophilius, has been exiled from 
Cyrene, and in reference to his own situation, Pindar makes the violence of ὕβρις—
previously criticized in the city writ large—explicitly political, as part of a plea to revoke 
                                                            
45 Carter (1986): 43.  
46 Carter (1986): 43. 
47 Burnett (1987): 434; Stoneman (2014): 6. 
48 Andrewes (1938): 89: Εὐνομία is “the noun of εὔνομος and εὐνομοῦμαι, meaning discipline and 
good order: a condition in which the citizens obey the law, not a condition of the state in which 
the laws are good.” 
49 Adkins (1976): 322 sees this as reflecting a general sentiment, and “would serve to convict of 
hubris any social inferior who endeavored to assert his rights against an agathos.”  
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his exile.50 Damophilius has learned his lesson to not strive against those who are better 
than he, in this case, the rulers of Cyrene. However, this type of ἡσυχία is not unqualifiedly 
praised, especially for the leaders of the city. Often, they must be active and engaged, not 
delaying accomplishments, and prepared to seize the moment when opportunity is given 
(οὐδὲ μακύνων τέλος οὐδέν, ὁ γὰρ καιρὸς / πρὸς ἀνθρώπων βραχὺ μέτρον ἔχει, Pind. Ol. 
4.285-6). Pindar is praising noble, politically involved, and actively athletic young men, and 
his calls for ἡσυχία on behalf of the city are not the same as asking those in power to be 
ἀπράγμων.  
Pindar, as might be rightly noted, is not an author who writes on particularly 
democratic or Athenian themes. Pindar was born around 520 B.C. and resided for much of 
his life in Thebes, which remained solidly oligarchic while the Athenians changed their 
constitution to a more democratic one in 508/507 B.C.51 Wade-Gery argued that the values 
espoused in Pindar’s poems, while aristocratic, were also the values of Greek elites 
internationally.52 Aristocratic Athenian families, who belonged in the same social class and 
strata as the ruling classes in other Greek poleis even as their own city turned towards 
democratic government, also commissioned Pindar’s work.53 Ober argues that such values 
were part of a “generalized ‘panhellenic’ aristocratic ideology,” that existed during the 
archaic period, coinciding with aristocratic and elite rule in many Greek cities.54 As Wade-
Gery argues, such values could be found amongst aristocratic Athenian families even down 
                                                            
50 Race (1997): 264. 
51 Hansen and Nielsen (2004): 455. 
52 Wade-Gery (1932): 210.  
53 E.g. Pythian 7, as per Stoneman (2014): 23. 
54 Ober (1989): 312.  
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to the eve of the Peloponnesian war, seeing a direct personal tie between Pindar and the 
family of Thucydides, son of Melesias, the aristocratic rival of Pericles in Athenian 
politics.55  
However, even if the values of ἡσυχία and εὐνομία, along with the social class that 
supported them, existed at Athens into the democratic period, it should still be noted that 
most of the cities Pindar describes as containing the laudatory characteristics of ἡσυχία 
and εὐνομία are Dorian cities that are in many ways very different from Athens. Thebes, 
Opous, and Corinth, which are praised both for their values of internal peace, unity, and 
concord, were all oligarchies at the time, while tyrants governed Aegina and Cyrene.56 
Sparta is described by in similar terms by Herodotus (Hist. 1.65) as also experiencing 
εὐνομία, for which it became the example par excellence. While there is a limit to how far 
Pindar’s values of quietude and a stable and aristocratic social order may be extended to an 
Athenian context, nonetheless they cannot be discounted for this study. In fact, the image 
of the peaceful, quiet, and well-ordered Dorian polity emerges as a foil and contrast to that 
of the Athenians.  
Yet, even the political discourse of Archaic Athens parallels some of the values 
found in Pindar. Under the period of aristocratic and elite rule before the Peisistratids and 
later the establishment of the democracy, the “generalized ‘panhellenic’ aristocratic 
ideology” mentioned by Ober found its own expression in the Athenian context. The sixth 
century lawgiver of Athens Solon appeals to similar values in a poetic fragment, part of a 
                                                            
55 Wade-Gery (1932): 210.  
56 Carter (1986): 44, citing evidence for Thebes in Pind. Pae 1.10; Corinth Ol. 13.6; Cyrene Pyth. 
5.67; Aegina Isthm. 5.22. 
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larger work justifying and explaining his reorganization of the constitution of Athens in 
the 590s. He describes his political and economic reforms and education of the Athenians as 
bringing “lawfulness” to the city.57 In the face of violence and turmoil in the city of Athens 
between elites and non-elites, Solon’s most famous reforms—specifically his abolition of 
enslavement for debt and opening of the highest political offices on the basis of wealth, 
rather than solely birth—were in the interest of reducing tensions between elites as well as 
between the rulers and the poorer populace.58 By abolishing debt-bondage, as well as offering 
the lowest classes minimal rights in the courts and assembly, a firm delineation was made 
between slave and citizen, ensuring that the lower classes were more endeared towards the 
upper classes. On the other hand, the governing aristocrats, by co-opting those who were 
rich but not wellborn into the apparatus of government, allowed the new elite of weath to 
partake in ruling rather than side with the lower classes against the existing elite order.59 It 
was a policy geared towards εὐνομία and in consonance with the values embodied by ἡσυχία 
in the lyric poets, which sought to protect the stability of the aristocratic order by redefining, 
or perhaps for the first time actually defining, the rights and privileges of different groups in 
Athenian society. 
Another fragment of Solon’s sheds more light on the relationship of quiet lawfulness 
to the values of κόρος (surfeit) and ὕβρις that Pindar’s lyric work decries:  
δῆμος δ᾿ ὧδ᾿ ἂν ἄριστα σὺν ἡγεμόνεσσιν ἕποιτο, 
μήτε λίην ἀνεθεὶς μήτε βιαζόμενος· 
τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἕπηται 
                                                            
57 Solon fr. 4, ln. 32.  
58 Ober (1989): 63; Ath. Pol. 6.1 for the abolition of debt-bondage, Ath. Pol. 7-8 for the opening of 
offices based on criteria of wealth. 
59 Ober (1989): 62-63. 
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ἀνθρώποις ὁπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ. 
 
“And in this way the masses would best follow their leaders,  
if they are neither given too much freedom nor subjected to too much 
restraint.  
For excess breeds insolence, whenever  
great prosperity comes to men who are not sound of mind.” 
    (Solon, fr. 6, trans. Gerber)  
 
Solon’s fragment here is revealing because it includes both the Pindaric and lyric 
conception of κόρος and ὕβρις in the context of early Athenian domestic politics. The 
δῆμος ought follow their leaders, being less sound or suitable (ἄρτιος) than the elites are. 
Desiring for more freedom than one is entitled to, a form of κόρος, makes one more likely 
to commit ὕβρις, and led to the violence that Solon’s reforms sought to cure in the first 
place.60 Solon himself claimed that he did not give the demos more than they deserved, nor 
did he harm them unduly.61 The implication here is that to not follow the leaders of the 
people is to lead to the violence and disorder of ὕβρις, which had been opposed to εὐνομία 
and ἡσυχία in Pindar’s poetry. Such language firmly reinforces a particular social order—
the leaders are to lead, the rest of the citizens, although more enfranchised than 
previously, are to be led. Again, an emergent dynamic is clear. In certain poetry of the 
Archaic and early classical period, the concepts of quietude on behalf of a city are also 
equated with an understanding and acceptance of elite political authority. In Pindar and 
Solon at least ὕβρις, either by other elites or especially by the masses, involves disrupting 
that acceptance.  
                                                            
60 Solon fr. 4, ln. 32-35: εὐνομία “τραχέα λειαίνει, παύει κόρον, ὕβριν ἀμαυροῖ”, “makes the 
rough smooth, stops excess, and weakens hubris.”  
61 Ath. Pol. 12.1. 
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 In Herodotus one sees a conflation between the negative political and social 
implications of terms such as πολυπραγμοσύνη and ὕβρις. Herodotus uses the term 
πολυπραγμοσύνη as he describes the revolt of the formerly deposed Egyptian king, 
Psammenitus, against the Persian King Cambyses, who had been keeping him at the Persian 
court since his deposition. Herodotus writes that due to Persian traditions about re-
enthroning rulers as client kings, Psammenitus might have retained his position “had he 
known not to meddle” (εἰ δὲ καὶ ἠπιστήθη μὴ πολυπρηγμονέειν, Hdt. 3.15.2). In this case 
the meaning of πολυπρηγμονέειν is somewhat similar to intriguing, or plotting, and is 
depicted negatively. Herodotus is less interested in proscribing a social value than in 
analyzing a historical situation—he seems to be employing language rather than using it to 
shape it into a form of discourse. He seems to be saying that had Psammenitus been an 
ἀπράγων in this situation his position would have been secure. Yet Herodotus also labels a 
similar situation, a revolt by the Egyptians under the subsequent king Darius, not as 
πολυπραγμοσύνη but as an act of ὕβρις.62 In this way, πολυπραγμοσύνη is also co-opted into 
the emergent axis of values both describing and proscribing different types of social 
behavior. Additionally, a similar reference in Herodotus involves ἡσυχία. When Herodotus 
describes the Spartan desire to go to war with their neighbors, the Arcadians, in an early 
                                                            
62 Adkins (1976): 323 argues that the use of πολυπραγμοσύνη rather than hubris in the 
democratic period reflects a secularization of religious beliefs reflected in language, arguing 
that elites begin to use the term πολυπραγμοσύνη because those individuals they wish to 
constrain no longer hold the religious beliefs associated with hubris that would render it a 
potent word of restraint. My only comment, which might not negate this view but complicate 
it, would be the fact that by the fifth and fourth centuries, a law against acts of hubris had been 
established and was considered a particularly democratic law. If what Adkins says is correct, it 
is possible that the language of wanton violence as dangerous to the community had been 
appropriated by democratic ideology to refer to the upper classes instead. Cf. Murray (1990): 
139.  
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part of the Histories, he says that the Spartans “were no longer eager to keep quiet” (οὐκέτι 
ἀπέχρα ἡσυχίην ἄγειν, 1.66.1). Such activity on the part of Sparta is later called τῶν 
Σπαρτιητέων τὴν πλεονεξίην, with πλεονεξία sharing significance with both ὕβρις and 
κόρος.63 
 In presenting these examples from Homer, the lyric poets, and Herodotus, I have 
sought to demonstrate and define a family of linguistic terms that relate to how Greek 
elites (largely the readers and writers of texts in the pre-classical period) talked about the 
relationship between minding one’s own things, or business, and appropriate social and 
political behavior. While the terms ἀπράγμων and πολυπράγμων largely do not appear in 
discourse until the fifth century B.C., praises and criticisms of what those ideas represent 
are present through other ideas and values. On the one hand the praises of ἡσυχία and 
εὐνομία are equated with a tranquil, retired, and politically quietist and orderly populace 
in the face of the established ruling classes. On the other hand, disruption of the given 
social and political order is presented as violent ὕβρις, exemplified in the abstract by 
Solon’s poetry and Pindar’s work but given a full form in Homer’s Thersites sequence. Both 
usages attest to existing elite attitudes towards behaviors that later become praised or 
blamed as πολυπραγμοσύνη and ἀπραγμοσύνη. Herodotus’s equation of the term to 
πολυπρηγμονέειν with committing an act of ὕβρις implies that by the fifth century, one 
does not go too far in categorizing such acts of social disruption as related to busybodiness, 
or political meddling, in a negative sense. Thus, two emergent axes can be seen: 
πολυπραγμοσύνη—πολλὰ πράττειν—ὕβρις and ἀπραγμοσύνη—τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν—ἡσυχία. 
Given the relative paucity of our sources in the classical period, these axes of values, and 
                                                            
63 Ehrenberg (1947): 46.  
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the broader ideas that they portray, are necessary for understanding the full implications 
























Being a  Busybody in Fifth-Century Athens 
  
 By the time that the term πολυπράγμων and its derivatives first appear in extant 
literature, the world of democratic Athens is far different from that of the Homeric basileus 
or the aristocratically ordered cities of the late Archaic period.64 Athenian elites continued 
to leverage their family ties, wealth, and status to be the chief policymakers and leaders of 
the polis, but they were operating in an increasingly democratic context.65 Reforms, spurred 
on both by exogenous events such as the increase of the power of the landless thetes after 
the naval victory at Salamis, as well as by competition amongst elites themselves slowly 
created a situation in which, by the 430s, major policy decisions were now made by mass 
bodies of the citizenry.66 
Conversations amongst elites in Athens about types of citizenship, appropriate 
political behavior, and the correct deference—or lack thereof—to political leaders were 
occurring in a context where non-elites now had the ability to participate in the political 
processes of the polis as individuals. Unlike in archaic cities, where the power of the lower 
classes could only be expressed through mass action, in democratic Athens, the regular 
citizen, whether an urban worker in the city, or a peasant farmer in living in the 
countryside of Attica, had certain political rights (and obligations) that enabled him to 
participate directly in decision-making processes. Such opportunities included the Council 
of 500, which was chosen by lot, and required approximately three-fourths of the council 
                                                            
64 Asheri et al. (2007): 3. 
65 Ober (1989): 85.  
66 Ober (1989): 83-85.  
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members to be new each year, meaning that a high percentage of the Athenian population 
had to serve on the council for the system to work.67 Additionally, under the Athenian 
democracy of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., any citizen, regardless of wealth or social 
status, had the right to bring a case to the popular courts to prosecute a wrongdoer on 
public charges.68 This was not only considered a crucial right of the democracy, but also 
was seen as providing another check on elite citizens by less powerful ones. Importantly, it 
was viewed as a particularly democratic right. It was also necessary for the structure of the 
polis to function since Athens had no public prosecutor. Law-breakers had to be voluntarily 
prosecuted by their fellow citizens.69 
Given that the Athenian demos legitimately wielded power that could restrict the 
powers of elite citizens, it seems that elite conversations and the promotion of certain 
norms of political participation had to be more nuanced. If critiques were to be made 
publicly to mass audiences, they often had to be framed as constructive criticisms—not 
negating the premises of the democracy—or as promoting a different type of democratic 
citizenship altogether.70 
                                                            
67 Hansen (1985): 57. Hansen is primarily concerned with the fourth century, where epigraphic 
lists of council-members are more readily available. Hansen argues that that century, the total 
population of Attica was around 30,000 people. Therefore the rotation of the council members 
and bans on serving more than twice would have meant more than 50% of the population 
would have taken part in the council—the agenda-setting body of the democracy—during their 
own lifetime. In the fifth century, where the population was larger and our data is scarcer, 
presumably that percentage would most likely have been lower, but still significant.  
68 Osborne (1990): 83.  
69 Hansen (1999): 193.  
70 Ober (1998): 126 argues that the comic poet was essentially an “internal critic of the 
democratic regime.”  
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It is perhaps in such a context that a term like πολυπράγμων comes into use as a 
proscriptive term. While its genesis might have been connected to the term ὕβρις, it carries 
fewer semi-religious and violent overtones. It is a more moderate word employed to 
critique what was rapidly becoming the dominant political ideology.71 Within the 
democracy, telling someone to mind their own business, or implying that it is not proper 
for them to act in a given political realm, was a way of delineating specific social lines that 
ought not be crossed, even when the institutional basis for those lines no longer existed.  
I would assert, then, that one may construct a basic set of categories as to how the 
terms πολυπράγμων and ἀπράγμων (and the synonymous concepts that they represent) 
are used to promote or proscribe certain behavior in fifth-century Athens. The first 
category is the criticism of the πολυπράγμων, the second is the praise of the ἀπράγμων, 
and the third is the criticism of the ἀπράγμων. The obviously missing final category in this 
scheme, the praise of the politically busy and nosy citizen, will be pursued and investigated 
further at length in subsequent chapters of this work.  
It is true that not all social behavior which was described as meddlesome in 
classical Athens in the fifth century sources was necessarily and explicitly political. In 
Aristophanes’ Peace, the protagonist Trygaeus drives off a poor soothsayer who attempts to 
join his feast uninvited by saying that, “you’re certainly nosy, whoever you are.” (πολλὰ 
πράττεις, ὅστις εἶ, Ar. Pax, 1058). Another example relating to both the household and 
private relationships is the example of the Chorus of Women of Troezen in Euripides’ 
                                                            
71 Ober (1998): 40 argues that by the late fifth-century, “‘The many’ gained control of the public 
language employed in political deliberations, and so the primary context for felicitous speech 
performance in Athens was defined by popular, not elite, ideology.”  
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Hippolytus, who declare—upon being asked whether they should enter the Queen’s home 
and remove her from her suicide noose—“to meddle is not the safe course in life” (τὸ πολλὰ 
πράσσειν οὐκ ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ βίου, Eur. Hip. 785). Yet in that case, as in another example in 
Aristophanes’ Frogs, meddling is associated with disobeying one’s master.72 The question of 
meddling and authority also can be found in Herodotus’s story of Aristagoras and 
Megabates.73 A fragment of Pherecrates, writing slightly earlier than Aristophanes, from 
440-410 B.C.,74 although delightfully vague on the exact situation, involves a character 
telling those who think themselves clever that they shouldn’t act the busybody 
(δοκησιδεξίων ... μὴ πολυπραγμόνει, Pherec. fr. 163). Interestingly enough, the adjectives 
and synonyms of clever sometimes have negative implications in the context of Athenian 
politics, often being associated with rhetoric or unfair linguistic or intellectual cunning.75 
This fragment seems to imply a relationship with those intellectual qualities of curiousness 
and being a meddler that will become more evident in later Athenian literature.  
The association of cleverness with meddling in contrast to simple or 
unsophisticated speech continues in a comic fragment from Eupolis, a contemporary of 
Aristophanes, which states that a character “is not really a πολυπράγμων, but rather 
simple.” (οὐ γὰρ πολυπράγμων ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἁπλήγιος, Eup. Fr. 238).76 In this case, the 
                                                            
72 Ar. Ran. 748-9. Ξανθιας: τί δὲ πολλὰ πράττων; / Οἰκέτης: ὡς μὰ Δί᾿ οὐδὲν οἶδ᾿ ἐγώ, “Xanthias: 
and what about meddling? / Slave: By Zeus, I don’t know anything else.” 
73 Cf. in Hdt. 5.33.1-4, Aristagoras and Megabates argue over who has authority in their given 
situation. Aristagoras, claiming that Megabates was sent by the Persian King to obey his orders, 
asks him “τί πολλὰ πρήσσεις”; “why do you meddle?”  
74 Storey (2011): 410.  
75 In Pl. Ap. 17b Socrates defends himself against charges that he is δεινός, clever or skillful in 
speaking, to name one case. 
76 Storey (2011): 225-26. 
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πολυπράγμων is contrasted to the ἁπλήγιος, which also means “clad in a single garment,” 
perhaps signifying social status or financial means. It is also a synonym for the 
metaphorical ἁπλόος, which can mean simple, plain, or simple minded. That sophistication 
and intelligence of a negative quality is associated with the individual πολυπράγμων is a 
theme directly mirrored in Aristophanes’ works, which are some of the best fifth-century 
examples for criticisms of the πολυπράγμων.  
The πολυπράγμων, especially as found in Aristophanes, is a product of the urban 
polis—he spends his time close to the agora, the assembly, and the law courts (the central 
political centers of urban Athens). In Aristophanes, characters labeled as πολυπράγμων or 
exhibiting πολυπραγμοσύνη are most often associated with the stock character of the 
sycophant. In Athenian comedy and court oratory, the sycophant was seen as someone 
who abused the rights given to citizens under the Athenian legal system, and imposed 
onerous litigation on their fellow citizens.77 If πολυπράγμων can be considered a mildly 
negative term, being labeled a sycophant in discourse was entirely negative.78 In Athenian 
literature abuse of the right to prosecute includes the motivation of making money off of 
lawsuits, either through outright extortion (for real charges)79 or through bringing false 
charges.80 The sycophant is in particular a product of the city because he (in many 
depictions) attempts to live off of the earnings of his extortions and his lawsuits,81 
                                                            
77 Harvey (1990): 103.  
78 Harvey (1990): 108-109 has a quite impressive listing of many of the negative terms to 
describe the sycophant and the locations that they appear in Greek literature.  
79 Harvey (1990): 110. 
80 Harvey (1990): 112.  
81 Osborne (1990): 86. “…It seems to have become standard to allege sycophancy in any case 
where a poor man was involved as plaintiff.”   
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something only possible if one’s residence is near the agora and the courts. In 
Aristophanes’ Acharnians, when the protagonist Dikaeopolis sets up his own reformed agora 
in the countryside, he specifically bans sycophants from its premises.82 The sycophant in 
Aristophanes is important as a critique of πολυπραγμοσύνη because it is most often an 
example of a contested discourse about civic duty and participation.  
In Aristophanes, while most of the sycophants (all of whom are introduced as 
sycophants, thus leaving the audience little room for doubt) are given short shrift and 
either thrashed or comically run off stage, they do however offer a vision of their role as 
democratic citizens in which being πολυπράγμων is a positive characteristic.83 In 
Aristophanes, the sycophantic characters make the claim that being meddlesome is 
actually part and parcel of being a good citizen. The sycophant in Aristophanes’ Wealth 
(facing off against the “just man” Dikaos) says that he is in fact a “useful and good citizen, 
as well as a patriotic one.”84 The fact that the sycophant claims he is χρηστός was most 
notably used for comic effect, as χρηστός was a term most often applied by the aristocratic 
Athenian elite to themselves.85 Later, as the sycophant is being thrashed off stage, he is 
called the opposite of χρηστός, “a vile champion” (πονηρόν γ᾿ ἆρα προστάτην). πονηρός was 
a term often used in opposition to χρηστός, and was often applied to political leaders in the 
                                                            
82 Ar. Ach. 725-727. 
83 Adkins (1976): 309: “This is of course, character assassination rather than portrayal, as befits a 
comedy. To introduce anyone as ‘sycophant’ already prejudges the question of the 
respectability of his activities…”   
84 Ar. Plut. 901-902. 
85 Ober (1989): 251: “The Athenian aristocrat was differentiated from, and might be perceived to 
be better than, the non-aristocrat because he was thought to have inherited from his ancestors 
certain desirable traits—especially the trait of being noble and good (agathos) and physically 
beautiful (kalos)—and because he acted differently from other men.” Ober notes that chrestoi is 
one of the many words used to describe this group.  
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late fifth century like Hyperbolus (by their elite rivals), who might have in reality been 
wealthy, but also lacked elite attributes, and were comically presented by critics as base, 
poor, and slavish. Their political style is particularly seen as serving as unelected speakers, 
allotted councilmembers, and volunteer prosecutors.86 Therefore, a connection is not only 
made with a class distinction, but a type of politics that was very different from the elite 
modes of gaining political power.  
Crucial to the conception of this sycophant’s political role is being a busybody. The 
rest of the sequence is worth quoting:  
ΔΙ: πῶς οὖν διέζης ἢ πόθεν μηδὲν ποιῶν;        
ΣΥ: τῶν τῆς πόλεώς εἰμ᾿ ἐπιμελητὴς πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἰδίων πάντων. 
ΔΙ: σύ; τί μαθών; 
ΣΥ: βούλομαι. 
ΔΙ: πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴης χρηστός, ὦ τοιχωρύχε, εἴ σοι προσῆκον μηδὲν εἶτ᾿ ἀπεχθάνει; 910  
ΣΥ: οὐ γὰρ προσήκει τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ μοι πόλιν  
εὐεργετεῖν, ὦ κέπφε, καθ᾿ ὅσον ἂν σθένω; 
ΔΙ: εὐεργετεῖν οὖν ἐστι τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν;  
ΣΥ: τὸ μὲν οὖν βοηθεῖν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις  
καὶ μὴ ᾿πιτρέπειν ἐάν τις ἐξαμαρτάνῃ.        915 
ΔΙ: οὔκουν δικαστὰς ἐξεπίτηδες ἡ πόλις ἄρχειν καθίστησιν; 
ΣΥ: κατηγορεῖ δὲ τίς; 
ΔΙ: ὁ βουλόμενος. 
ΣΥ: οὔκουν ἐκεῖνός εἰμ᾿ ἐγώ; ὥστ᾿ εἰς ἔμ᾿ ἥκει τῆς πόλεως τὰ πράγματα.     
ΔΙ: νὴ Δία, πονηρόν γ᾿ ἆρα προστάτην ἔχει.       920  
ἐκεῖνο δ᾿ οὐ βούλοι᾿ ἄν, ἡσυχίαν ἔχων ζῆν ἀργός;        
ΣΥ: ἀλλὰ προβατίου βίον λέγεις,  
εἰ μὴ φανεῖται διατριβή τις τῷ βίῳ. 
         (Ar. Plut. 906-925) 
                                                            
86 Rosenbloom (2004): 61. “Leaders marked poneros perform speaking roles that require 
knowledge of political and legal procedure, but they lack traditional elite attributes; they serve 
as un-elected rhetores and allotted bouleutai. They intensify political competition by 
representing the demos when they prosecute graphai and charges arising from euthynai, styling 
themselves ‘friends of the people’ (φιλόδημοι) and defenders of democracy.” 
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The sycophant notes that his employment (referencing the monetary motivation 
behind sycophancy) is to be the “manager of all private and public affairs” (907), and when 
asked as to how he has that right, he claims, “βούλομαι” (909), referencing, of course, the 
nomenclature for the right to bring cases to juries, as well as for initiating other citizen 
action, that of “ho boulomenos.” He calls his actions of bringing cases to uphold the established 
laws (βοηθεῖν τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις) to be a benefaction to the city (εὐεργετεῖν). 
Interesting enough, the sycophant’s enemy, the “just man,” does not argue with the 
sycophant’s legal right to engage in political action as a boulomenos (919) in theory.87 He 
instead decries the nature in which it is done, calling such actions as “πολυπραγμονεῖν” 
(913), or “to meddle.” The sycophant is told by Dikaos that the matters of the city “τῶν τῆς 
πόλεώς” and private life “τῶν ἰδίων πάντων” are not his business or concern “εἴ σοι 
προσῆκον μηδὲν” (910), meaning they are not fitting for him to do, because of his vile 
character, rather than being specifically illegal. In fact, he is well within his citizen rights.88 
The conversation goes on to use more language that fits on the πολυπράγμων-ἀπράγμων 
axis. When Dikaos asks, why can’t you keep quiet and live an idle life (ἡσυχίαν ἔχων ζῆν 
ἀργός)—here again ἡσυχία is opposed to activity, in this case explicitly political—he responds 
that such a life would be living like a sheep (προβατίου βίον, 921-922). Before being 
humiliated and pushed off stage, the sycophant makes one more claim that appears 
preposterous in this context, but it also gives a sense of why the πολυπράγμων might justify 
                                                            
87 Sommerstein (2001): 194 notes that “the Informer is allowed to present an argument which 
has considerable prima facie plausibility and which his antagonists do not refute but merely 
ignore, as if instinct rather than reason assured them it must be wrong.”  
88 Sommerstein (2001): 194: “It was a completely sound argument (since no one envisaged the 
alternative of creating a state prosecution service).” 
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bringing his cases forward, saying that the god Wealth is “guilty of attempting to subvert 
the democracy, acting on his own authority” (945).  
 The πολυπράγμων presented as justifying his meddling actions by appealing to 
patriotism and duty is featured elsewhere in Aristophanes. In the Acharnians, a sycophant 
has somehow arrived at Dikaeopolis’ newly instituted agora, and attempts to denounce as 
contraband a Megaran and his goods. Dikaeopolis drives him out, but not before the 
sycophant cries, “may I not denounce our enemies?” (οὐ γὰρ φανῶ τοὺς πολεμίους; Ar. Ach. 
827). The sycophant makes a patriotic appeal, but Dikaeopolis dismisses him, saying that he 
will bear the consequences of such meddling rather than the Megaran (πολυπραγμοσύνη 
νῦν ἐς κεφαλὴν τράποιτ᾽ ἐμοί, Ar. Ach. 836). Leigh sums up the situation insightfully when 
stating, “the active citizen constantly runs the risk of being dismissed not as a patriot but 
as a busybody.”89 
 Such a perception seems equally present in the Old Oligarch’s mention of 
πολυπραγμοσύνη in politics. This anonymous elite writer who authored a pamphlet, 
possibly between the 430s and 410s, deeply critical of Athenian democracy, complains that 
it is always the wealthy and well born (πλούσιος ἢ γενναῖος) that are demonized in 
comedy.90 He argues that rarely are “the poor or members of the masses” (τῶν πενήτων καὶ 
τῶν δημοτικῶν) comedized91 except for when they have been “meddling in others’ affairs, 
or trying to rise above their position,” so people feel no problem with them being abused by 
                                                            
89 Leigh (2013): 24.  
90 Osborne (2004): 9. 
91 Adkins (1976): 307 uses this as a translation of κωμῳδέω, satirize, or make fun of someone.  
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the poets (μὴ διὰ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ διὰ τὸ ζητεῖν πλέον τι ἔχειν τοῦ δήμου).92 The Old 
Oligarch seems to assume that the leaders of the demos satirized in comedy try to seek to 
have more than the demos (ζητεῖν πλέον τι ἔχειν).93 Such language implies that there is a 
specific sphere that both the demos and the men who get above it should be participating in. 
In the Old Oligarch’s telling, to emerge from that mass by exercising certain citizen rights, 
even if one claims to be arguing for the good of that larger body, is to expose oneself to 
claims that one is being meddlesome, or even worse, trying to infringe on the populace of 
mass citizens that they claim to speak to. 
The situation that the Old Oligarch sets up seems to be directly related to, and 
possibly even to explain the dynamics of the Thersites sequence that appeared in Homer. 
Aristophanes’ plays, like the Homeric text, both vilify the meddling character, the disruptive 
influence and individual who steps out of the anonymous mass, but also still allow his voice 
to be heard. Thalmann sees the Iliad and Odyssey as ideological tools of an aristocratic elite, 
composed during the development of the polis, and serving to legitimize their hold on power 
(having replaced the basileis, yet still dominating the lower classes) by presenting an idealized 
vision of the heroic hierarchy.94 These poems did so, however, even while being performed to 
                                                            
92 Ps.-Xen. Ath.Pol. 2.18. 
93 Adkins (1976): 310: “Dicaeus and Aristophanes, and the Old Oligarch, contrive to give the 
impression that such polupragmones and “sycophants” were drawn exclusively from the poorer 
citizens of Athens, and that other members of the demos disapproved so much of their activities 
that they would have tolerated their being “comedized” by the comic poets.”  
94 Thalmann (1998): 275; Powell (2007): 59 says “Most scholars now agree that Homer’s world, 
while embodying artifacts from earlier times, from the Bronze Age and the Iron Age, is mostly 
the world of his own day, the early Archaic Period of the eight century B.C.” 
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audiences that were socioeconomically and ideologically diverse. 95 Perhaps there were those 
who might sympathize with the claims Thersites makes, were he not presented as such a 
vilified character. In fact, by giving Thersites his chance to speak while making him as 
comedically grotesque to the audience as possible, Thersites is distanced from the soldiers on 
whose behalf he is arguing. The theatre audience in Athens was similarly socioeconomically 
diverse, and although mass theater is a democratic institution, plays were also produced by 
and written by elite writers.96 Therefore, the same ideological contestation might be at play.97 
Much like Thersites is “comedized,” and the class critic of the Homeric power structure is 
made into a comic scapegoat, and his criticisms negated by being distanced from the body 
that he claims to represent, so is the figure of the πολυπράγμων and sycophant in 
Aristophanic comedy. Presenting those who exercise certain democratic rights and claim 
to be working in the interests of the democracy as both separate from and even 
detrimental to the rest of the democratic community is a form of scapegoating in its own 
way. Matthew Christ argues that in Aristophanes’ sequences, the “process of intrusion and 
expulsion diminishes the status of the sycophant as outsider that must be shunned.”98 By 
                                                            
95 Thalmann (1988): 27-28: “early Greek epic was publicly performed and thus occupied a 
central position in its society”; Scodel (2009): 176 agrees, saying “The evidence tells strongly 
against such a restriction of the audience, although the presence of bards at elite feasts 
certainly implies that some people had more opportunity than others to enjoy epic 
performances.” 
96 Roselli (2011): 9.  
97 Ober (1989): 152 argues that Athenian theater reflected ideological contestation in other 
respects, saying, “Athenian theatrical performance was closely bound up in the attempt to 
resolve the contradictory social values of intense competition and political unity.”  
98 Christ (1998): 53. Christ also argues on 48, “Sycophancy constituted a negative social category, 
founded upon the notion that the Athenian society consisted of insiders and outsiders and that 
it was critical for Athenians to distinguish sharply between these.” 
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associating the actions of a meddler or a sycophant as being like those of an outsider, in a 
way, elites are able to distance what is a democratic institutional function of society that is 
particularly dangerous to them—the man who dares to stand up and speak truth to power—
and discourage it by presenting it as being harmful to the democratic community as a 
whole.99  
 Another way such language dissuading political meddlesomeness functions is to 
praise the individual who is ἀπράγμων, or ἥσυχος, or minds their own things, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ 
πραττείν. There are crucial passages in Euripides, Thucydides, and again Aristophanes 
that—in contrast to the (largely satirized) claims of the πολυπράγμονες—present 
ἀπραγμοσύνη instead as the political value that is to be promoted and esteemed amongst 
the citizenry. In particular, praise of the peasant farmer as the ideal type of democratic 
citizen mirrors the attitude towards urban politics and regular political participation which 
accords with the critiques of the πολυπράγμων lain out above.100  
 Thucydides states that at the start of the Peloponnesian War, the majority of the 
citizens in Athens and Attica were still living in the countryside, and were forced to enter 
the walls of the city when the Peloponnesians invaded Attica.101 The majority of these 
would have been autorgoi, a term meaning “those who work their own land.”102 These 
                                                            
99 Osborne (1990): 94-95 argues that despite the rhetoric that surrounded the sycophant, the 
volunteer prosecutor who acted in a vexatious way was crucial for the functioning of the 
democracy. I am not yet engaging that claim here, but I will seek to do so later on in this work.  
100 A second theme, which I will not touch on here, but return to when discussing 
πολυπραγμοσύνη in Plato’s writing, is the development of the figure of the contemplative or 
philosophic ἀπράγμων, and the critiques and praises of their behavior in Plato, Euripides, and 
the court orators.  
101 Thuc. 2.16.1. 
102 Carter (1986): 77. 
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autorgoi would have had little leisure and little capital, and therefore, little time or 
economic incentive to come into the city regularly.103 These autorgoi were often presented, 
in idealized and dramatic form, in the theatrical plays of Athens’ festivals. Aristophanes’ 
pro-peace plays featured protagonists that are (or were originally) rural residents, and 
mostly autorgoi.104 Many of them, as has been mentioned above, are the enemies of the 
sycophants and meddlers when in the city, or when such urban characters intrude into the 
countryside. In Aristophanes’ Peace, Tyrgaeus announces himself as a rural demesman, a 
vinedresser, and neither a sycophant nor a lover of (urban) affairs (ἐραστὴς πραγμάτων, Ar. 
Pax 190). In the Knights, the Sausage-Seller identifies the greatest desires of the character 
Demos to be to return to his lands in the country, to enjoy his country ways (Ar. Eq. 805). 
The country is associated with quietude and peace, while the city life is associated with the 
law courts, with business, and with politics. It is for that reason that two autorgoi 
protagonists of the Birds leave Athens; they declare themselves to be looking for “a quiet 
and peaceful place” (τόπον ἀπράγμονα, Ar. Av. 44). 
 In terms of thinking proscriptively about political values, the rural protagonists of 
Aristophanes make for an important contrast to the urban sycophants, πολυπράγμονες, 
who also have the associations of poverty, and low-class status, at least in comparison to 
the χρηστοί who served as political leaders. The fact that these individuals are largely 
unable to participate regularly in politics is actually praised by writers like Euripides, who 
praises both the character and the retiring nature of the autorgoi. Like Aristophanes, his 
                                                            
103 Carter (1986): 81. In some cases the distance from one’s deme to the city center would have 
been a day’s walk.  
104 Dikaeopolis in Acharnians, Strepsiades in Clouds, Peisthetairos and Euelpides in Birds are 
autorgoi, to name a few.  
 41 
depictions are idealized and are probably not meant to be explicitly political, yet they still 
offer a different sense of proscriptive values of political behavior.105 Euripides introduces 
the eponymously named Autourgos as a character in the Electra, where he is introduced as 
the husband of Electra, who has been forced to marry a peasant farmer by her mother and 
mother’s lover, Aegisthus. However, this farmer has respected his wife and preserved her 
virginity, ashamed to violate her (ὑβρίζειν) since he is “not worthy of the daughter of a 
wealthy man” (οὐ κατάξιος γεγώς ὀλβίων ἀνδρῶν τέκνα, Eur. El. 45). Carter argues that the 
figure of the autorgos in the Electra displays a “sturdy independence, yet knows his place; he 
is in a word, respectable, and it is this which endears him to the oligarchic and fourth-
century theorists.”106 Carter also notes that the terms of nobility and restraint used to 
describe the peasant farmer, such as gennaios, aristos, eugenes, smack of the self-praises of 
the aristocracy. 107 
 In the Suppliant Women, Euripides’ Athenian king Theseus specifically singles out the 
class in between the poor and the rich as being the “class which saves the city by 
protecting the order that the city ordains” (μέσῳ σῴζει πόλεις κόσμον φυλάσσουσ᾽ ὅντιν᾽ 
ἂν τάξῃ πόλιs, Eur. Supp.  245-6). When a hostile Theban herald enters the city, he 
denigrates the Athenian regime for being one in which the demos rules, and identifies that 
demos which Theseus talks about as the body of poor farmers, saying that they are 
incapable of participating in politics, because they don’t have the time to turn from their 
                                                            
105 Dover (1974): 17 argues that despite the fact that tragedy contains “fictitious people in 
fictitious situations,” one should still consider that “the moral sentiments which they utter 
deserve to be taken seriously as the sentiments which some Athenians could accept in some 
circumstances.”  
106 Carter (1986): 91.  
107 On this see also Rosenbloom (2004): 56. 
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work to deal with common things, the politics of the city (Eur. Supp. 421-22). Yet, in the end 
it is this very quality that Euripides seems to praise about the politics of the autorgoi. In the 
Orestes, Euripides praises the farmer who speaks up in the assembly. This farmer is “not 
often seen in the marketplace and in the town,” but he is, much like in the Suppliants, the 
savior of the city, an individual who is beyond reproach (Eur. Or. 929-933). In other 
fragments, such as the ἄγων λόγος in Euripides’ Antiope, this concept is echoed yet again, 
where the quiet man is praised as both safest and best citizen for the city (ἥσυχος φίλοισί τ᾿ 
ἀσφαλὴς φίλος πόλει τ᾿ ἄριστος, Eur. Fr. 194). Carter’s summation of Euripides’ idealized 
peasant citizen—poor, living far from the city, rarely at the town and at the assembly, 
contrasted with the demagogue, and praised in similar terms to the χρηστοί—leads to an 
interesting result: “It would seem that Euripides’ hero is a good citizen not because he is 
always busy and zealous in his city’s affairs” (much as I would suggest, the πολυπράγμων is) 
but for the opposite reason, “because he is in fact unable to come to the assembly very 
often.”108 In this case, the ideal citizen is one who does not exercise his democratic rights, 
or only does so in a very limited and moderate way.109 In this way, the praise of the 
ἀπράγμων peasant in this context encourages political deference and a limited engagement 
with civic institutions of the city.  
 The closest that we come to seeing a depiction of outright praise of a 
“polypragmatic” type of democratic citizenship in the literature of the fifth century is 
Thucydides’ Pericles’ strong critique of the ἀπράγμων in the Funeral Oration in Book II, 
                                                            
108 Carter (1986): 92.  
109 Euripides perhaps gives an inclination of what negative political participation is in Fragment 
200, from the Antiope, when Antiphon praises the wisdom of one wise counsel over the crassness 
of the mob (σὺν ὄχλῳ δ᾿ ἀμαθία πλεῖστον κακόν, Eur. Frg. 200). 
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which rounds out the third category of my typology. In the speech (as any of the speeches, 
which, as one should remember, are not necessarily historical documents, but what 
Thucydides felt what ought be demanded in a given situation),110 the man he saw as the 
democratic leader par excellence both honors the war dead as well as praises the democratic 
constitution.111 One might read the speech, therefore, not necessarily as praising what 
Thucydides saw as praiseworthy, but what a democrat speaking to democrats might wish to 
praise. Midway through the speech Pericles states his goal to highlight the unique nature of 
the Athenian constitution in comparison to its neighbors (Thuc. 2.37.1). He touches on 
participation in politics, arguing that in Athens individuals are not barred from the ability 
to gain honors because they belong to a given class, and poverty is not to prevent someone 
from public service if they wish to do the state a service (ἔχων δέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν 
πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ κεκώλυται, Thuc. 2.37.1). Participation and contribution, in the 
words of a paradigmatic democrat, are open to all. Pericles goes farther when he claims 
that in Athens, in comparison to other poleis, Athens regards those who not are taking part 
in (μετέχοντα) the affairs of the city or public duties (τὰ πολιτικά) are not only considered 
                                                            
110 Thuc. 1.22, “Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, 
the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most 
befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the 
general sense of what was actually said” (trans Smith); Hornblower (1991): 60 sees Thucydides’ 
claim to have written what was objectively appropriate (in his own mind) for the situation to be 
inconsistent with his subsequent claim to “οὐδ’ ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει”, “reconstruct events according 
to ideas of my own.” Thuc. 2.65 “In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands 
government by the first citizen”, “ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου 
ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή.”  
111 On Pericles’ stated praise of Athens’ democratic constitution see Thuc. 2.36: “But what was 
the road by which we reached our position, by what was the road under which our greatness 
grew?” 
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“ἀπράγμονα” but also useless (ἀχρεῖον, Thuc. 2.40.1). Thucydides’ Pericles, having not only 
cast a broad net for whom can be useful to the state—anyone respective of class or wealth—
then proceeds to argue that it is indeed their role to be un-ἀπράγμων. πολυπραγμοσύνη is 
not mentioned, but it is clear that Pericles is not equating these political roles with 
intervention in others’ personal lives in that negative sense. He had earlier claimed that 
Athenians do not exercise a “jealous surveillance over each other” in their personal lives 
(Thuc. 2.37.2).  
It would seem that the characteristics that Pericles praises about Athens are 
somewhat akin—if not presented as such a negative light—to the characteristics of the 
πολυπράγμων. Regular political participation and engagement is praised, as also is the 
spectacle of “daring and deliberation,” as well as a willingness to brave toils (τῶν 
κινδύνων) on behalf of their country (Thuc. 2.40.3). The speech of the Corinthians (Thuc. 
1.70) contextualizes these same characteristics in a more critical light, one that sounds 
suspiciously like πολυπραγμοσύνη. The Corinthians detail the national character of Athens 
to the Spartans. The Athenians are innovative and revolutionary (νεωτεροποιός) and are 
quick to plan and act on such plans (1.70.2). They are bold and adventurous, and run risks 
and dangers optimistically (κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες, Thuc. 1.70.3). The 
Athenians are constantly active, toiling, and troubling, both in their domestic lives and 
their foreign policy, for themselves and for their country, and for them, having no leisure 
(ἀσχολίαν) is less of a misfortune than the peace of a quiet life (ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα). Such 
a characterization of the domestic character of the Athenians is not limited to mouths of 
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the hostile critics of Athens in Thucydides.112 This characterization of the Athenian polis on 
the whole as being busy, optimistic, and active finds common currency in popular 
discourse as well. Similar language is found again in Aristophanes, this time in Birds.113  
This play opens with the two main characters leaving Athens in order to find a 
peaceful place (τόπον ἀπράγμονα, Ar. Av. 45), something therefore that Athens is not. The 
business that they seek to leave is similar to Aristophanes’ previous depictions of 
πολυπραγμοσύνη with much blame going on the law courts; they are a pair of anti-jurors, 
coming from a land that has few juro-phobes (105-110).114 Later on, when describing the 
city in the clouds founded by the birds at the instigation of Peisetairos, one of the 
protagonists, one of the things the city is specifically cited for is embodying is “gentle 
peace” (ἀγανόφρονος Ἡσυχίας). Dunbar’s commentary on this passage specifically 
highlights the Pindaric tinge of such a passage, noting that here, as in Pindar, the concept 
of Athens as a busy, unquiet, rambunctious polis is used in Aristophanes and Thucydides to 
contrast with the “ideals of Dorian cities.”115 While the protagonists at the start seem to be 
seeking an idealized type of city such as the Dorian type, other characteristics emerge in 
                                                            
112 Hornblower (1991): 114 argues that the Corinthian speech, compared to many of the 
speeches, may actually represent what Thucydides believed was the main difference between 
the Athenian and Spartan characters—ambitious versus cautious—as it essentially expands 
upon the statements that he makes at 8.96 in his own voice blaming Spartan cautiousness for 
their inability to end the war after attacking Euboea during the oligarchy of the Four-Hundred.  
113 Hornblower (1991): 115 mentions that Birds was first produced in 414, midway through the 
war. It might be hard to draw a line of direct influence between Aristophanes’ work and 
Thucydides’ History, but such a correlation does provide evidence of an existing contemporary 
discourse around depictions of the character of Athens and the Athenians as a whole.  
114 Dunbar (1995): 169: ἀπηλιαστής: One who is ἀπ-Ἡλιαία, or one who keeps away from the 
main law-court of Athens.   
115 Dunbar (1995): 649.  
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their characters that are more reminiscent of the democratic polis that they are leaving 
behind.  
The two heroes are named Peisetairos and Eulepides, names that are both words for 
“comrade-persuader” (πείθω-ἑταῖρος) and “hopeful or optimistic” (literally, good hope, εὖ- 
ἐλπίς). Euelpides puts in mind the optimism ascribed to the Athenians by the Corinthians 
(Thuc. 1.70.3) while on the other hand, Peisetairos’s ability to be a comrade-persuader, as 
Leigh puts it, is better suited to the active citizen in the courtroom or the assembly than to 
the ἀπράγμων.116 Finally, upon meeting the chorus of birds, Peisetairos tells them that they 
are unlearned (ἀμαθής) and un-curious (κοὐ πολυπράγμων, Ar. Or. 469), at least compared 
to their Athenian guests, who subsequently persuade the birds into engaging in the utopian 
mission of building a city in the clouds. Used positively here on Peisetairos’ behalf, the 
concept of the πολυπράγμων as intelligent does have further implications for democratic 
citizenship—in modern democracies, being informed is oft described as crucial to 
participation. In the ancient discourse, Aristophanes’ heroes had bashed the well-informed 
πολυπράγμονες as being informers.117 One of the characteristics hinted at here is of the 
πολυπράγμων as an individual interested in gathering and using information. Despite 
attempting to leave the polypragmatic city of Athens, the protagonists still demonstrate 
attitudes towards πολυπραγμοσύνη that are particularly Athenian. Harding puts it well in 
claiming that Peisetairos and Euelpides will never find their τόπον ἀπράγμονα, “for no 
                                                            
116 Leigh (2013): 46.  
117 The fragments of Pherecrates (193 Loeb) and Eupolis (238 Loeb) had both also connected 
being a πολυπράγμων to intelligence and cleverness; Dunbar (1995): 325 notes that “the term is 
now being used in a clearly favorable sense, appropriate to Peis., who is now actively 
interfering in the life of the birds. A restless, interfering man would be likely to keep himself 
well informed on everything including Aesop’s stories.” 
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sooner will they find it than their true nature will assert itself and they will take over the 
universe.”118 Leigh too sees the Birds as essentially being “a play about polypragmosyne and 
the Athenian spirit,” and it is well worth noting that the depictions of the Athenians in 
Thucydides, as individuals and as a polis as a whole, draw on larger (and dubiously negative) 
conceptions of πολυπραγμοσύνη.  
While Thucydides’ Pericles is outwardly praising of this kind of national character—
something Aristophanes’ plays and Pericles’ rhetoric seem to attach specifically to Athens’ 
democratic institutions—it is not clear that Thucydides the writer saw those characteristics 
as positive. In fact, as Ehrenberg states in his study of the term πολυπραγμοσύνη as it 
becomes applied to Athenian foreign policy (and as was noted by the Corinthians), in 
Thucydides, “πολυπραγμοσύνη was the psychological basis for Athenian imperialism.”119 
The Athenian speakers in Sicily proudly describe their policy to the Camarinaeans, whom 
they are trying to win over to their side, as “our interfering character” (πολυπραγμοσύνης, 
Thuc. 6.87.3). Alcibiades, in pressing for the Sicilian Expedition, denounces Nicias’s 
opposition as ἀπραγμοσύνη, and argues that a city not inactive by nature (πόλιν μὴ 
ἀπράγμονα) could ruin itself by adopting a policy of ἀπραγμοσύνη (Thuc. 6.18.6). Diodotus, 
arguing against Cleon for punishing the Mytilenean revolt, argues that hope (ἐλπὶς) along 
with desire (ἔρως) is what does damage (βλάπτουσι) to ventures or plans. Such a 
description of Athenian foreign policy puts in mind the name of Aristophanes’ 
polypragmatic protagonist, Euelpides. Ehrenberg notes that one of the characteristics 
leading Athens into the Sicilian Expedition, one of Athens’ greatest disasters, was 
                                                            
118 Harding (1981): 41.  
119 Ehrenberg (1947): 47. 
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unreasonable optimism.120 Subsequent scholarship has largely made the connection of 
Thucydides’ depiction of the domestic democratic πολυπραγμοσύνη as leading to an 
interventionist, meddling, and imperialist foreign policy.121  
Therefore, the question to be asked is, in comparison to the speech he puts in 
Pericles’ mouth, does Thucydides approve of πολυπραγμοσύνη, at home or abroad? His 
portrayal of the Athenians as being overambitious and optimistic in their views of the 
Sicilian Expedition seems to indicate that he believes such national characteristics 
permitted to their extreme to have led to disaster. Politically, the Old Oligarch described 
the abuse of the allies by the Athenian democracy as a result of the democratic rabble 
(δημοτικοῖς) having sway in politics (Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.15). Thucydides, less blunt than the 
Old Oligarch, seems to view Athenian imperialism as stemming more from a democratically 
related πολυπραγμοσύνη rather than simply bold money-grubbing against the allies. 
However, he offers his own political preferences when he praises the moderate Oligarchy 
of 5,000 that followed more severe one that orchestrated the coup of 411. Thucydides notes 
that such a time was when the Athenians seemed to be best administering the state (εὖ 
πολιτεύσαντες, Thuc. 8.97.2). It then could be argued that the glowing praise that 
Thucydides puts into Pericles’ mouth about the character of a democratic city, and 
especially its attitude towards action, business, optimism, and mass political participation 
                                                            
120 Ehrenberg (1947): 51, cf. Thucydides 6.24, who describes the “ἐπιθυμία,” desire of the 
majority, and the lack of doubt in the success of the expedition.  
121 Ehrenberg (1947): 53: “The ἀπράγμων is anti-democratic, the πολυπράγμων is a democrat. 
This division can be traced behind Thucydides’ application of the terms to foreign policy;” 
Harding (1981): 44 is perhaps the outlier in that he equates πολυπραγμοσύνη with all types of 
Athenian imperial policies, and moderately argues that support for such a policy was broad and 
widespread, not restricted to a radical democratic faction or opposed by a radical oligarchic 
one.  
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must be read through the perspective of a writer that seems at other times to be very wary 
of those characteristics. Thus, what appears to be an example of democratic language 
extolling a polypragmatic democracy becomes far more suspect given the rest of 
Thucydides’ narrative. 
In much of the literature of the fifth century in Athens, the terms πολυπράγμων 
and ἀπράγμων were part of a contested discourse about political engagement, citizenship 
duties, and even foreign policy and the character of a city. Previously, I had laid out four 
categories of use for these terms and the family of synonyms and antonyms that go with 
them, and examined some of the paradigmatic ways that these terms are treated in 
surviving literature. In the first category—that of criticism of the πολυπράγμων—business, 
nosiness, and bad character are used to tar those who are exercising certain democratic 
rights, especially those of ho boulomenos. However, what critics can decry as meddling, a 
positive user of such terms can claim that they are acting in the interest of the city, and 
name a necessity (the lack of a state prosecutor) and a patriotic compulsion. On the other 
hand, the praise of the idealized rural, rustic, and retired ἀπράγμων who appears in the 
plays of Euripides and Aristophanes as the ideal democratic citizen has an irony to it. The 
individual who is praised as being best for the state is the one who is least likely to 
participate often in its formal political institutions. Implicit criticism is found again in 
these sources of those who actively seek to spend their time engaging in civic business—
they are equated to demagogues or busybodies, and are detrimental for the state.  
On the one hand, Thucydides’ Pericles, in his castigation of the ἀπράγμων, might 
appear in his Funeral Oration to give the most coherent explanation of democratic rights 
and democratic participation, and their relation to the busy, active, and optimistic 
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democratic character. Yet, much of Thucydides’ narrative becomes a strong criticism of 
such πολυπραγμοσύνη as manifested in Athens’ relationship with other nations in the field 
of foreign affairs. It is the goal of this study in subsequent chapters to investigate this 
missing part of the quartet—the praise of the πολυπράγμων. I will seek to use the fourth 
century sources—which provide us a good deal more information about the ways that a 
regular Athenian interacted with his fellow citizens and political institutions on a day-to-
day basis—to tease out a conception of the busy, active, democratic citizen during what was 
a largely stable and well-documented time for democratic institutions.  
Unlike much of the literature of the fifth and fourth century, which is largely 
written for elite/elite audiences, such as the Old Oligarch, Thucydides, and the philosophic 
writers like Plato, the speeches of the Athenian orators before the popular assemblies and 
before the courts plausibly offer a view into how the Athenian demos, and not just elite 
commentators, considered itself and its democracy.122 I therefore will seek to use popular 
oratory to engage with broadly held and popular views of πολυπραγμοσύνη. After doing 
this, I will consider πολυπραγμοσύνη as it is presented in Plato. As one of the most 
sophisticated critics of Athenian democracy, Plato makes πολυπραγμοσύνη central to his 
conception of justice and the political critiques offered in the Republic. Writers like Plato, 
Aristophanes, the Old Oligarch, and others saw πολυπραγμοσύνη and meddlesome or 
bothersome ways of exercising democratic citizenship as being present enough in their 
own contemporary context to make it the point of sustained criticisms, many of which 
                                                            
122 Ober (1989): 43. “It would be reductionist to suppose that every comment in an oration 
derives immediately from popular ideology, but we may suppose that skilled and experienced 
speakers would avoid making comments that they thought were likely to contradict deeply 
held popular convictions.”  
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have been treated in this second chapter. This implies, then, that democratic citizenship 
was something that, at least by the late fifth century, did legitimately encourage a sense of 
activity and involvement (or over-involvement) for regular, non-elite citizens. The voices 
of the critics that we have access to—elite writers—mostly seem to characterize such 
behavior as meddlesome, analogous to pre-existing examples of social disruption and 
admonitions to “stay in one’s place.” However, it is largely the voices and experiences of 
such citizens that we lack in the historical record of the fifth century in classical Athens in 
which I am interested. While Aristophanes lays the dikasts of Athens out for brutal satire in 
his plays, the archaeological record on the other hand provides evidence that many 
Athenians took their jury-allotment tokens with them to their graves.123 It is the views and 
impact of the role of such citizens that I will continue exploring in subsequent chapters of 











                                                            
123 Hansen (1999): 7.  
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Chapter Three 
From Rhetoric  to the Republic :  Polypragmosune in the Orators and Plato 
 
In the previous chapters I sought to demonstrate that in much of Athenian 
literature of the fifth century B.C., the use of the term πολυπραγμοσύνη to describe and 
criticize the busy, active, prying, optimistic, and meddlesome Athenian citizens as 
individuals and a polis as a whole more often than not came laden with socio-political 
baggage. In the works of elite writers, criticism of πολυπραγμοσύνη and praise of 
ἀπραγμοσύνη involve criticism of their current democratic status quo, and (with praises of 
ἀπραγμοσύνη in particular) point Athens towards a more measured and less directly 
participatory gradient of democracy, particularly in regards to the legal system and the 
assembly.  
I had also set out a schematic for considering uses of πολυπραγμοσύνη and related 
terms in fifth-century literature: (1) criticism of πολυπραγμοσύνη or the πολυπράγμων, (2) 
praise of ἀπραγμοσύνη or the ἀπράγμων, (3) criticism of the ἀπράγμων, and (4) praise of 
the πολυπράγμων. I found the criticism of the first two categories coming from mixed 
sources such as the playwrights (reformist criticism internal to the democracy in the form 
of “warnings and admonitions,” also called “immanent critics,” by Ober)124, and rejectionist 
critics, such as the Old Oligarch, whose disapproval of Athens’ πολυπραγμοσύνη-laden 
character are indications of broader dissatisfaction with the political regime as a whole. In 
the fifth century, Thucydides’ work provides evidence of the third category, praising 
characteristics that are in other negatively associated with πολυπραγμοσύνη, and offering 
                                                            
124 For admonitory critics, see Ober (1998): 126. For immanent critics see Ober (1998): 48.  
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on the ἀπράγμων through the mouth of his paradigmatic democrat, Pericles, associating 
these characteristics and a defense of them, with the democratic conditions of the late fifth 
century. However, Thucydides’ own narrative seems to make it clear that Pericles’ praise is 
not his own. Much of his narrative plays out Athens’ πολυπραγμοσύνη as leading to 
disastrous consequences in political and military leadership—Thucydides himself endorses 
a more limited form of government near the end of his work, the Five Thousand, based on 
restricted wealth qualifications (Thuc. 8.98).  
One might be tempted to see an explicit political axis relating to these two terms 
emerging. Praise of the πολυπράγμων might be said to come from more democratic 
sources, and criticism of the ἀπράγμων comes from the more aristocratic examples of the 
fifth-century writers. Also, as the words of Thucydides’ Pericles might lead one to believe, 
it is to democratic discourse that one must turn if they are to complete the fourth category, 
and find praise of the πολυπράγμων and his behaviors in a democratic context. While some 
of Athens’ citizens may have been functionally literate,125 it would be hard to look to 
written literature for an unequivocal democratic response to such elite penned criticism—
the writing of literature and the collection of books was largely an upper-class activity, 
with minor middle-class participation.126 Ober suggests that much of Athenian popular 
ideology was formulated by public speech acts in fora such as the Assembly and the 
lawcourts. In his view, the “general understanding held by the citizenry regarding the 
nature of society was the same understanding employed by all decision-making bodies in 
                                                            
125 Morgan (1999): 59-60. 
126 Allen (2010): 5, 162-163.  
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formulating government policy for deployment in the real world.”127 Therefore, it is to the 
literature with mass audiences, such as symbouletic and dicanic speeches, that the scholar 
of popular ideology should turn. Canevaro too notes that in Athens, “popular culture seems 
to live rather inside the formal institutions of the state, fostered and validated by them.”128  
While the speakers of public addresses in the assembly, courts, or council that we 
find extant were frequently members of the wealthy elite (although not always, as Lysias’s 
On the Pension suggests), the majority of those sitting on the assembly, courts, and council 
were not of elite status.129 Ober suggests therefore that this dynamic produces a complex 
relationship in reading the values of elites and masses into court oratory. In his view, it is 
important to see rhetorical appeals in assembly, council, and court speeches as calculated 
to appeal to the opinions, norms, beliefs, and prejudices of their audiences.130 He therefore 
sees court oratory in particular as a key way that the real and obvious inequalities of 
wealth and status between Athenian elites and the majority of the population were 
mediated in light of a prevalent egalitarian ideology and popular control of decision-
                                                            
127 Ober (1998): 34. 
128 Canevaro (2016), forthcoming.  
129 On the notion that logography services were not common for non-wealthy elite see Canevaro 
(2016). Contrast Ober (1989): 118: “Given that being a politician in fourth-century Athens was a 
full-time affair, being a member of the leisure class was virtually a prerequisite.” On overall 
demographics see Hansen (1999): 127 “There is, therefore, no good ground to postulate any 
marked difference between the Assembly and the courts in this regard; indeed the crush to 
secure the daily payment indicates that the poorer group of citizens were the majority in both 
sorts of meeting, as they undoubtedly were in the population as a whole.  
130 Ober (1989): 43: “As Aristotle clearly recognized, an orator who wishes to persuade a mass 
audience must accommodate himself to the ethos—the ideology—of his audience.” 
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making political bodies.131 Yet, aside from the obvious doubts about questions of fact, court 
documents cannot simply be used as an easy mirror of reality, particularly for popular 
sentiments. Mass audiences and elite litigants may have differing expectations and 
standards for respective elite and non-elite behavior. Elite values and standards of behavior 
may not be able to contradict popular ideology, but they can significantly differ from the 
standards espoused by and for non-elite Athenians.132 
I spend time on this qualification because the context in which a speaker decries 
the πολυπραγμοσύνη of their accuser or accusers in general and promotes their own 
ἀπραγμοσύνη needs to be considered in order to determine whether such criticism or 
praise refers to ordinary citizen behavior, or sets differing standards to which elites are 
held to rather than their non-elite judges in the courts. Part of what I am seeking to 
understand is whether the behaviors (both positively and negatively associated with 
πολυπραγμοσύνη and its certain brand of civic behavior) were considered by the common 
Athenian at the time to be, first, associated with a democratic form of government, and 
second, played an important role (positive or negative) to the democracy’s functioning.133 
                                                            
131 Ober (1989): 45: “Public rhetoric not only helps us to define Athenian public ideology, it was 
instrumental in the regulation of mass-elite relations for the Athenians themselves.  
132 Ober (1989): 44: “...[W]e may suppose that skilled and experienced speakers would avoid 
making comments that they thought were likely to contradict deeply held popular 
convictions.” Ober (1989): 335: “The orator had to be simultaneously of the elite and of the 
mass, and he was expected to prove his membership in both on a regular basis.”  
133 Even if they were not considered by an Athenian at the time to be important to democracy’s 
function, I do not believe that such a fact would invalidate my interest in πολυπραγμοσύνη—it 
is entirely possible that the ancient Athenians could not have conceived of hyperactivity, 
busyness, and inqusitiveness as being political virtues as was negatively construed in their 
discourse—but such behaviors may have been important to their society’s functioning 
nevertheless.  
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Yet, elite citizens and non-elites often drove forward different parts of Athens’ democratic 
machinery, and while an elite litigant may promote their dedication to actively staying out 
of politics and being above the fray of, say, the boule, or assembly, as does the speaker in 
Lysias’s On the Property of Aristophanes (Lys. 19.55), this may reflect attitudes that he is 
expected to hew to as a member of a wealthy family. On the other hand, the regular 
assembly- or council-goer might not be proud to abnegate something they consider to be a 
right, duty, or simply a common behavior as a citizen of the polis. 
Given the previous association of πολυπραγμοσύνη with democracy, one might 
assume that discussions of πολυπραγμοσύνη would, in contrast to elite/elite literature, 
entail the positive identification of certain behaviors and characteristics embodied by the 
πολυπράγμων, such as vigorous information gathering and inquisitiveness (Ar. Or. 469), 
enthusiastic activity and action in domestic and foreign affairs (Thuc. 6.18.6-7), and 
innovation and adventurousness (Thuc. 1.70.2). One might expect to find in such discourse 
the language of vigorous participation in citizen obligations, such as the lawcourts and the 
assembly, as might befit a type of citizen that is expected to be busy, active in many things, 
and spending time around the city’s political institutions and the marketplace (Ar. Plut 907-
909). If elite critics attempt to draw lines (as represented by the formulation of (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ 
πράττειν) proscribing an active inquisitiveness into private and public lives, or limit 
spheres of political behavior considered to be particularly democratic, one might expect to 
find a defense of such behavior in popular rhetoric. Yet, what one discovers at first blush is 
that like in elite-penned literature, it appears that it is decidedly a negative thing to call 
someone a πολυπράγμων. Yet, numerous references to the term and its synonyms and 
antonyms betray one of the weaknesses of court oratory for historical factuality—but still 
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make it useful for this study. As Leigh notes, πολυπραγμοσύνη (and court rhetoric in 
general) is construed subjectively—while a defendant in court can tar their political 
adversary with negatively tinged characteristics such as being a πολυπράγμων, an accuser 
in court can equally claim to be a good citizen carrying out their duties, or an engaged 
community member seeking information and political discussion in the open spaces of the 
city.134 
In the court orations, calling someone a πολυπράγμων or other synonyms like a 
φιλοπράγμων (a lover of πράγματα) or a περίεργος (meddler, with an emphasis on 
officiousness) is lumped in with other popular insults designed to present their adversary 
as being a danger and outsider to the community in their personal and civic behavior, such 
as sycophancy and quarrelsomeness. Thus Aeschines calls his political nemesis 
Demosthenes both a “meddler and a sycophant” (περίεργος καὶ συκοφάντης, Aeschin. In 
Ctes. 172-173) in the same breath in which he implies that Demosthenes’ mother was a 
foreigner (and therefore of suspect citizenship), and that he had squandered his own 
inheritance. On the other hand, Demosthenes, at the same trial, justifying his own career as 
a public speaker, obviously puts it in a different light, saying that his skills in speaking have 
always been brought forward for “the common good” (τοῖς κοινοῖς, Dem. De cor. 277). That 
is, he works for the public’s concerns and the public’s interest, rather than the public’s loss, 
and his own interest. What Demosthenes can tout as a career of honorable prosecutions in 
the public’s interest, Aeschines can call meddlesome self-aggrandizement.  
                                                            
134 Leigh (2013): 16: “These are always profoundly subjective terms: nobody ever saw a 
polypragmon or periergos on the streets of Athens, only someone he or others held to be such.”  
 58 
Other court speakers take pains to defend themselves from claims of 
πολυπραγμοσύνη. The defendant in Lysias’ On the Pension argues that he has never been 
politically active before—he has to contend with the claim that he is “a busybody or quarrel 
seeker” (ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι πολυπράγμων εἰμὶ καὶ θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθήμων; Lys. 24.24). Lycurgus 
claims that it is unfair that those who bring cases to court or speak in the assembly can be 
considered “not as patriotic but as meddlesome” (οὐ φιλόπολιν ἀλλὰ φιλοπράγμονα δοκεῖν 
εἶναι, Lycurg. Leoc. 3). Isocrates’ Antidosis states, perhaps metaphorically, that the 
“πολυπράγμονας” are one and the same with the “wrongdoers and sycophants” that the 
city punishes (ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς συκοφαντοῦντας, Isoc. 15.237).135 In another speech of 
Lysias, an old woman is reluctant to tell the defendant about a case of adultery that is being 
committed in his own house for fear of being named as a meddler (πολυπραγμοσύνῃ 
προσεληλυθέναι με νόμιζε πρὸς σέ, Lys. 1.15-16). The litigant in Lysias’s On the Property of 
Aristophanes praises his father for having naturally minded his own business, while in 
contrast critiques his deceased and destitute creditor Aristophanes for bankrupting himself 
by focusing on both public and private activities (Lys. 19.18).  
As these examples show, calling someone a πολυπράγμων is not simply part of elite 
discourse. In legal discourse the term was indeed used along with other terms of social 
disapproval, often as a modifier to a worse term, the sycophant, designed to present 
                                                            
135 Isocrates’ Antidosis, it should be noted, does not conform to all the standards I had discussed 
for the use of popular rhetoric earlier. As Leigh (2013): 27 notes, it is a speech composed for a 
fictional trial, which however still retains characteristics of the typical courtroom exercise 
speech, down to the “sundry references to the dripping of a non-existent water clock.” 
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adversaries as dangerous social outsiders.136 In that way, the use of it might assume that 
certain values associated with the πολυπράγμων, such as inquisitiveness, busyness, 
activity, and action are not ones that are viewed as positive amongst the Athenian 
populace as a whole. Adkins, believing that in the late fifth-century Athens was “still to a 
surprising extent in sentiment and values a collection of virtually autonomous households” 
sees such uses of language as revealing a “general pre-existing dislike of ‘meddling’ that 
rendered polupragmosune so useful a word of abuse in Athenian politics.”137 As Millett notes, 
archaeologically and textually, there does seem to be strong attitudes towards a division 
between private life and public life: “private space is oikos space,” as opposed to “polis 
space.” Textual references to doorkeepers, locked homes, and a reluctance to step over the 
threshold of another without invitation138 reflect preoccupations with personal privacy not 
surprising to us in the modern age.139 Christ, approaching the topic of popular values from 
a different angle, argues that “helping behavior” between Athenian citizens (particularly in 
disputes involving strangers and bystanders) who were neither friends nor family was in 
fact minimized by the fear of being considered “intrusive and meddlesome.”140 However, I 
argue that this is not simply a cultural onus against prying or busy behavior—it is also an 
outgrowth of the democratic nature of Athens’ society. Athens was a polis where every 
                                                            
136 Christ (1998): 51: “The sycophant bustles about (perieimi) the city in pursuit of victims and 
never desists from his sycophantic activity; he is a meddlesome troublemaker (polupragmōn) 
and busybody (periergos); he disturbs (tarattō), confuses (kukaō) and shakes down (seiō)—that is, 
blackmails—his victims…” 
137 Adkins (1976): 304.  
138 Millett (1998): 207.  
139 Millett (1998): 207 also cites Nevett (1995) who argues that architecturally, the design of 
homes in Athens restricted sight lines from the streets into the house.  
140 Christ (2010): 285. 
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citizen had the right—and was essentially individually deputized, in contrast to a modern 
governmental prosecutorial arm—to carry out the law (as well as seek a lawsuit against any 
other Athenian, regardless of social status and class) as ὁ βουλόμενος.141 Moreover, 
intervening in other individuals’ legal troubles might not only be seen as a negative thing, 
but potentially dangerous for the intervening party, who might run the risk of 
exacerbating or being included in an ongoing conflict.142 While Theophrastus’s Characters is 
certainly not a piece of popular rhetoric, it does corroborate the claim in speeches that the 
περίεργος is someone who will attempt to separate combatants in a fight even if he does 
not know them.143 
 One side of the πολυπράγμων that appears to come in for criticism in both 
elite/elite and elite/non-elite discourse is the inability to distinguish what one’s own 
things, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν are. The type of πολυπραγμοσύνη described in the courtroom 
reflects a fear that might have had legitimate purchase in Athens—the positive side of 
embracing one’s citizen duties as a prosecutor can also mean investigation, intervention, 
and judgment on the private lives of other individuals. Regardless of whether this aspect of 
Athenian democracy was beneficial to the flourishing of the state or adherence to the laws, 
a defendant in court would naturally feel (and seek to present such activity) as socially and 
                                                            
141 Hansen (1999): 72: “‘He of the Athenians who wishes from amongst those who may,’ 
frequently mentioned as the originator of laws, decrees, and public prosecutions, was arguably 
the real protagonist of the Athenian democracy.”   
142 Christ (2010): 274: “Bystanders in Athens, moreover, typically did not know the context of 
violence involving strangers, including whether the participants had a history of violent 
relations of which this was just one more episode.” 
143 The genre and purpose of the Characters is an open question. Theophrastus was a pupil of 
Aristotle, but rather than any work of moral philosophy like his teacher’s Ethics it should be 
according to Ussher (1993): 23 taken instead as a literary hand-book, a guide to comic 
characterization.  
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morally onerous. Indeed, as Thucydides’ Pericles had noted in the Funeral Oration, one of 
the outstanding Athenian characteristics is that they are not suspicious of each other in 
their private lives (Thuc. 2.37). This is a πολυπραγμοσύνη that lacks the kind of anti-urban 
(as the city center is associated with the agora, courts, and assembly) sentiment and 
questioning of broader democratic values that could be found in some of the fifth-century 
literature, and is more concerned with how certain Athenians gather information about 
and interact with each other on a daily basis. In the court orations, πολυπραγμονεῖν is 
representative of a subset of individual citizens. Meddlesomeness and busyness are not 
characteristics that are to be critiqued about the entire democratic polis or Athens’ 
constitution as a whole as is presented by Thucydides’ Corinthian speech (Thuc. 1.70).  
The intellectual trend I had advanced in the first chapter was that of the 
πολυπράγμων as a kind of overextended democrat—one who infringes on the political 
space traditionally considered the domain of the political elite and celebrates what 
Thucydides’ Pericles would call “the freedom that Athenians maintain in their 
government” (ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν, Thuc. 2.37). Such a trend 
can still be seen in these orations, but in an inverted way. Whereas in the fifth century, 
aristocratic and oligarchic writers were praising the ἀπραγμοσύνη of the rural peasant with 
little time for politics, in the fourth-century orations, it becomes a common topos in oratory 
for a wealthy defendant to highlight their own ἀπραγμοσύνη, their own withdrawal from 
politics.  
Lateiner highlights this trend well in his analysis of Lysias’s speeches, both those 
written by the metic logographer for mostly wealthy clients (between 402-380), as well as 
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those delivered on his own behalf.144 He argues that even when dominant in the fifth 
century, “the ordinarily political class, the self-styled khrēstoi (the kaloi k' agathoi to which 
Pericles belonged),” felt a “posture of distaste” towards the institutions of democratic 
politics.145 Lateiner shares a view with other scholars that the nature of political leadership 
shifted in the late-fifth century away from being dominated by an established elite of 
wealth and birth, largely through family ties, largesse, and military success, keeping an 
aloof or a measured distance from the democratic organs of the city, such as attacks in the 
courts and in the assembly.146 Lateiner notes that Lysias describes his own family as living 
in Athens in a “democratic fashion” (ᾠκοῦμεν δημοκρατούμενοι, Lys. 12.4). What this is 
revealed to mean, however, is an abstention from lawsuits and wrongdoing against other 
citizens (Lys. 12.5) as well as paying for liturgies, funding festivals, and living in an orderly 
and moderate fashion (κοσμίους δ’ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παρέχοντας, Lys 12.20).147 However, Lysias 
is a metic, a resident foreigner, and while obliged to fund civic life in the city and able to 
                                                            
144 Carter (1986): 106-107 presents Lysias’s clients as wealthy. Certainly, those who claim to have 
funded choregia and trierarchies were undoubtedly wealthy, as well as those who paid for 
speechwriting services. Ober (1989): 113 argues that in private oratory, speakers were most 
likely part of a wealthy elite, if not an educated elite. On 221-222 he remarks that many 
speakers who claim to not be of such social status may be employing a dramatic fiction, one 
fully understood by their audiences. Lateiner (1982): 4-5 adds, “While quick to mention their 
fulfillment of civic obligations and duties, the logographer’s wealthy clients claim to have 
avoided, to the best of their ability, the law courts, the assembly, and the council house: that is, 
Athenian politics tout court.” 
145 Lateiner (1982): 4. Pericles himself is perhaps is the outlier in this regard. Ober (1989): 88 
presents his unique success vis-à-vis his contemporaries due to his embrace of democratic 
rhetoric and institutions. 
146 Connor (1971): 9-11 on family ties, 19-22 on politics of largesse. Ober (1989): 86: “The 
Athenian politician of the earlier fifth century appealed to the demos, but he did through the 
symbols of wealth and birthright that would have been familiar to his sixth-century ancestors.” 
147 Lateiner (1982): 6.  
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appear in court, he and his family lack any of the directly participatory political rights of 
Athenian citizens.148 In Lysias’s case, living in a “democratic fashion” has nothing to do 
with exercising political rights of decision-making. 
This is an important passage to highlight, because many of Lysias’s other clients, 
who are, in contrast, wealthy and also fully enfranchised citizens “dissociate themselves as 
clearly as the metic from the lawcourts and from the administration of the state.”149 In 
Lateiner’s reading, the speaker of On the Property of Aristophanes claims that he had never 
been seen in the council and courts (Lys. 19.55) because it was sensible for members of the 
upper classes following the two oligarchic revolutions to “plead a lack of appearances in 
the political arena.”150 Lysias’s clients appear to make themselves indifferent to either 
democracy or oligarchy, stressing that they are politically active under neither, but live in 
an orderly (κόσμιος) and modest (σώφρων) manner.151 As I mentioned above, it is difficult 
to attempt to extract values wholesale from such court documents, be they popular or elite 
ones. However, one does see that during the early fourth century, a time when the 
democracy has been restored, and popular control of the assembly, courts, and council re-
established,152 it is an acceptable strategy for wealthy defendants disavow any type of 
πολυπραγμοσύνη, and any type of political activity altogether. Regardless of whether such 
                                                            
148 Hansen (1999): 97.  
149 Lateiner (1982): 7.  
150 Lateiner (1982): 7.  
151 Lys. 7.41: “κόσμιον δ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ παρασχών”; Lys. 21.19: 
“διὰ τέλους τὸν πάντα χρόνον κόσμιον εἶναι καὶ σώφρονα”; Lateiner (1982): 8.   
152 Ath. Pol. 42.2: “They have made themselves supreme in all fields; they make run everything 
by the decrees of the assembly and by decisions of the courts in which the people are supreme.” 
Democracy restored and reaffirmed, Harris (2014): 3-4; Ober (1989): 98 claims “The description 
of the democracy of the fourth century as most fully developed, most extreme, even most 
“radical” makes a good deal of sense from the point of view of political sociology.”  
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a strategy was viewed favorably or unfavorably by the non-elite jurors and audience, the 
fact that the defendants—in what is, admittedly, an incredibly slim representation of 
surviving court literature153—so consistently sought to contrast their behavior with their 
πολυπράγμων accusers and highlight their distance from Athens’ democratic institutions 
offers a negative critical inference for the existence of such behavior as particularly 
democratic—spurred on by the popular institutions—and prevalent in Athens.  
The “retreat by the socially and economically advantaged class from the world of 
politics and political maneuvering in the courts”154 that Lateiner notes, and the aristocratic 
ethic that emerges from it—wealthy litigants claim to be “κόσμιος” and “σώφρων,” in 
opposition to civic-minded and active—are particularly important in relation to the works 
of one of the most famous and lasting critics of Athenian democracy, Plato. As a writer, 
Plato is in dialogue with and actively critiquing his contemporary political culture in 
Athens, and it is no surprise that he treats the subject of πολυπραγμοσύνη in a central place 
in his most famous work, the Republic.  
Compared to other writers like Herodotus, Thucydides, and even Aristophanes, the 
scholarly tradition preserves a good amount of biographical detail about Plato, whose 
writing overlaps with that of Lysias. Plato was born into an aristocratic family around 
424/3 B.C., and died in the 340’s. He was the nephew of two politically active aristocrats, 
Critias and Charmides, who were notorious in later literature, such as Xenophon’s Hellenica, 
for overthrowing the democracy in 404/403 B.C., and putting to death enemies of the new 
                                                            
153 Ober (1989): 44 remarks on the paucity of written texts by ordinary Athenians for mass 
audiences, and argues further that the speeches we have surviving represent about ten percent 
of the speeches actually delivered.  
154 Lateiner (1982): 11. 
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regime.155 He founded a school of philosophy at the Academy gymnasium in Athens, and for 
a time travelled to Sicily to educate two tyrants of Syracuse. Most famously, he wrote 
largely in the dialogue form, and was an admirer and, during his early life, direct student of 
Socrates.156 Rare bits of biographical detail supplied by the author himself emerge in the 
dialogues. The Apology (34a) places Plato at Socrates’ trial in 399 B.C., although he was not 
present for Socrates’ death as depicted in the Phaedo (59b). Aside from later sources like 
Aristotle and Diogenes Laertius, much of the contemporaneous biographical information 
we have about Plato comes from the so-called Letters, and in particular, the Seventh Letter. 
While the letter is of contested attribution, it is crucial to the arguments of certain modern 
writers on the purposes and intentions of Plato when writing the dialogues.157 The Letter 
states that Plato was deterred from embarking on a career in politics twice. First he became 
disaffected with hardline oligarchy after seeing the abuses of his great-uncle Critias and 
uncle Charmides as part of the Thirty’s regime (Pl. L. 7.325a). However, following that he 
became disaffected even with Athenian democratic politics following the eminently unjust 
and unholy (ἀνοσιωτάτην) conviction and execution of Socrates (Pl. L. 7.325b). 
 Addressing the question of why and to whom Plato was writing with his dialogues is 
an important question of this section, because, in the Republic, Laws, and other dialogues 
Plato makes strong normative claims about the ideal ordering of society which are 
                                                            
155 See Xen. Hell. 2.3.32-56 for Critias’ debate with Theramenes, a more moderate oligarch. 
Biographical details for Plato, Allen (2010): 11 and Ober (1998): 156.  
156 Diogenes Laertius 3; Ober (1998): 156.  
157 Ober (1998): 162 n. 16 reads the letter as if it were written by Plato or a member of the early 
Academy; Allen (2010): 12-13 doubts that it was written by Plato, yet still believes it to be a 
trustworthy source of information about his beliefs. It is a thoroughly contested subject, but I 
tend to agree with those who argue for attribution.  
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particularly related to Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη. Political theorists like Strauss and 
Bloom see in Plato a heavy focus on irony in his own writing and beliefs (rather than just in 
the words of his version of Socrates), and a rejection of utopian ideals and an ability to 
directly influence political ends openly through writing.158 Therefore, they see the goal of 
Plato and the Republic in particular as seeking to cultivate a love of philosophy in rulers, as 
a method of indirect leadership.159 On the other hand, scholars like Ober and Euben take 
Plato as genuinely intending political action and effect with his writings, although to 
different degrees of criticism, while refraining from the more extreme view offered by 
Popper, who saw Plato as wholeheartedly endorsing antidemocratic tyranny.160 Ober 
classes Plato as largely a “rejectionist critic” of democracy who seeks not to reform the 
current society, but challenge and overthrow its dominant values.161 Allen, in seeking to 
interact with this question, argues for a kind of middle ground, saying that Plato’s political 
plan in the Republic is to “refashion Athenian political language” and cultural values. In her 
mind, “the utopian plan” of the dialogue that has caused such controversy “is a tool used” 
for that purpose.162  
                                                            
158 Allen (2006): 127; Bloom (1991): 410: “The Republic serves to moderate the extreme passion 
for political justice by showing the limits of what can be demanded and expected of the city; 
and at the same time it shows the direction in which the immoderate desires can be 
meaningfully channeled.”  
159 Allen (2006): 128; Bloom (1991): 425 “The choice between the philosophic and tyrannic lives 
explains the plot of the Republic. Socrates takes a young man tempted by the tyrannic life and 
attempts to give him at least that modicum of awareness of philosophy that will cure him of the 
lust for tyranny.”  
160 Stances of Ober, Allen, and Popper summarized by Allen (2006): 129. 
161 Ober (1998): 49.  
162 Allen (2010): 19.  
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Allen therefore sees a broader political role for the philosopher and elite writers in 
public life than the previous writers mentioned. In her view Plato did seek the wholesale 
transformation of Athenian life towards the ideals of Republic, but sought to do such 
through education.163 However, in this reading, Plato’s education was not only that of elites, 
like in Strauss’s and Bloom’s view, but also education of a wider audience, through the use 
of the rhetorically constructed images such as the noble lie, the γενναῖον ψεῦδος (Pl. Resp. 
414b-c). Such rhetorical images, while not being the truth prized by the philosopher, have a 
similar moral and actionable effect as truth on the broader populace.164 Her thesis is 
supported by analyses of the speeches of the court orators, particularly Aeschines, 
Demosthenes, and Lycurgus, in which she identifies Platonic language and topoi in the 
debates about how best to respond to the foreign policy threat of Macedon as well as the 
domestic political conflicts between Aeschines and Demosthenes.165 However, as Allen 
herself notes, such cross-references do not necessarily mean that the philosophers were 
influential in politics, but that the orators’ debates were, like the works of the philosophers, 
grappling with the same fundamental and practical questions “of what type of city to 
build.”166 Regardless of whether Plato or someone in his close circle wrote the Seventh 
Letter, the fact that Plato claimed (or was seen to have claimed in his time) that education 
                                                            
163 Allen (2010): 77.  
164 Allen (2010): 67-68. On pg. 5 of the same work she argues that the low rates of literacy were 
not necessarily an impediment to some dissemination of Plato’s ideas solely beyond a literate 
and moneyed subsection of society, bringing up the fact that the Academy was not a 
hermetically sealed group, but as Kierstead (2013): 214 puts it, “The location and origins of the 
philosophical schools fed into their character in the fourth century as open, dynamic 
institutions with permeable boundaries with the rest of the Athenian polis.” 
165 Allen (2010): 119-121. 
166 Allen (2010): 113.  
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in philosophy was necessary for rulers (Pl. L. 7.326b) seems to bear out the idea that Plato 
pragmatically sought to reshape the values of his own community, even if it was through 
writing and teaching rather than active political engagement.  
If one understands Plato as a critic of Athenian democracy as existed in his time, 
therefore, the critiques his interlocutors make about Athenian political behaviors and 
political culture are necessarily reflective about the political climate in which he is writing. 
For the purpose of this project, discerning Plato’s intent, or perhaps whether he had 
political orientations that could be actualized is secondary to understanding what his 
critiques reflect about democracy in his day. I do not deem it divisive to say that Plato can 
be construed as a “critic of popular rule,” questioning the capability of the broader 
populace to engage in political decision-making, while raising questions of the necessity of 
expertise, and specialized knowledge in politics.167 If Plato’s views can be considered a 
reaction against Athenian democracy, the highly structured and regulated cities in speech 
that appear in the Republic and the Laws can be seen as being in explicit opposition to and in 
criticism of Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη.  
A section in the Charmides initially seems reminiscent of the kind of ἀπραγμοσύνη 
that Lyisas’s elite speakers appear to be promoting when they tie their lack of political 
activity to both their “κόσμιος” and “σώφρων” characters. Socrates, speaking with 
Charmides, Plato’s family member and future oligarchic revolutionary, describes his 
interlocutor as both handsome and of good family (Pl. Charm. 154b-d). Socrates inquires as 
to what the meaning of temperance (σωφροσύνη) is, and after several failed attempts, 
Charmides offers the formulation that it is “τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν,” to mind one’s own 
                                                            
167 Ober (1998): 161. 
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business, or to do one’s own things, claiming that he has heard it from another person (Pl. 
Chrm. 161b). Socrates, sardonically claiming that Charmides must have heard this from 
some other of the wise men (τῶν σοφῶν), rounds on Critias, who he believes to be the 
author of this dictum, calling it an enigma or riddle (αἴνιγμα, 161c).  
Socrates—taking “minding one’s own things” literally, by understanding τὰ ἑαυτοῦ 
to mean an individual’s physical possessions—asks whether a city would be well managed 
(εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι) if everyone produced everything they needed for themselves, if “there was a 
law commanding each man to weave and wash his own cloak, make his own shoes, and oil 
flask and scraper, and perform everything else by this same principle of keeping his hands 
off other people’s things and by making and doing his own” (161e-162a). When Charmides 
agrees that this hypothetical would not be good governance, Socrates responds that if 
being governed temperately is the same as governing well (σωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα εὖ ἂν 
οἰκοῖτο), a city where everyone minded their own business (being the working temperate) 
would not be governed well, and therefore the two things are not the same (162a-b). 
Following this, Critias is incensed, and is depicted as having an emotional stake (162d-e) in 
this argument. 
The situational use of the phrase τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, along with a praise of 
σώφρων behavior might remind the reader of Lysias’s defenses of his wealthy clients. Yet, 
on the other hand, the fact that Plato has Critias—who was an actively violent member of 
the oligarchic faction—roused to defend such a claim, does not seem unintentional.168 
Several of Lysias’s clients use the formulae of being σώφρων and minding their own 
business in the same breaths that they deny aiding and abetting the oligarchic revolutions 
                                                            
168 Xen. Hell. 2.3.15 names Critias as specifically ordering the death of democratic sympathizers.  
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of the late fifth century.169 Yet, as I hope to have demonstrated in my last chapter, in the 
fifth century, such language of encouraging others to mind their own business was often to 
circumscribe activity that was deemed unsuitable for them by another person.170 While it 
should be remembered that this is a fictional dialogue, constructed perhaps decades after 
any hypothetical dramatic date, the fact that a pro-oligarchic aristocrat in mid-fifth 
century Athens (before the revolutions) could be plausibly presented as endorsing or 
having devised such a formulation fits with the essentially negative aristocratic attitude 
towards Athenian democratic political activity and behavior represented by 
πολυπραγμοσύνη.171  
Critias would not (unlike Lysias’s clients) perhaps deny that he was active in 
politics. He might, however, as a member of the χρηστοί, disdain the type of non-elite, 
active, and institutionally vigorous political activity represented by πολυπραγμοσύνη and 
embrace τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν as a proscriptive doctrine.172 Each one should do what is their 
own business, and explicit in the moral claims of the fifth-century χρηστοί (who might also 
indeed describe themselves as σώφρων and κόσμιος) is an expectation of a monopoly on 
                                                            
169 Lys. 7.41, 20.14; Lateiner (1982): 7-9. 
170 Leigh (2013): 18: “It is the voluntary circumscription of one’s own activities and is the 
opposite of unwelcome or uninvited intervention in that which is proper to others. Yet, it also 
admits of a more prescriptive application if we do not ourselves decide what is our proper 
business but have that decisions made for us.”  
171 Nails (2002): 311 puts an estimated dramatic date at 430 B.C., when Critias is in middle age, 
and Charmides—whom we can say was at least of a politically active age in 404/403 B.C.—is still 
in his youth.  
172 Socrates offers a detailed backstory of the honor, fame, and wealth embodied in the 
aristocratic lineage of both Critias and Charmides at Pl. Chrm. 157e-158c. Connor (1971): 18-22; 
Ober (1989): 85 and 251.  
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influencing civic life.173 Meanwhile their opposites, the πονηροί, who seek power through 
serving as public speakers, council members, or court litigants, are to be deterred.174 It is 
true that in this dialogue, Critias refrains from exploring the political implications of such a 
formulation in search of a better definition of σωφροσύνη, yet the fictional Critias exists in 
a different political world than his analogues in Lysias’s speeches. Whereas Critias might be 
able to wholeheartedly adopt the claim that one should “mind their own business”—given 
that part of his culturally entitled business is politics—following the tyrannies, it is not 
acceptable for a wealthy litigant in popular rhetoric to embrace participation in politics as 
part of their “own business,” or to seek to circumscribe that of others as a matter of due 
course. Plato, on the other hand, writing dialogues rather than public speeches, has a 
freedom to interact with, and expand—possibly to an unrecognizable extent—the political 
notions behind this throwaway phrase of an aristocratic partisan.175  
The formulation of τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν appears in the Republic at a crucial point, 
and when it does appear, it is directly paired with πολυπραγμοσύνη. While initially 
                                                            
173 Rosenbloom (2004): 56 n. 3 notes that a host of associated terms with χρηστός are “kalos 
k’agathos, gennaios, eugenes, dikaios, sophron, kosimos, metrios, dexios, mousikos, eusebes”. 
Rosenbloom (2004): 63: “This ideological positioning legitimates its moral leadership (aretê) and 
elicits the consent, honor (timê), and gratitude (charis) of all classes”; Ar. Eq. 1274-75 praises the 
χρηστοί as worthy of being well reckoned, “ὅστις εὖ λογίζεται.” 
174 Rosenbloom (2004): 61: “Leaders marked ponêros perform speaking roles that require 
knowledge of political and legal procedure, but they lack traditional elite attributes; they serve 
as un-elected rhêtores and allotted bouletai.  
175 Leigh (2013): 19 calls this an “avowedly commonplace” phrase, and Critias’s use of it as 
reflective of a more popular usage, while Adkins (1976): 302 sees it as important that the 
definition comes from Critias or “another wise man,” meaning that it is not simply a popular 
convention. On 325 Adkins argues that in using the phrase τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πραττείν, Charmides and 
Critias “evidently wished to confine political activity to their own, very small, group of 
aristocratic Athenians.”  
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constructing the idealized city in speech, Kallipolis, Socrates has Glaucon and Adeimantus 
agree to a principle of division of labor: a person does a better job if they only practice a 
single craft, and does the best at the single craft to which they are naturally suited (Pl. Resp. 
2.370b-c). He further argues that one person cannot attempt to “dabble in many things” 
(ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος), because they will not be good at them (Pl. Resp. 3.394e). 
Such an agreement may not be objectionable under some branches of modern economic 
theory and conceptions of labor specialization.176 But it becomes more controversial and 
contradictory to Athens’ popular democratic ideology as the dialogue continues, and the 
principle of specialization is extended beyond the economic and into the political and 
social fields. Socrates notes that such principles lead to a city where one finds a “cobbler 
who is a cobbler, and not also a captain along with his cobbling, and a farmer who is a 
farmer and not also a juror along with his farming” (Pl. Resp. 3.397e). Such an argument is 
antithetical to the democracy at its core—the very nature of the council, the assembly, and 
the juries is predicated on the democratic belief that the wisdom of mass and collective 
decision-making was superior, and that all citizens could participate, even if they were a 
cobbler or a farmer.177 To push it farther, structurally, Athenian democracy in the fourth 
                                                            
176 Ober (2008): 94 connects this argument with the modern theory of Taylorist and Fordist 
industrial organization, which involves applying expert technical knowledge in the 
management echelons to determine best practices and production strategies and imparting it 
down to the non-experts at the lower echelons of decision-making.  
177 Ober (1998): 33. Markle (1985): 275: “The kinds of citizens who predominated in the Athenian 
assembly were craftsmen, traders, and farmers, and these persons required some compensation 
for loss of earnings when they took time off from their occupations to attend the assembly.” 
Xen. Mem. 3.7.6 has Socrates describe assembly attendants as “fullers, shoemakers, carpenters, 
blacksmiths, farmers, merchants, or traders…”  
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century required the participation of those workers without leisure.178 These are the same 
men who most obviously did not have the time—as the Athenian Stranger mandates for 
citizens in Plato’s Laws for largely the same reasons of lack of competence at more than one 
profession as in the Republic—to refrain from work and solely cultivate civic virtue.179  
Socrates himself notes that this forced separation of citizen duties is something 
that could happen solely in Kallipolis. The fact that each person is not two or multiple 
                                                            
178 I take the council as an example, because the council is often said to have been the least open 
to wage laborers given that it met on a daily basis (and members even slept in the Pyrtaneion 
during their Prytany), according to Rhodes (1972): 30-31. Therefore it is most often considered 
to have been a full-time occupation in the way that Plato’s Socrates discusses here. Hansen 
(1986): argues that the institutional structure of the boule in Athens meant that it required at 
least 19,000 citizens to be of serving age (above 30) in the population in the fourth century, 
which would mean that if the citizen population was near 25,000 or even 30,000 as Hansen and 
others argue, then anywhere from 63-76 percent of the citizen body had to serve on the boule 
for it to function adequately. Hansen (1999): 249 again notes that almost two thirds of citizens 
over forty would have served on the council in their lifetime, and the boule itself must have 
required a “reasonable” number of thetes, the lowest wealth class of the Athenian citizenry. 
Sinclair (1988): 106 argues that in the fifth century there was a restriction on the thetic class 
serving in the council, but “it was very likely that by the 320s the question of the census class 
was ignored, as it was in respect to the election of archons, and that thetes were members of 
the council.” As Markle (1985): 271 argues, the point of instituting assembly, council, and jury 
pay was to enable those who work full time to support themselves and their dependents “to 
take time off from their occupations to perform public service and attend festivals.” Sinclair 
(1988): 108 also argues that the payment to councilors was more regular, and higher (5 obols), 
and more frequent (260 days of service) than either assembly or jury pay, and might have been 
enough to allow a laborer to participate in most or all of the meetings with good conscience. 
179 Pl. Leg. 8.846b-847b (block translations of Platonic dialogues are all from Cooper (1997) unless 
otherwise noted) “A citizen’s vocation, which demands a great deal of practice and study, is to 
establish and maintain good order in a community, and this is not a job for part-timers.” I 
would argue that in contrast, Athenian government in the fourth century could be considered 
wholly as a job of part-timers, particularly the assembly, the courts, and to a lesser degree, the 
council. Yes, given the regularity of meetings, frequency of court cases, and requirements of 
the council, Athenian government may have been a democracy of part-timers, but certainly not 
amateurs. Harris (1986): 363 notes that the Assembly met at least four times per prytany, which 
means at minimum, forty meetings per year.  
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people simultaneously, as Socrates puts it (διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς, Pl. 
Resp. 3.397e), certainly differs from the vision of Thucydides’ Pericles in the Funeral 
Oration. He, speaking to a popular audience, praised Athens as one of the sole places in 
Greece that produces versatile and dexterous citizens (εὐτραπέλως, Thuc. 2.41) who, as was 
mentioned in the previous chapter, are able to attend well to their own private as well as 
public affairs (τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἅμα καὶ πολιτικῶν, Thuc. 2.40). Socrates does not at this 
point name Athens as the subject of his barbs, but one can easily see what he leaves out. 
The multiplicity of roles that any individual can fulfill in Athenian democracy, be it cobbler 
and juror, sailor and assemblyman, peasant farmer and councilman, which Pericles praises 
as the heart of what a democratic constitution is, are conspicuously absent. In fact, the 
tripartite structure of rulers, guardians, and laborers is to be fixed in place by the noble 
falsehood (γενναῖον ψεῦδος) and foundational myth of Kallipolis that legitimizes the firm 
division of individuals into separate immutable classes (Pl. Resp. 3.414c). Socrates states 
that it will be given out that a divine oracle foretells disaster for the city if the classes are 
ever to be mixed (Pl. Resp 3.415c). For, given that Socrates had stated (and his interlocutors 
agreed) that individuals are suited to only be in one of the three classes in the city by 
nature, and that the individuals in each class are only able to do one thing well, it would be 
harmful to the proper functioning of the city if citizens were to switch roles (Pl. Resp. 
4.434b).  
Socrates goes on to offer the formulation that in the proposed city (in speech), 
justice is therefore “for each one to do one’s own things and not to meddle” (ὅτι τὸ αὑτοῦ 
ἕκαστος εἷς ὢν ἔπραττε καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει, 4.433d). In the inverse, injustice in the 
city therefore is for “there to be exchange between the different classes and meddling in 
 75 
the jobs of others” (δοκεῖν ταύτην τὴν τούτων μεταβολὴν καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην ὄλεθρον 
εἶναι τῇ πόλει, 4.434b-c). Πολυπραγμοσύνη, in the words of Socrates, results in the 
destruction of the highly ordered and segmented polity of the proposed city (in speech). 
This city, which is both self-controlled and moderate (σώφρονα), and ruled by the prudent 
minority of best-educated and best-natured individuals (φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσί τε 
καὶ ἐπιεικεστέροις, 4.431d), is also just. The fact that Socrates offers πολυπραγμοσύνη as the 
worst injustice in such a city could not have been lost on the contemporary Athenian ear. 
Unlike the orators, who used the charge of πολυπραγμοσύνη to rhetorically negate their 
individual opponents’ behaviors in the eyes of the jurors, Plato—like Thucydides—offers a 
definition of πολυπραγμοσύνη that is leveled at the institutions and character of the 
democratic Athenian polis as a whole. By tying injustice to πολυπραγμοσύνη, Socrates’ 
critique is aimed squarely at Athens, where part-timers and the less formally educated 
enjoyed a share in and sometimes dominated politics.180  
 Socrates further ties such meddling specifically to democratic constitutions, when 
he notes that oligarchy (having previously devolved from the best regime to timocracy, 
and then to oligarchy) devolves to democracy partly because it allows meddling; under this 
constitution, oligarchs—who fear to arm the masses—have to serve as farmers, money-
makers, and soldiers all at the same time (8.551e). The fact that property can be sold in an 
oligarchy allows for the creation of a class of those without property, “πένητες”—a word of 
contested meaning, ranging from day laborers to indigent poor—that eventually endeavors 
                                                            
180 Ancient sources also referred to them as the poor: Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.2; Pl. Resp. 8.557. 
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to establish a democracy.181 The democracy is characterized by many of the things that 
Socrates praised his Kallipolis for lacking, namely total freedom, freedom of speech, and the 
license for each individual to do as they wish (ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας 
γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅτι τις βούλεται, 8.557b).182 In the democratic city one 
finds people of all variety of types (παντοδαποὶ δὴ ἂν οἶμαι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 8.557c). 
Socrates calls democracy an anarchic constitution—literally “ἄν-αρχος,” without rulers—
that provides equality to equals and non-equals alike (ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις, 8.558c).  
 In creating Kallipolis, Socrates identifies (and circumscribes) two interlocking facets 
of democratic life—freedom and πολυπραγμοσύνη. The just city is radically different from a 
democracy in its relationship to freedom and permissiveness. The social structure is rigid, 
and all roles, be they economic or civic, are specialized according to individual natures. 
Participation of individuals in the diverse roles of wage-labor, farming, commerce, law 
court judging, assembly decision-making, and military service—all roles that an Athenian 
citizen might plausibly fulfill over the course of their lifetime, sometimes 
simultaneously183—is made possible by the political equality and freedom that democratic 
regimes offer. The democratic constitution, in Plato’s telling, does not only permit, but 
actively promotes dabbling in many things. However, in the just city, such behavior is 
                                                            
181 Markle (1985): 268: “Use of the terms πενία and ἀπορία and their related forms by other 
ancient writers also indicates that the poor included people who had to work for a living and 
lacked leisure. Indeed, the nouns πενία and πένης are derived from the verb πένομαι which 
means to ‘labour’.” 
182 At Pl. Resp. 4.431b Socrates had noted that “one finds all kinds of diverse desires, pleasures, 
and pains, mostly in children, women, household slaves, and in those of the inferior majority 
called free.” In the city in speech, as was noted above, inferior many are ruled by and restrained 
by the prudent few (4.431d).    
183 Leigh (2013): 20.  
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characterized as πολυπραγμοσύνη, and the height of injustice. In making his broader 
arguments about the moral licentiousness (Resp. 8.556-558, Leg. 3.700-701) and political 
amateurism of democratic life, Plato places the fact that the Athenians are busy about and 
dabble in many things (πολυπραγμονοῦσι) as one of the key facets of such a life.  
 Socrates’ stated goal in constructing the just city in the Republic is to offer by 
analogy the example of the just man (Resp. 4.435b). This text has therefore been read as not 
offering practical political suggestions.184 Yet, some of the ideological implications, if not 
practical blueprint of the Republic are also expressed in Plato’s Laws.  The hypothetical polis 
described in the Laws also emphasizes unity and order, while at the same time seeking to 
minimize contact between social classes, enforcing specialization, and endorsing 
associational rigidity—offering another way to reducing the ability or intention for citizens 
to “dabble in many things.” Again, because of Plato’s status as a critic of democracy (and 
the fact that his primary speaker in the laws is the “Athenian Stranger”) the innovations 
introduced in the Laws are particularly interesting for what they reveal in relationship or 
in opposition to Athens.185 
In the Republic, the commercial and laboring classes are to have no say in political 
leadership, but they are still considered to be part of the state.186 However, in the Laws, the 
metics and slaves in the city—who lack political or even long-term residence rights—fill the 
                                                            
184 Allen (2006): 127-128; Pl. Resp. 9.592b offers the possibility of the existence of the just city as a 
blueprint for a real polis as ambiguous: “But perhaps, I [Socrates] said, there is a model of it in 
heaven, for anyone who wants to look at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of 
what he sees. It makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take 
part in the practical affairs of that city and no other.”  
185 Ober (1998): 160. 
186 Establishing their status and co-fraternity with the other classes of the state is the point of 
the noble lie in Resp. 4.414b. 
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same roles that the lowest class of citizens did in the Republic. Metics are allowed to stay in 
the city for only twenty years (Pl. Leg. 8.850b-c), while slaves are to be imported from 
different countries and speak different languages, and therefore have little cultural or 
social connection to the city whatsoever (Leg. 6.777c-d).187 Like the Republic, strict 
separation of roles is enforced to a degree: citizens are banned from working as 
craftspeople and laborers (Leg. 8.846d), as such roles are only to be filled by metics (Leg. 
8.849d). Even within the class of craftspeople and laborers, there is to be no switching of 
roles.188 In contrast to contemporary Athens, the laboring class is not only institutionally 
excluded from politics, but also spatially separated from each other and the rest of the 
citizens through their residency in thirteen separate districts around the city (Leg. 
8.848e).189 The only interactions between citizens and the craftsmen metics are to be 
through mediated and regulated business in the city’s twelve separate and orderly markets, 
overseen by the market-wardens, and then only on specific days of the month (Leg. 8.848e-
849c). Such activity is a far cry from the agora at Athens, which served as a civic, 
commercial, and social space.190 The Athenian agora provided the backdrop for interactions 
                                                            
187 Stalley (1983): 106-108.  
188 This is a law to be enforced by the City-Wardens (Leg. 8.847a). In the Republic, Socrates and 
Glaucon had agreed that a carpenter attempting “to do the work of a cobbler” would do some 
small harm to the city, but far less notable when compared to the harm of a craftsman 
attempting enter the ranks of soldiers (Pl. Resp. 4.434b).  
189 Sobak (2015): 705 n. 71.  
190 Wycherly (1956): 3: “If law-courts were embedded in market-districts, political activity too 
was not confined to council-house and magistrates’ office but was carried on vigorously in the 
neighboring shops just as in the cafés of modern Athens”; Camp (1992): 122: While many of the 
smaller shops were not on the public square known as the agora proper in the fifth century, 
there were also large stoai constructed as early as the 420s B.C. (such as “South Stoa I”) where 
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between many different social classes and individuals, often to the chagrin of conservative 
critics at the time.191 In this way the Athenian interlocutor of the Laws appears acutely 
aware of and responsive to Athenian social behaviors that are not what we in the modern 
day would call political, but seem to be linked together for ancient thinkers.  
The fact that the ideal city of Magnesia in the Laws is characterized not only by 
institutional and social rigidity but also geographic and spatial separation highlights one of 
the characteristics of πολυπραγμοσύνη that has been teased at by various writers who had 
associated it with the urban polis, the agora, and the civic institutions, but not explicitly 
drawn the connection. In Plato, the polypragmatic behaviors that characterize democratic 
cities are not only institutional; they also refer to types of individual behaviors that expand 
purely social interactions and increase contact between the ostensibly separated groups in 
the ideal poleis. Whether the intended goal, or part of a broader goal of creating unity in 
these ideal cities, it seems that both the Athenian Stranger and Socrates (and other 
conservative critics of socializing, politicking, and non-elite interactions in the agora) 
attempt to hamper a process of democratic information-gathering and knowledge sharing 
that is only made possible in a city where individuals are polypragmatic—where the farmer 
and urban laborer (or the silversmiths and the cobblers) work and trade together in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
private individuals were allowed to carry out commerce in the heart of the agora. South Stoa I 
itself bordered the Heliaia, the main court of the city.  
191 Vlassopoulos (2007): 40; Aristotle Politics 1331b argues that in his ideal city that there should 
be different agorai and locations for economic business, for sacred buildings, law courts, and 
leisure. He recommends particularly a Thessalian agora, which is called a “ἐλευθέραν,” into 
which “no artisan or farmer may intrude unless summoned by the magistrates.”  
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agora, attend the assembly together and serve on the council, and perhaps serve in the 
military together.192 
It is not, however, only the metics and citizens who are separated spatially from 
each other in this polis, it is also the citizens who are set spatially apart from each other as 
well. In the ideal state of the Laws, all families are to own equally divided lots of agricultural 
land (Leg. 5.737d-e), making them in essence, farmers. As was mentioned above, citizens are 
to refrain from manufacture and trade but it is not entirely clear whether these citizens 
will be working their own land, or slaves will be doing it for them.193 The fact that the 
citizens are ordered to concentrate solely on maintaining good order, which requires study 
and practice, and is not a part-time job, seems at odds with the Athenian Stranger’s 
comments that the lowest two classes of the citizen population need not (and presumably 
will not regularly) attend the assembly (6.764a). In the theorized Magnesia the citizens are 
to own land, serve in the military, and elect leaders and (to a degree) engage in politics—
something that appears to be breaking the dictum set down in the republic of 
specialization. However, Stalley notes that the roles that had previously been kept away 
from the guardians and the rulers of Kallipolis by assigning them to the lowest class of 
citizens, in this case have been pawned off on the metics and the slaves of the city, who do 
not participate in the franchise.194 In the case of the Laws, the citizens are homogenized and 
                                                            
192 Vlassopoulos (2007): 40; Ar. Nub. 1002-8; Theophrastus’s Characters abound with individuals 
who are presented as being particularly onerous, chatty, and gossiping in marketplaces; 
Aristophanes’ characters (Ar. Ach. 725) particularly associate the agora with commerce, 
πολυπράγμονες, and sycophants; as mentioned in the last chapter, the autourgos in Euripides’ 
Orestes 930 is notable and praised for rarely being in the marketplace.  
193 Stalley (1983): 102.  
194 Stalley (1983): 111.  
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given roughly the same roles, and much of their association and personal contact is not 
separate from, but under the umbrella of the central state. The twelve village centers 
established outside of the main city center in Magnesia (known as demes) are “spatially 
extended enough not to be natural sites of associational activity.”195 While the citizens are 
often brought together to eat in common messes established by the state called syssitia, 
(Leg. 1.635e-636a) they are not particularly encouraged to associate formally or informally 
outside of the institutions of the central state. Solidarity is so important to Magnesia that 
the Athenian Stranger can say that “ἑταιρεία,” companions, clubs, or associations, are one 
of the most dangerous things for the state.196 
 The fact that the Stranger in Plato’s Laws spatially separates and regulates the kind 
of behaviors that are allowed to occur in the agorai of Magnesia is perhaps one of the 
greatest ways that he differentiates his cities from the contemporary Athenian life. To an 
elite critic such as Plato, the agora of Athens might represent the height of 
πολυπραγμοσύνη. As noted before, those seeking information, rumors, and gossip all 
operate in the marketplace and by the court buildings located therein. However, a huge 
variety of interconnected and diverse activities happened on a daily basis in the Athenian 
agora. After listing the variety of judicial, economic, conversational, and entertainment 
activates that went on in one of Athens’ large stoai197—the architecturally open, covered, 
                                                            
195 Kierstead (2013): 6. 
196 Kierstead (2013): 7.  
197 Millett (1998): 215: The Stoa Poikile served as a patriotic art gallery, a military museum, an 
execution chamber, a location for arbitration, a law-court, a strolling place for the stoic 
philosophers and fashionable men of letters, as well as a haven of street entertainers and 
beggars.   
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and multifunctional colonnades that surrounded the city’s squares198—Millet summarizes 
them as synecdoche of the activities in Athens’ agora as a whole:  
 “The mixing of activities and persons within the space of the Stoa Poikile 
exemplifies in miniature the blending of formal and informal, public and private 
that went on over the whole of the Agora area. In civic terms, the classical Agora 
was the setting for administration, publicity, justice, ostracism, imprisonment, 
religion, processions, dancing, athletics, and equestrian displays. In addition to 
persons passing through, individuals might gather there to get information (official 
or otherwise), gather a crowd, gamble, torture a slave, get hired as labourers, bid 
for contracts, accost a prostitute, seek asylum, have a haircut, beg for money or 
food, fetch water, watch a cock-fight and find out the time. The list is hardly 
exhaustive. And going on all around was the business of buying and selling.”199 
 
 In contrast, Plato separates the civic and political from the economic, commercial, 
and social in the Laws. Assemblies are moved to religious sites (Leg. 5.738d) and magistrates 
are to be elected in temples (Leg. 8.848d). As was mentioned above, strict regulations are 
imposed on buying and selling, and interactions between citizens, slaves, and metic 
craftspeople in the marketplaces are monitored for their conduct; goods are sold for fixed 
prices (Leg. 8.849-850a). In contrast, in Millett’s words, the agora of Athens provided a 
“neutral stage on which all citizens, however poor, had good reason regularly to appear, 
relate to, and (if they wished) compete with each other.”200 The structure of Athens’ own 
agora and its relationship to civic spaces also keys into one of Plato’s key arguments against 
πολυπραγμοσύνη. The spatial closeness of the workshops and stalls to civic spaces allows 
                                                            
198 Wycherly (1978): 37 notes the radical openness of the stoai: “essentially it was a long narrow 
structure with a solid wall on one long side and an open colonnade on the other” and “was not 
attached to any other structure, but rather formed the edge of an open space.”  
199 See Millett (1998): 215 cf. n. 25 on 215-216 for what is an incredibly extensive list of literary 
references in classical Athenian literature to all of the above activities happening in the 
Athenian agora.  
200 Millett (1998): 220.   
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more individuals to participate more easily in the civic activities of the city. The hill of the 
Pnyx, which is near the agora, is less than a ten-minute walk away. Xenophon’s “fullers, 
shoemakers, smiths, peasants, and merchants” are enabled to dominate the assembly, 
partially because the assembly is so close to their place of work.201 It is not hard to imagine 
that many of the banausoi of Athens’ marketplace could attend some of the shorter 
assembly meetings.202 They could have performed this duty without significant cost to their 
earnings in a given day, especially if many of their clients and neighboring vendors were 
doing the same.203 For those wishing to attend the courts, the spatial location was even 
more congruous—most courts met in the agora. Many private suits were over in two hours, 
and while public suits had the potential to last all day, jurors were still compensated.204 
 The cities of the Republic and the Laws are not structurally or entirely ideologically 
consistent with each other, nor do they have to be for the purposes of this study.205 What is 
crucial about the two depictions of idealized states in Plato’s works is what they reveal 
                                                            
201 Millett (1998): 223.  
202 Hansen (1999): 136 notes that it was noteworthy that meetings might go from dawn to dusk. 
More often than not, the Athenian assembly meetings (which began in the morning) probably 
lasted a few hours and were over by midday. The fact that the council often met for their daily 
meeting after assembly meetings demonstrates that meetings could not have regularly been all 
day affairs.  
203 The fact that the assembly became paid throughout the fourth century certainly would have 
aided this process as well, at a rate that started at 3 obols for an assembly meeting, which grew 
to 1 drachma, according to Ath. Pol. 41.3 and Jones (1952): 14. On 23-24 Jones also heartily rejects 
the claim that one could make a living drawing pay from serving on the various organs of 
government. The yearlong council pay could only be drawn for at most, twice in a lifetime, 
while the possibility of being one of the 6000 jurors in a given year was slim and not something 
to be counted on. He sums up: “The majority of the citizens were then workers who earned 
their own livings and whose political pay served only to compensate them in some measure for 
loss of working time.”  
204 Hansen (1999): 186-187. 
205 Stalley (1983): 8.   
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about what Plato, an acute observer and critic of Athenian political life, saw as particularly 
noteworthy and particularly democratic. Beginning with the contentions that individuals 
are best suited to one role, and that political expertise requires specialization and 
education not available to the majority of citizens in his contemporary democracy due to 
both their lack of education and natural capacities, Plato’s characters construct highly 
ordered societies, and therefore remove non-elites from the processes of political decision-
making. Underlying the arguments of the Republic and the Laws, and explicitly stated in the 
Statesman, is the contestation that the majority of these non-elite individuals (who served 
as jurors, assemblymen, and magistrates in democratic Athens) had any sort of knowledge 
of a political art of ruling that was distinct from their own discrete and separate trades (Pl. 
Plt. 305c). Here the ideal ruler is posited as the one that knows how to organize these 
discrete and separate arts based on when is the right and wrong time to use them (305d). It 
could be noted that such an organization of the discrete and separate trades by a single 
mind is essentially the ideal that is expressed in the social organizations in the Republic and 
the Laws.206 There society is ordered by educated elites who (in the Republic in particular) 
grasp the expert knowledge of the Form of the Good, one that is “not communicable to 
non-experts.”207 Plato is therefore concerned with, and highly critical of the value of 
knowledge among common people, particularly those that participated in Athens’ 
democracy, and the possibly of such knowledge to shape good decision-making.208 
                                                            
206 Sobak (2015): 705. 
207 Ober (2008): 93.  
208 Bang (2009): 449.  
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 Plato’s emphasis on questioning popular wisdom and establishing different 
standards of valid knowledge than that of the democratic populace is directly related to his 
desire to limit πολυπραγμοσύνη in both of his cities. My sketch of the πολυπράγμων in fifth 
and fourth century Athenian literature suggests that one of the primary facets of the 
πολυπράγμων, and of a cultural stereotype of a busybody—even in our day—is inquisitive, 
active, and information-seeking behavior. The orators (who have rhetorical defense as 
their goals) and playwrights (who had comedy as theirs) had often connected the gathering 
and spread of such information to the goal of aiding libelous prosecutions, abetted by 
slander and rumor. Such behavior can really only be played out in the open spaces of the 
city—particularly in places like the agora, in ways that I have already sketched out above. 
Demosthenes notes that his opponent in Against Aristogeiton makes his way through the 
marketplace seeking individuals against whom to bring calumny or mischief (Dem. 25.52). 
Demosthenes additionally calls Aristogeiton part of a class of meddlers (τῶν 
περιεργαζομένων, Dem. 26.15). Aristophanes’ Wealth ties the spread of rumors in the polis to 
the people who sit gossiping in barbers’ shops (Ar. Plut. 337-338), and in a fragment of 
Eupolis a slave announces that he learns many things in the barbershops. When Peisetairos, 
the embodiment of Athenian πολυπραγμοσύνη in Aristophanes’ Birds, critiques the Birds 
for being ignorant and not inquisitive (ἀμαθὴς γὰρ ἔφυς κοὐ πολυπράγμων, Ar. Av. 469-
471), he highlights the relationship between information gathering and πολυπραγμοσύνη.  
 One of the most notable images of the information gathering πολυπράγμων comes 
from Plato himself. His Socrates, in the Apology, when on trial for his life, admits that his 
traditional activity of interrogating individuals about their morals in private (ἰδίᾳ μὲν 
ταῦτα συμβουλεύω) might be viewed as meddling (πολυπραγμονῶ, Pl. Ap. 31c). The use of 
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“ἰδίᾳ” which can mean “in private,” or “as a private citizen” is in this case deceiving. While 
Socrates claims to never have had any public political role of speaking in the assembly, 
holding magisterial office, or pursuing lawsuits in the courts (Pl. Ap. 32b), his inquiries are 
an entirely public affair. In Plato’s dialogues, they more often take place in public spaces 
such as the agora, public stoai, on the streets of Athens, at open palaestra and gymnasia, 
inhabited by and including diverse social classes and individuals and in front of spectators 
just as they are to be private conversations set in the homes of Socrates’ wealthy and 
aristocratic associates.209 Xenophon (in contrast to Plato) represents Socrates as actually 
interacting with many artisans and laborers, and other lower folk.210 In Plato’s Apology, 
Socrates himself mentions that he has interrogated the manual artisans (Pl. Ap. 22b) along 
with the poets and the politicians as to their sources of wisdom. For both the sycophant 
and the itinerant philosopher, figures that are tarred with the name of πολυπράγμων, the 
intermingling, spatial closeness, and occupational diversity that is present in Athens is 
crucial to their business of generating and sifting through information in a democratic 
city-state. Athens was not, as multiple scholars have noted, a face-to-face society with 
“everyone knowing everyone else and their business.”211 However, “free spaces” in Athens 
like the agora, which gathered—either due to business, politics, or leisure—a wide variety 
of individuals of differing social status and function (some citizens, some not) were crucial 
                                                            
209 In the agora: Menexeus, Parmenides; in streets and public places: Gorgias, Second Alcibiades, 
Greater Hippias, Ion, Meno; at palestrai, gymnasia and other schools: Charmides, Lysis, Euthydemus, 
Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman; Public buildings and stoai: Euthyphro, Eryxias, Theages. Locations 
taken from Nails (2002): 308-330.   
210 Xen, Mem. 3.10.1. 
211 Millett (1998): 228; Vlassopoulos (2007): 36. 
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for maintaining the possibility and opportunities for random or deliberate information 
gathering through encounters between citizens.212 
 Whether entirely intentional or simply a side goal of his broader philosophic 
treatments of the just cities, in constructing elaborately rigid and spatially separated 
societies Plato negates even the possibility of these kinds of exchanges, contacts, and 
accumulation and dispersal of knowledge between groups and classes that is represented 
by the Socratic πολυπράγμων. There also would have been little room in Plato’s ideal cities 
for many of the characters depicted by the writer Theophrastus, comic types that 
nevertheless reveal some things about Athenian social behavior in the fourth century.213 
Such figures not only include the περίεργος, a fourth century synonym for πολυπράγμων,214 
but also the chatty individual who goes about from group to group, marketplace to palestra, 
seeking and spreading information (Theophr. Char. 7.4-6.), or the garrulous man who 
approaches strangers in public places and engages them in conversation unprompted 
(Theophr. Char. 3.1-3). Obviously, such individuals are presented as caricatures, but Plato’s 
ideal societies seem to present little use for such individuals—they are idlers, dabblers in 
many things that are not their own, and busybodies. I only hint here at the value that such 
individuals like Plato’s Socrates and even Theophrastus’s “garrulous man” have for the 
functioning of the democracy—that will be a major piece of my final chapter.  
                                                            
212 Vlassopoulos (2007): 38: “Free spaces are spaces that brought together citizens, metics, slaves 
and women, created common experiences and interactions, and shaped new forms of identity. 
We can define a number of such spaces: the agora, the workplace, the tavern, the house, the 
trireme, and the cemetery.” Cf. Millett (1998): 228.  
213 Ussher (1993): 23. 
214 Leigh (2013): 48. 
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 Plato’s work demonstrates clearly that—at least in his mind—πολυπραγμοσύνη was 
a crucial part of the Athenian democratic character and experience, both an outgrowth of 
the rule of the many and the political equality and freedom that Athenian social and 
political life introduced. Thus, it was something to be limited and mitigated, and his 
prescriptions for Kallipolis and the city of Magnesia in the Laws reflect this desire, through 
the institution of rigid specialization of both political and economic roles. Yet, it seems that 
Plato’s spatially separated and closed societies do not simply work towards the goal of 
creating expertise by promoting specialization. They also seem particularly geared towards 
hampering the social conditions that allowed for the gathering of knowledge and its 
dispersal in democratic Athens—particularly in their antipathy to the mix of business, 
politics, and social life present in the Athenian agora. A crucial part about being a 
πολυπράγμων is not simply being a doer of many things, but also being a knower of many 
things. The fact that the way this elite epistemic critique of Athens is borne out in part by 
directly limiting πολυπραγμοσύνη points to a larger question of how the Athenian citizens 
generate, gather, and disperse knowledge amongst themselves, and the value and utility of 
polypragmatic behaviors to democratic decision-making. 215 In my next chapter—in 
conjunction with theories from modern social science—I hope to demonstrate that 
behaviors that are typically described as polypragmatic and negative (by both democrats 
and critics of the democracy) actually aided the Athenian process of knowledge dispersal, 
enforced and supported community norms, and led to the kind of political and community 
                                                            
215 Sobak (2015): 704.  
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Chapter Four 
Epistemic Democracy and the Polypragmon 
 
The broad Platonic critique of Athenian culture, political institutions, and social 
structure that I have highlighted in the Republic, Laws, and the Statesman was primarily 
concerned with whether those making decisions in political institutions—namely, the 
diverse and significantly non-elite citizens of Athens—are capable of manifesting “a form of 
wisdom when they gather in political Assembly, and so prove capable of deciding what 
would be best for the polis,” as Ober has succinctly put it.217 While the specifics differ from 
dialogue to dialogue, Plato’s characters argue that ruling is something that in idealization 
might be done by those individuals with a superior higher knowledge of governing. In the 
Republic philosophers or kings carry this out informed by the philosophic Form of the Good 
(Pl. Resp. 7.520b-521c), and in the Statesman by the unique individual who possesses a skill of 
a secondary level of knowledge from the discrete, separate, and subordinate technai that 
are the subject of their direction within the city (Pl. Plt. 304d-305d).218 In the Laws, the small 
citizen body technically rules, but the highest sovereignty is given to the laws.219 It has 
been noted by scholars that the Platonic treatment of the practical banausic arts and other 
technai—which lack the transcendent character of knowledge arrived at through “sight, 
                                                            
217 Ober (1998): 160.  
218 Among the arts that are “set in motion” when it is “the right time to begin” and the “wrong 
time to begin” (305c-d) are the banausic arts involving “work with the hands,” (304b) the art of 
rhetoric (304c-e), generalship (304e), and the art of judgement (305c).  
219 Stalley (1983): 9: “Thus law in some ways takes the place of the philosopher kings who 
exercise sovereignty in the Republic. Since the ultimate purpose of law is, in Plato’s view, to 
make the citizens virtuous, law and education are so closely linked that at times they become 
almost indistinguishable.”  
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speculation, contemplation”—has led to a long-standing bias against and preference in 
higher education and scholarship for a non-banausic definition of “valid knowledge.”220  
Plato’s critique of the capacity of democracies to use knowledge to function 
effectively works in tandem with, but is substantially different, from comments offered by 
other critics of the democracy. A critic like the Old Oligarch shares Plato’s concern about 
the morality and the excessive individual freedom permitted at Athens,221 but makes his 
primary argument against the democracy not that the rule of the demos—synonymous with 
the worse people—is incompetent, but instead that it rules only in the interest of those 
worse many (Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1). In fact, the Old Oligarch even grudgingly admits that the 
democracy is successful at perpetuating its own regime, but also at accomplishing things 
other city-states are unable to do (Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1, 3.1). In a section of Aristotle’s Politics 
that has been contested in recent years, the philosopher notes that it is possible that in 
deliberation “each person that composes the crowd is not individually a good man, but 
when they join together they may be better, not individually, but collectively.”222   
At the end of my previous chapter, I provisionally sought to connect Plato’s broader 
epistemic critique of democracy with the political and societal proposals that his 
                                                            
220 Egan (1987): 445. Lewis (1993): 176-178: “Epistemological notions in the Greek Platonic 
tradition have had a nagging resiliency through the ages, transported through time especially 
via the medium of the great English universities, and the instrument or the concept of liberal 
education.”  
221 Ps.-Xen. Ath Pol. 1.11; Pl. Resp. 8.563b equates the extensive political freedom to citizens 
available at Athens as having led to equal freedoms to social inferiors like slaves and metics.  
222 See Waldron (1995): 569 “I think that Aristotle, in espousing DWM, is in fact committing 
himself to the proposition that the many acting collectively may be a better judge than the few 
best not only of matters of fact, not only of social utility, but also and most importantly of 
matters of ethics, value, and the nature of the good life—issues which go beyond the mere 
accumulation of individual experiences.” In contrast, see Cammack (2013): 178.  
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characters espouse in the Republic and the Laws, particularly as they relate to 
πολυπραγμοσύνη. First, Plato’s Socrates makes explicit the ties between a democratic 
political structure and the behaviors of πολυπραγμοσύνη. In the Republic and the Laws, one 
sees that it is the endless participation of the Athenians in multiple roles—as soldiers, 
artisans, members of associations, and most importantly, participants in decision-making 
bodies—as being the essentially polypragmatic characteristic of Athenian social and 
political life. In Plato’s thought, this Athenian tendency to do many things is doubly 
dangerous—it ensures that individuals will never have the time to perfect one role and will 
never be an expert at one thing. Therefore they will sub-optimally fill all of the varied roles 
that they attempt to participate in, ruling being the most important of them.223 On first 
blush it may not seem that Plato’s focus is specifically concerned with the other types of 
πολυπραγμοσύνη that I had sought to demonstrate in my previous chapters, as referenced 
by the fifth-century comedians and the fourth-century popular orators, who (in the case of 
Euripides and Aristophanes) may have questioned the values and character of frequent 
political, social, and economic busyness and involvement, but did not advocate for a 
reduction of the franchise or endorse anything like Plato’s social structures. Their 
πολυπραγμοσύνη appears as a negative (or at least comic) behavior at the intersection of 
public and private life, featuring energetic, information gathering, agora residing, and 
lawsuit bringing πολυπράγμονες who are more on the nosy side of being a busybody, 
whereas Plato’s polypragmatic democrats appear as the hyperactive doers and joiners—less 
                                                            
223 The depiction of the “democratic man” in Pl. Resp. 8.561c-d is similar in content to some of 
the characteristics of the πολυπράγμων. Plato is obviously playing up the fickle and disorderly 
aspect of the democratic man, but he is characterized by a multiplicity of impulses, which he 
alternatively acts on in seemingly irrational ways.  
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interested in information, they are doers of many things—the linguistic essence of πολύ-
πράγματα.  
Yet, I believe that the ways that Plato’s ideal poleis attempt to impose social and 
spatial rigidity, mediated interactions between citizens, and an antipathy to the culture of 
free spaces that characterized Athens is an oblique response to the πολυπραγμοσύνη 
represented in the popular culture of Athens—particularly centered on limiting the spread 
and generation of democratic knowledge. I will not retread my arguments here, but I 
merely reintroduce them to make the argument that Plato’s goal of limiting 
πολυπραγμοσύνη in a well-ordered state is equally designed to prevent the kinds of 
contexts that undergird the kinds of social, spatial, and situational interactions and ties 
that enable Plato’s restless multifarious individuals to judge, vote, buy, sell, and gossip all 
on the same day in the same location as well as allow for any number of defendants and 
litigants to investigate both fact and rumor amongst their fellow citizens.  
Largely because Plato’s epistemic critique of democracy seems antithetical to any 
notion of a social basis for valid knowledge, and because the inquisitive πολυπράγμων 
which he so proscribes thrives off of a social setting, I see the πολυπράγμων and 
πολυπραγμοσύνη as being ripe for analysis on basis of modern social science scholarship 
examining social ties, and information dissemination and aggregation in diverse groups. I 
would particularly like to follow in the footsteps of modern scholars in the classics who 
seek to use theories in modern social science and sociology to resolve quandaries and 
criticisms (such as Plato’s) about Athens’ ability to design, implement and enact effective 
and “good” policy, in a context where authority political decision-making and executive 
action were dispersed broadly amongst a socioeconomically and geographically diverse 
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populace. By considering the macro-level issue of Athens as an epistemic democracy 
grappling with the question of how to manage and aggregate knowledge and inform its 
citizen body, one sees the behaviors of the polypragmatic individual emerge as a useful and 
necessary part of the democratic state’s functioning. Such activity also need not be 
considered through the lens of altruism or patriotism—in a state such as Athens, 
πολυπραγμοσύνη on the part of individuals was indeed necessary to accomplish individual 
ends, be they for personal gain or in service of the state. By looking at the subject in this 
light, I hope to demonstrate how the behaviors described in such diverse works and 
contexts as πολυπραγμοσύνη could have contributed on an individual and micro-level 
structurally and socially to a macro-level governing environment where Athens could truly 
be considered as the nimble, innovative, and active and adventurous polis that Thucydides’ 
Corinthians present it to be.  
According to Ober, arguably the current leading scholar behind the synthesis of 
political science and classical studies on the subject of democracy, knowledge, and 
decision-making, a “democracy may said to be ‘epistemic’ to the degree to which it 
employs collective wisdom to make good policy.”224 This conception of democracy is not 
only concerned with whether, how, and why mass bodies might make good decisions, but is 
also interested in exploring the institutions and cultural context that facilitate the spread 
of necessary information in a social and political setting, and make such mass decision-
making possible. Joshua Cohen first introduced the term epistemic democracy into social 
science literature in an article where he argued that in an epistemic conception of 
democracy, there exists an “independent standard” of correct decision-making, a “cognitive 
                                                            
224 Ober (2012): 119.  
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account of voting” that expresses beliefs about what correct policies are, rather than 
simply personal preferences, and an account of “decision making as a process of the 
adjustment of beliefs, adjustments that are undertaken in part in light of the evidence 
about the correct answer that is provided by the beliefs of others.”225 In his conception, 
“what the epistemic populist claims is that, when there is a general will, and public 
deliberation is guided by principles that define that will, the decisions of majorities about 
which policies to pursue can provide good evidence about which policies are in fact 
best.”226 Putting it a different way, List and Goodin argue that the aim of epistemic 
democracy has previously been defined in relation to that of procedural democracy: “for 
procedural democrats, democracy is not about tracking any ‘independent truth of the 
matter’; instead the goodness or rightness of an outcome is wholly constituted by the fact 
of its having emerged in some procedurally correct manner.”227 It is therefore the 
“application of the appropriate procedure which is itself constitutive of what the best or 
                                                            
225 Cohen (1986): 34. The title of Cohen’s article is “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy,” but 
the characteristics that I am describing here fall under his sub-category of “Epistemic 
Populism.” 
226 Cohen (1986): 34.  
227 List and Goodin (2001): 279, 282 on which they note some of the practical tenets of 
democratic proceduralism: “Democratic proceduralists of the broader variety have insisted, 
among other things, that elections should be ‘free and fair,’ with voting proceeding without 
intimidation or corruption, and all valid ballots being counted; that the franchise should be 
broad, and elections regular and frequent; that the rules governing voting should be common 
knowledge, and the procedure by which votes are transformed into decisions publicly 
transparent…that social decisions should be preceeded by certain processes of reasoned 
political deliberation and communication, and that people affected by a decision ought be 
heard; and also that social decision procedures should be practically viable and implementable 
at acceptable costs.”  
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right outcome.”228 Scholars like David Estlund have advocated for a blending of the two 
views, arguing, “democratic laws claim legitimate authority in virtue of being the product 
of procedures that tend to make correct decisions.”229 
Some of the earlier scholarship on this subject focused heavily on the “jury 
theorem” of the Marquis de Condorcet (first set down in 1785), which argued that when 
voters face two options, and vote independently of each other, and vote their judgment of 
what the right solution to the problem is, rather than their interests, and if they on average 
have a greater than fifty percent chance of being right, as the number of jurors increases to 
infinity, the probability that the majority vote will yield the right number approaches one-
hundred percent. The initial version of such a theory’s premise was applied to jury trials in 
criminal cases, with a binary decision of guilty or not guilty, given a presumption that the 
jurors were legitimately attempting to discover the truth of the situation.230 Scholars have 
seen this as a powerful tool, and seek to expand the feasibility of his rule to allow it to apply 
to more than binary a-b decisions, such as ranking candidates amongst a variety of choices, 
or even to plurality voting procedures.231 However, there are certainly limits to this 
theorem. Even though some scholars have argued that the theorem can hold in plurality 
voting situations even when some individual decision makers are likely to be right less than 
fifty percent of the time—and is therefore perhaps a more realistic model of the average 
voter’s competences232—the theorem could hold strongly for the inverse; if individuals are 
                                                            
228 List and Goodin (2001): 281.  
229 Anderson (2008): 129-130. 
230 Anderson (2006): 11; List and Goodin (2001): Ober (2008): 109.  
231 Young (1988): 1232. List and Goodin (2001): 284.  
232 List and Goodin (2001): 285. 
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less likely rather than more likely to make the wrong decision, adding more individuals to 
the process will increase the probability of choosing wrongly to a strong degree.233 
 Elizabeth Anderson highlights the limitation of relying on such simple models of 
mass decision-making in arguing for the epistemic competence of democracy. Her 
criticisms of solely using the Condorcet theorem also set out broader principles for 
institutional arrangements designed to promote the aggregation and responsiveness to 
diverse knowledge sources necessary for a successful and epistemic democracy. Condorcet 
relied on and assumed an epistemically homogenous citizen body (citizens all shared 
similar knowledge) that is not the case in democratic deliberation in both ancient and 
modern contexts. In fact, many arguments made for the knowledge-aggregating powers of 
democratic governance specifically highlight the diversity of knowledge in a community as 
a crucial benefit and necessity.234 Additionally, such a theory supposes that voters vote 
independently of one another, which excludes the ability to pool information. “Without 
access to public fora for sharing information and opinions beyond their immediate 
knowledge, voters are uninformed and often helpless.”235 
 Anderson, in setting out criteria for epistemic democracy, sees a useful analogy in 
the works of Friedrich Hayek, who argued that the problems of efficiently allocating 
                                                            
233 Gaus (1997): 150: “Populists should be cautious about appealing to the jury theorem, as it is 
not clear that it endorses widely responsive procedures: the probability of a correct answer 
plunges just as dramatically downward if the average voter is more likely to be wrong than 
right.” 
234 Anderson (2006): 11: “Most of the problems democracies have to solve are complex, and have 
asymmetrically distributed effects on individuals according to their geographic location, social 
class, occupation, education, gender, age, race, and so forth. Since individuals are most familiar 
with the effects of problems and policies on themselves and those close to them, information 
about these effects is also asymmetrically distributed.” 
235 Anderson (2006): 11.  
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economic resources could not be solved by state planning, “because these facts are never 
so given to a single mind,” and therefore “it is necessary that in the solution of the problem 
knowledge should be used that is dispersed among many people.”236 For Hayek, this 
translated to a preference for markets and price valuation as a method of economic 
resource allocation. Anderson argues that in terms of the spread of non-economic and 
other useful information there exists other ways that socially dispersed information can be 
transmitted through a society: “votes and talk—democratic institutions.”237 Such a 
description of the collective and dispersed intelligence existing in society fits with 
Landemore’s characterization of collective intelligence and distributed intelligence. 
Collective intelligence is the idea that the intelligence of the group is more than simply the 
sum of the individual intelligence of its members.238 It implies that there is a value added 
when the distributed intelligence of a given population or group is brought together by the 
“votes and talk” institutions that Anderson identifies with democracy. Distributed 
intelligence is a crucial concept to think about, especially when later considering the 
Athenian situation, because it implies that knowledge “cannot be simply traced to 
individual minds but rather to the interaction between those minds and between them and 
their environment.”239 The collective intelligence of a society too is distributed, “it is not 
located in one central entity, but stretched over many individuals and the cognitive 
artifacts that are part of their environment.”240 
                                                            
236 Hayek (1945): 530; Anderson (2006): 8-9.  
237 Anderson (2006): 9.  
238 Landemore (2008): 17-18.  
239 Landemore (2008): 19-20.  
240 Landemore (2008): 21. 
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 John Dewey, as cited by Anderson, favored an account of democratic government 
similar to that proposed by Anderson and Landemore, calling it “the use of social 
intelligence to solve problems of practical interest,”241 run first through the thought 
process of deliberation, then enactment, and then a responsive evaluation of the results. In 
her telling, “Dewey took democratic decision-making to be the joint exercise of practical 
intelligence by citizens at large, in interaction with their representatives and other state 
officials. It is cooperative social experimentation.”242 Dewey saw that universal inclusion in 
a democratic system ensured first that the problems being addressed were genuinely in the 
public interest (if majorities of the population seek to act on them) as well as a crucial 
means of “pooling asymmetrically distributed information for decision-making.”243 
Anderson, writing in a modern democratic context, notes that for information to be 
aggregated and spread across a citizen body, individuals “need access to channels of 
communication with one another and government decision-makers,” as well as need to 
“follow norms that welcome or at least tolerate diversity and dissent.” For democracies to 
make use of these epistemic benefits, they must not only have legal and institutional 
structures, but also the cultural characteristics of “a way of life governed by cultural norms 
of equality, discussion, and tolerance of diversity.”244  
  It is not within the scope of my own project to fully evaluate the broad claims of 
these various epistemic conceptions of democracy. Many rely on statistical and probability 
driven-models or studies carried out in the modern day. My own contribution to the 
                                                            
241 Anderson (2006): 13.  
242 Anderson (2006): 13. 
243 Anderson (2006): 14.  
244 Anderson (2006): 15.  
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subject will be limited to a subsection of the relationship between social interactions, 
political participation, and the spread of knowledge in Athens. However, modern scholars 
in the fields of classics and political science have sought to integrate modern thinking 
about epistemic democracy, institutions, and the spread of knowledge in order to better 
explain the functioning of Ancient Athens as a whole. Ober took on this task in his 
Democracy and Knowledge, which argued that Athens had a particularly “modern” approach 
to aggregating, aligning, and codifying knowledge that allowed for “Athenian 
exceptionalism,” and Athens’ “ability to outperform its rivals.”245 By using the limited 
statistical data remaining to modern scholars about ancient Greece, Ober argues that 
Athens was a success story in the ancient world—a polis that was bigger, wealthier, and had 
more institutional and cultural longevity than many of its neighbors246—not only because 
of its democratic institutions and culture, but because those institutions specifically sought 
to employ “knowledge in action,” by which Ober means “making information available for 
socially productive purposes through individual choices made in the context of 
institutional processes, and involving both innovation and learning.”247  
Ober further narrows his subject of knowledge in action into a definition of 
“politically relevant knowledge” consisting of “people’s beliefs, capabilities, experience, 
and information, organized in ways that can be reproduced and shared within and among 
collectivities.” Such information “conjoins social/interpersonal and technical/expert forms 
                                                            
245 Ober (2008): 27.    
246 To measure Athens’ success, Ober (2008) uses “Aggregate Flourishing” 43, “Distribution of 
coinage” 48, comparisons with Syracuse and Sparta 52, and citations in other Greek literature 
53-54.  
247 Ober (2008): 18.  
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of knowledge that are possessed by the organization as a whole (in the form of 
institutionalized processes and formal codes) and by individuals (both explicitly and 
latently).248 Social knowledge consists of knowledge of individuals, societal norms, 
institutions, and their characteristic practices—in a democratic community, it is necessary 
for participation in government and civic life, and is more or less broadly present in the 
political body. It includes knowledge of what individuals to trust, how one ought behave in 
public, and how to access political institutions.249 Technical knowledge accords more with the 
technai that so caught the interest of Plato’s Socrates. It is “specialized knowledge about 
how to use tools and processes to gain desired ends in a given domain of endeavor.” In 
contrast to social knowledge, there is likely to be only a limited number of true experts.250 
Ober’s endorsement of such a view is not to agree with Plato that one cannot do more than 
one thing well—it is simply acknowledging that in a society there will be fewer people who 
are the best at their skill, and a great many more who are somewhere between expert and 
mediocre. The job of decision-making institutions in a context where information and 
expertise are dispersed is therefore to bring the two types of knowledge together, allowing 
a body of individuals of various levels of expertise to jointly possess a range of knowledge 
beyond what could be found in a limited group of experts.251  
Ober largely turns to formal Athenian political and institutional design to explain 
how Athens aggregated what Landemore had called the “collective distributed intelligence 
                                                            
248 Ober (2008): 91.  
249 Ober (2008): 92.  
250 Ober (2008): 92.  
251 Ober (2012): 121. 
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of the people.”252 He focuses on the collegial magisterial boards, the assembly, and 
particularly the design of the Council of Five-Hundred, the agenda setting body for the 
Athenian assembly.253 However, in focusing on the macro-level structure of political 
institutions, I believe that Ober leaves some space in his interpretive theory for me to add 
to the nature of micro-level behaviors relating to the spread of knowledge and information 
in Athens. In one sense, Ober’s focus on deliberative and participatory institutions meets 
Anderson’s criteria for the two means non-market information may be spread in a 
democratic society: “votes and talk.” Strictly speaking, Athens’ institutions, particularly the 
Council of Five Hundred and the assembly, combined both institutionally. The council 
brought together a yearly cross-section of five hundred members of Athenian society. On 
the one hand it brought together a diverse group of citizens with respect to geography.254 
At the same time this distribution was likely socioeconomically, and presumably 
epistemically, diverse. It was a group that would spend a yearlong role together that 
involved intensive debate, communal administration, and occasionally even living full-time 
                                                            
252 Landemore (2008): 16. 
253 For a thorough description of how the council—despite having a new set of members every 
year—was able to pool information from geographically diverse areas of Attica, institutionally 
learn and develop, as well as build ties between citizens from different regions, see Ober (2012).  
254 Rhodes (1972): 4: The councilors were apportioned amongst the 139 demes of spread through 
Attica as a proportion of their size. Attica itself was a territory of over 2,500 km2 according to 
Morris (2009): 109. According to my measurements from Trail (1975): Maps 1-3, 43 of the demes 
were within a 10km radius of the city, while the rest were farther, with the farthest ones being 
Rhamnous to the northwest (37km), Sunion to the southeast (40km), Oinoe to the East (33km). 
Migration to the city during the Peloponnesian war attested by Thucydides (Thuc. 2.14-16) 
might have changed that, but recent scholars like Rosivach (1993): 397-398 and Taylor (2011): 
134 have challenged that fact, arguing that there was fluidity between city and country 
migration in the fifth and fourth centuries.  
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in the same space.255 The council was an institutional way for citizens to “talk,” as much as 
public debates of the assembly offered citizens the chance to “vote.”  
If an epistemic democracy is one that thrives off of the collection, aggregation, and 
interest in useful information, while also requiring and incentivizing the participation of 
many citizens within different deliberative and participatory institutions to make that kind 
of information useful to the city, it seems that Athens, both on a polis-wide macro level, as 
well as on an individual level, is eerily similar to the two broad types of the πολυπράγμων. 
The first is the individual who is busy, restless, and inquisitive, seeking information for 
public or private gain. Yet, πολυπραγμοσύνη also seems to entail a doing of many things 
such as participating in multifarious deliberative bodies, and filling various social roles. 
Being active as a deliberator and a trader in the marketplace, a craftsperson and a gossip—
these are a few of the ways that πολυπραγμοσύνη can represent a social or even hyper-
social approach to Athenian public life. Even if such a figure was not always praised in 
Athenian literature, in evaluating Athens from the more removed standpoint of epistemic 
democratic theory, several of the more positive characteristics that the πολυπράγμων 
embodies seem to fit into the criteria that Ober sets out for ideal participants in epistemic 
decision making.  
It is by expanding Anderson’s definition of “talk,” from her formulation of “votes 
and talk” that I hope to demonstrate the role and benefit of a positive πολυπράγμων in the 
epistemic marketplace of the social milieu of Athens. The individual who does many things, 
who frequents (and is notorious for always frequenting) public places, and has an interest 
                                                            
255 Hansen (1999): 254 notes that when one’s tribe was in their prytany, or administration of the 
council, one third of the tribe had to stay in the Tholos, the administrative building all day.  
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in the lives, experiences, and information of others, for whatever motivations, can serve an 
important role when one considers the ways information may be spread through social 
connections, networks, and “weak ties.” In this way, πολυπραγμοσύνη on the part of 
individual citizens (on the micro-level) serves as a crucial and necessary function before 
Ober’s and after institutional processes of knowledge aggregation. As was mentioned above, 
part of the problem experienced by a society like Athens, or any society that wishes to 
allow broad groups of non-experts to make decisions in non-hierarchical ways, is that 
necessary knowledge for forming, enacting, and evaluating government policy is incredibly 
varied.256 Michael Fuerstein, writing on this subject, doubts that there exists a Platonic-
style higher-order knowledge or “wisdom” that could simply allow one to pool all of these 
epistemic categories to make good policy decisions, and instead argues that it is more likely 
for communities to employ a “division of cognitive labor.”257 Much like Ober argues that 
the highest levels of expertise may exist in society, but are dispersed, he argues that 
politically “relevant bits and clusters of knowledge are abundantly, though by no means 
completely, available in principle” throughout society.258 In a similar vein, even in a 
theoretically idealized participatory democratic scenario, it is not always the experts on a 
given subject who will be attending a given meeting where their expertise might be useful. 
In the Athenian council, assembly, magisterial boards, or courts, subjects under discussion 
                                                            
256 Fuerstein (2008): 76-77 notes that such knowledge includes that of (a) administrating 
government and procedurally passing legislation, (b) general knowledge of the various 
sciences, theories, and practices behind governance (everything from economics to 
epidemiology), (c) knowledge of how a particular policy will affect the lives of citizens, and (d) 
knowledge of how citizens believe policies will affect their lives. 
257 Fuerstein (2008): 80. 
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might involve technical knowledge—such as shipbuilding for naval operations, building 
expenses or labor rates for individual artisans such as stonecutters and sculptors—as well 
as social knowledge, and knowledge about individuals—such as the citizenship status of an 
individual, or whether they were a slave or a metic—may not have always been immediately 
available to those on the governing body at the time. 
More importantly, even information that we take for granted as being centralized 
and accessible in our day at various institutional levels of government or in the business 
world—such as citizenship listings, taxation brackets and information, or even trade and 
business listings—were not easily accessible, or in some cases, nonexistent. Athens, as was 
noted previously, was not a face-to-face society as some modern commentators have 
pictured it, and ancient sources such as Thucydides and Isocrates make reference to that 
fact.259 However, certain institutional information was not centralized either, such as a list 
of who was and was not a citizen in Athens. Such information was physically dispersed 
amongst the demes of Attica, most of which were well away from the city center, inscribed 
in a deme register.260 Institutionally, to be a citizen of Athens, and to participate in the 
institutions located in the city center, one had to be first inscribed as a member of a 
                                                            
259 Cohen (2004): 105-106: “A society characterized by murky and complex multidimensional 
social affiliations and arrangements that were continually being modified by internal 
demographic mobility and by extensive immigration and emigration, Athens was not a ‘face-to-
face’ community—not on a polis wide scale, and not within its demes…” Thuc. 8.66 notes that 
the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred was made possible because the size of the city 
and the prominence of the conspirators seemed to exaggerate the power of the oligarchic 
sentiment; Isoc. 15.172 comments on the size and lack of interpersonal knowledge between 
individual citizens.  
260 Ath. Pol. 42.1. 
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deme.261 Such information was therefore not centrally located, and more often than not 
was procured through social means. While Whitehead notes that the “demesman as witness” 
was a common trope in Athenian court oratory, what is less known or explored are the 
mechanisms by which a defendant or prosecutor acquired their information on their legal 
adversaries.262 Particularly through proceedings in court cases that involved prosecutions 
over false citizenship, a prosecutor would most likely have to come in contact with, and 
inquire for information from, smaller and diverse communities within Athens (namely, 
demesmen of another tribe) that they were not familiar with or only know peripherally. 
Such activity might be the only possible way with which to bring a case, be it legitimate or 
not; yet, following the literary depictions set out by the first two chapters, such activity 
could also result in being branded as a πολυπράγμων.  
One way to theoretically consider the spread of information by individuals between 
discrete locations and clusters of knowledge in any given large (particularly non-face-to-
face) community is through the mechanism of “weak ties,” identified by the sociologist 
Mark Granovetter. Granovetter argued that in contrast to what might be commonly 
assumed, weak interpersonal social ties might actually be more effective for spreading 
useful information to a broader community of individuals or inquirers than strong ones. 
Defining the strength of a tie is largely intuitive—it is a “combination of the amount of 
time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services 
which characterize the tie.”263 Stronger ties imply more, frequent, and regular contact 
                                                            
261 Whitehead (1986): 97.  
262 Whitehead (1986): 227. 
263 Granovetter (1973): 1361. 
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between individuals, while weak ties imply less contact and regularity. Most individuals are 
situated at the center of a network of strong social ties such as family members, friends, 
and daily coworkers. Additionally, there is a mathematically high chance that your own 
strong ties will have strong, or at least weak ties to each other.264 Such ties are crucial to 
anyone. Considering them instrumentally, they provide greater support and are often 
more easily available.265 However, when considering such ties in the context of the spread 
of ideas, innovations, and information, a network that is dominated by strong ties will be 
seemingly paradoxically worse at providing those within it with new information. 
Granovetter uses the example of the spread of a rumor in a high-density strong tie 
network. If all of the individuals tell the rumor to their strong ties, it is more likely that 
they will be telling the rumors multiple times to the same people, and because one’s own 
strong ties are likely to have ties to each other, the rumor is less likely to leave the clique.266 
On the other hand, weak ties, infrequent connections, acquaintances, and other less 
immediate social contacts are more useful for sharing dispersed information because of 
their function as “bridges” between different social groups and discrete strong-tie clusters 
in a society. In Granovetter’s description, a bridge is the tie “in a network which provides 
the only path between two points.”267 When thinking about the dispersal of knowledge and 
                                                            
264 Granovetter (1973): 1362 uses the example: “If A-B and A-C ties exist, then the amount of 
time C spends with B depends (in part) on the amount A spends with B and C, respectively. (If 
the events "A is with B" and "A is with C" were independent, then the event "C is with A and B" 
would have probability equal to the product of their probabilities. For example, if A and B are 
together 60% of the time, and A and C 40%, then C, A, and B would be together 24% of the time. 
Such independence would be less likely after than before B and C became acquainted.)” 
265 Granovetter (1983): 209.  
266 Granovetter (1973): 1366.  
267 Granovetter (1973): 1364. 
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information in a large network, the bridge is the most logical and efficient way for 
information to spread between two discrete groups. Bridges are less likely to exist in 
groups dominated by strong ties, because, as was said before, the weak ties are still more 
likely to be between individuals generally in the same social sphere, rather than with of 
groups outside of it. Therefore, not all weak ties are bridges, but all bridges are weak ties.268 
In some cases, the bridging tie is not the only theoretical way that information may travel 
between social groups. However, it is often the most likely.  
 
Weak ties are important in terms of thinking about knowledge and the travel of 
knowledge because if a weak tie is a bridge, and it is the only way that social group A has 
any connection to social group B, it means that two distinct (and possibly epistemically 
diverse) groups who would have no connection to each other otherwise now have a means 
of sharing information with each other specifically through the individuals at both ends of 
the bridge.269 According to Granovetter, “individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of 
information from distant parts of the social system and will be confined to the provincial 
                                                            
268 Granovetter (1973): 1364. Granovetter notes that the possibility of a strong tie being the only 
connection between two individuals is likely only in a small community. The probability is low 
that B and C do not have (or do not develop) a connection independent (weak or strong) of A if 
strong ties exist between A-C and A-B.  
269 Although I am thinking about this in the context of the dissemination of knowledge, norms, 
and ideas, such social clusters could differ from each other in a variety of characteristics.  
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news and views of their close friends.”270 One of the most cited and empirically tested 
aspects of Granovetter’s thought is his claim that people are more likely to discover and 
receive information about job prospects through weak ties rather than strong ties.271 Such 
ties therefore are not only passive conductors of cultural symbols and ideas, and general 
news, but also information that can be useful in an immediate and instrumental way.272 The 
more weak “bridging” ties that an individual has, the more likely it is that they will have 
access to new innovations, norms, and information coming from the different groups. 
Weak ties offer a social mechanism through which one might be able to satisfy Ober’s and 
Fuerstein’s desires to see differentiated and dispersed clusters of technical, expert, and 
social knowledge interact across a society.  
The question might be asked as to why individuals should seek out these kinds of 
weak ties and the new kinds of information embodied in them, just as an Athenian citizen 
might ask the question Socrates asks of himself at the trial, “Why do you meddle?” 
(πολυπραγμονεῖς)273 These kinds of bridging ties can be useful for gathering and receiving 
information in an instrumental way—particular to solving certain specific problems, but 
from another modern perspective, they also allow individuals to benefit from the 
perspective of accumulating social capital. In the words of Roland Burt, social capital refers 
to the “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.” However, social 
                                                            
270 Granovetter (1983): 202.  
271 Granovetter (1983): 205. 
272 Granovetter (1983): 214.  
273 Pl. Ap. 31c. “ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύω 
περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ,” saying, “perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and 
interfere in other people's affairs to give this advice in private.” 
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capital can also be framed as the benefit one may have from occupying a certain space in a 
network or social structure.274 As Burt notes, “Certain people or certain groups are 
connected to certain others, trusting certain others, obligated to support certain others, 
dependent on exchange with certain others. Holding a certain position in the structure of 
these exchanges can be an asset in its own right.”275 Building off of Granovetter, he argues 
that weak bridging ties represent “structural holes” between differing groups in society, 
which creates a competitive advantage for the individual who is on one side of the hole. By 
being the sole receptor of information via the weak tie, this individual has “an advantage 
with respect to information access,” and is therefore incentivized to make a broad diversity 
of contacts, in order to “have a hand in, and exercise control over more rewarding 
opportunities.”276 Cultivating and taking advantage of such ties is not something everyone 
does, or is even in the position to do. However, Burt characterizes such individuals who do 
make use of this kind of information and social position in a network as having an 
entrepreneurial character—his research and empirical studies link those who take 
advantage of such holes as being more creative and innovative. He, like Granovetter, seeks 
to empirically link increased performance and innovative potential with networks that 
span weak ties, as compared to strong tie networks. 277 
The question to be raised is how such weak tie networks come into being. One way 
that Ober connects the development of weak ties and this kind of social entrepreneurial 
spirit in Athens is to consider it in an institutional sense. He sees the Council of Five 
                                                            
274 Burt (2000): 348.  
275 Burt (2000): 347.  
276 Burt (2000): 354, also 355.  
277 Burt (2000): 407.  
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Hundred (especially in its inception in 508/507 B.C., when Athens was socially reorganized 
by Cleisthenes, and few people knew each other from other demes) as a source of initiation 
of such weak ties—individuals were brought from all over Attica into close contact with 
each other for extended periods of time.278 There they developed contacts, exchanged 
information, and, hypothetically, created weak bridging ties between the strong-tie 
networks of the demes in the form of the councilors who attended in a given year.279 
However, another specifically non-institutional example favored by modern social 
scientists is the example of participation in civic and private associations that allow 
individuals to develop weak ties. Robert Putnam, who largely focuses on the role of civic 
life and social capital in the modern United States, argues that associating in groups in civil 
society is a way to both build weak ties and strong ties.  
Putnam’s conception of social capital and its benefits are broad. In fact, his work 
has been criticized for being a “catch-all” concept of community life.280 It is associated not 
only with advantages gained to individuals through networks, but also greater social 
cohesion, the promotion of common norms, and individual trust, simultaneously a public 
and private good.281 Putnam, writing in the tradition of previous thinkers such as Alexis de 
Tocqueville about modern liberal representative democracy—rather than participatory 
                                                            
278 Ath. Pol. 21.3-4 saw the Cleisthenic reorganization of demes into tribes that included equally 
the three geographic areas of the coast, the plains, and the uplands as being specifically for 
mixing the population up together. The author of Ath. Pol.’s narrative sees such a division as 
breaking the geographic divisions embodied by the factional strife represented by Megacles, 
Lycurgus, and the tyrant Peisistratus; Kierstead (2013): 121-122 seeks to make the current 
academic orthodoxy more nuanced—he believes that Cleisthenes did not seek to disrupt or 
replace old ties between demes and tribes, but simply supplemented them with more ties.  
279 Ober (2008): 127.  
280 Kierstead (2013): 24.  
281 Putnam (2000): 20.  
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direct democracy in the ancient style—sees the presence and prominence of such 
associations as being crucial to the health of a democratic system.282 Such associations 
discussed by de Tocqueville and Putnam are voluntary, are secondary associations 
(meaning not family and friends), and are characterized by horizontal relations.283 That is, 
they are largely non-hierarchical and egalitarian, and in that way, reflective of the 
democratic society around them.284  
In the Classics, James Kierstead and Nicholas Jones have recently done work on the 
associations of classical Athens, and both writers focus largely on the “internally ordered 
segments of public organization” as represented by the demes, phratries, and phyles.285 
Such organizations had institutional functions in Athens and cannot be considered purely 
voluntary in the modern sense. Membership in one of the demes was both inherited from 
birth (with some exceptions) and had a number of institutional functions attached to it. To 
be selected by lot for many citywide offices, candidates had to present themselves to be 
picked by lot at their phratry (or tribal) assembly, having been screened by their fellow 
demesmen first.286 Ober had identified the demes as sources of strong ties amongst the city, 
                                                            
282 de Tocqueville (2002): 489-500 for some of Tocqueville’s thought on the importance of 
associations to American society, as well as democratic societies in general.  
283 Warren (2001): 29.  
284 Putnam (2000): 339 sees certain associations “as places where social and civic skills are 
learned—‘schools for democracy’”; de Tocqueville (2002): 490 announces that in democratic 
societies, “all citizens are independent and weak; they can do almost nothing by themselves, 
and none of them can oblige those like themselves to lend them their cooperation. They 
therefore all fall into impotence if they do not learn to aid each other freely.” 
285 Jones (1999): 3-4; Kierstead (2013): 290: “I chose to focus on two mechanisms. The first is the 
construction of solidarity in the demes, and the second concerns the policing of citizenship 
boundaries by a series of associations.” 
286 Whitehead (1983): 276-278.  
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and saw the tribal contingents in the council of Five Hundred as a generator of weak ties 
from the perspective of individual non-institutional behavior.287 These are part of the 
institutional framework of Athen’s public organization, and not a response to or crafted by 
individual behavior. For most citizens, being a member of a deme, phratry, or phyle was 
not a choice, it was a reality of being a citizen—in fact, because most of these bodies were 
closed to the citizenry, it can be argued that they lack a major source of weak ties—
interaction with metics and slaves (freed and unfreed), who formed a sizeable part of the 
population of Athens.288  
Instead, I turn to some of the types of associations that Jones classifies as similar to 
voluntary organizations of the present day (meaning one did not have to be a citizen to 
join, and they were not included in the public structure of Athens’ internal organization).289 
Voluntary organizations such as dining-clubs, religious associations, sailor’s associations, 
brotherhoods and priesthoods, and business partnerships, all existed in Athens to some 
degree, although our evidence for them is limited, by all accounts.290 Religious 
organizations are particularly seen as developing ties between diverse members of a 
community—Clare Taylor notes in a study of certain fourth-century religious Attic 
inscriptional dedications that men, women, and slaves all contributed to and could be 
                                                            
287 Ober (2008): 127. 
288 Akrigg (2015): 157-158 notes that a total number of metics in Athens is elusive, but that it was 
a sizeable population. Many metics were “economic migrants,” but there were undoubtedly a 
large number of free slaves who stayed in the city and achieved metic status after achieving 
freedom. Akrigg uses this to argue that it is hard to speak of one distinct metic community or 
experience.  
289 Jones (1999): 3-4.  
290 Arist. Nic. Eth. 1160a. Jones (1999): 4 notes that “the closest that the classical period comes to 
a worker’s guild is a single unilluminating dedication by a number of servile or freed fullers.”  
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named together on group dedications.291 Some associations were obviously not cross-
cutting or bridging, and represent strong ties, such as the hetairia, usually translated as 
association, company, or group, which often refers to “private societies of upper-class 
males devoted to purely social activity amongst themselves.”292 Kierstead particularly 
points to the philosophical schools as being an example of an open, relatively cross-cutting 
associational structure that might have found replication in other aspects of Athenian life. 
According to Kierstead, the “location and origins of the philosophical schools fed into their 
character in the fourth century as open, dynamic institutions with permeable boundaries 
with the rest of the Athenian polis.”293 As I had previously mentioned, much of the earliest 
discourse between intellectuals in Athens (such as Socrates) happened in the public areas 
of the agora. However, even after his death, some of the schools, such as the eponymous 
Stoics and the Cynics also frequented public stoai and buildings in the agora, Athens’ most 
frequented and highly visible location.294 The gymnasia to which the later philosophical 
schools moved to (Antisthenes taught in the Kynosarges, Plato in the Academy, Aristotle in 
the Lyceum) were indeed farther out from the city center as to not automatically include 
the passerby in a given debate, yet, the gymnasia were indeed public spaces, and 
philosophic attendants are at least anecdotally known to have been more diverse than 
                                                            
291 Taylor (2015): 43: “Onomastic analysis suggests that the people commemorated here 
included citizens and non-citizens, men and women, and perhaps slave and free. However, 
citizenship status is never explicitly stated on these dedications, which implies that 
distinguishing between these groups was unimportant in this context.” 
292 Jones (1999): 223.  
293 Kierstead (2013): 214.  
294 Jones (1999): 230.  
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solely the sons of aristocratic men who typically exercised there.295 Plato himself taught for 
free—the only expense of attending for a lower-class citizen was remuneration for his (or 
her) lost wages for attendance. Metics were obviously allowed—the founder of the Lyceum 
school, Aristotle himself, was a metic.296  
There is evidence then, albeit slim, that associations which were voluntary and not 
associated with citizenship had the ability to have members of groups from many different 
areas of society. The philosophical schools offer a particular nexus of individuals who 
associate and spend time together, but are not particularly bound or divided from each 
other by ties of class, wealth or citizen status. Other associations for which we have little to 
no surviving evidence (possibly due to the fact that many of them would have belonged to 
lower-class individuals, for whom our surviving literary or physical evidence is truly 
scarce) such as the worker’s organizations, business partnerships, and sailor’s associations 
mentioned in Aristotle and other banausic trade guilds and associations could have been a 
source of at least weak ties between individuals who are neither of the same citizenship 
status, nor of the same deme or phratry.297 Trade organizations probably would not have 
crosscut divides of a socioeconomic nature, although they certainly might have cut across 
the metic-citizen divide. As Taylor noted, religious and cultic organizations seem to 
demonstrate a greater probability of being a location where a dedicated social 
                                                            
295 Jones (1999): 233; Kierstead (2013): 215.  
296 Diog. Laert. 4.1 notes that Speusippus, Plato’s first successor as head of the Academy, was 
criticized for introducing a fee to attend, which Plato was said to have not endorsed. Diog. 
Laert. 3.46 notes several women studying at the Academy during Speusippus’s time. Kierstead 
(2013): 216. 
297 Vlassopoulos (2007): 34 particularly speaks to the belief that modern scholars have 
“undervalued the importance of the non-agricultural population in classical Athens.” 
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entrepreneur of the type that Burt envisioned could have gathered and employed useful 
information and contacts. Due to the paucity of evidence, it is hard to make a firm 
argument on the subject, but these types of associations (in theory) offered individuals the 
possibility to accumulate ties, and therefore, knowledge, from different parts of the social 
spectrum.  
As I have argued, I believe that associations could have served as one of the loci for 
developing bridging paths for information and ideas, and weak ties in society. However, the 
modern focus on individual association also seems to come out of concerns within societies 
that are larger and greater distance (physical and institutional) between the individual, 
their neighbors, and their government. Tocqueville, who inspires much of modern theory 
on democracy and associations, had a fear that individuals in modern representative 
democracies—who did not have the ability to wield power or govern themselves—would 
become atomized and isolated from their fellow citizens, and eaten up in their own 
concerns.298 If my review of the subject of πολυπραγμοσύνη has shown anything, those who 
wrote about and criticized democracy in Athens—the thinkers who have influenced the 
way individuals like Tocqueville and more modern political theorists consider our brand of 
liberal and representative democracy—believed that democratic government (not just 
voting, but office holding, as well) was too participatory, too frequent, and too ingrained in 
                                                            
298 de Tocqueville (2002): 482-484 called this phenomenon individualism, an excess of which, he 
argued, would lead to a disengagement of citizens from political life and lead them open to a 
democratic despotism of administration, detailed on 661-673 in a section called “What kind of 
despotism democratic nations have to fear.” 
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popular culture.299 Additionally, the fact that πολυπραγμοσύνη seems even to be a word 
with purchase in Athenian discourse implies that rather than a fear that citizens were too 
fragmented, too atomized, and uninvolved with each other’s lives, it might have been the 
opposite, at least in the eyes of conservative theorists like Plato. Strong and prominent 
associational life might have been a key part of that.  
 It is true that Athens was not a face-to-face society, and not a πόλις εὐσύνοπτος as 
Aristotle defined it, a city with a population that could be taken in in one view.300 Such a 
definition was crucial to my argument as to how information (and authority) was dispersed 
and decentralized, making information spread by individuals to be necessary and also 
beneficial for the polis, as well as for the individual spreading it. The territory of Attica was 
large, and individuals could not have conceivably known each other all socially or by their 
faces.301 Yet, given that fact, the facilitation of knowledge and weak ties between the citizen 
body would still have been aided by what Ober calls the “interpresence” and 
“intervisibility” of individuals and information in specific spaces in the city.302 I already 
                                                            
299 By “ours,” I mean American democracy, the context in which I am studying and writing this 
thesis. My apologies for the provincialism to readers from outside of the United States.  
300 Vlassopoulos (2007): 36 for the identification of those two concepts as the same; Arist. Pol. 
1327a for the size of the ideal polis as being one where “τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐσύνοπτον ἔφαμεν 
εἶναι δεῖν”. 
301 This is certainly true given that Akrigg (2011): 57 notes that some commentators have put 
the number of male citizens along at near 60,000 before the war Peloponnesian War, and 25-
30,000 afterwards. 
302 Ober (2008): 192: Common knowledge is not just a matter of passively “taking up” a 
particular message; it is an active social experience. Personal interpresence and especially 
intervisibility among interpresent individuals create a particularly effective environment for 
building common knowledge because each participant can personally observe not only that 
others know some piece of information in common, but how others respond to that 
information.” 
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brought this up with a review of the differing types of activities that could be done in the 
agora, but it is worth highlighting again. The diverse set of activities that occurred in “free 
spaces” like the agora—a fact of life that conservative critics bewailed, and Plato’s poleis 
legislated against—add to their nature as social and recreational spaces, as well as political 
and economic. Demosthenes—albeit in a rhetorical attempt to portray one of his opponents 
as an anti-social outsider—noted the centrality of the agora to all the citizens’ lives when 
he stated that out of the approximately twenty-thousand Athenians, every single one of 
them frequents the marketplace on public or private business (Dem 25.21). The speaker 
seeks to use a rhetorically constructed fiction of the face-to-face character of Athens to 
convince his fellow jurors that his opponent, Aristogeiton, does not do any of the things 
that Athenians are typically said to do. Aristogeiton, in the speaker’s view, is not only 
different from the Athenians because he does not spend time in the agora for official 
business, but also for a lack of social interactions that presumably go hand in hand with the 
agora. He is critiqued for not taking part in philanthropic or personal associations, but also 
for neither calling at any of the barbershops in the city nor the workshops (Dem 25.22).  
 By recurrently frequenting spaces like the agora, individuals gained a set of casual 
contacts—often changing, and often new—which are somewhere between strong ties and 
anonymity. As was mentioned at the end of the last chapter as an example of 
polypragmatic figures, the πολυπραγμοσύνη of such caricatured characters of 
Theophrastus could also offer examples (albeit comedic) of how individuals are able to 
generate weak ties simply by the interpresence of individuals in the city center. The 
“garrulous man” is one who sits down and speaks to someone he does not know (Thphr. 
Char. 3). The rustic figure will ask the first person he sees for information on entering the 
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city (Theophr. Char. 4). The chatty individual will seek to spread the news of the assembly 
meeting once he has learned of it (Theophr. Char. 7). Both the chat and the gossip are 
enabled by the social nature of the agora and other associated spaces, such as workshops 
and porches of buildings (Theophr. Char. 8). Large and open public spaces, such as inward-
facing agorai and theaters, were not unique to Athenian architecture, but it could be 
argued that they particularly amplified the effects of intervisibility and interpresence in 
Athenian political and cultural life.303 Individuals in Athens shared the same palaestra and 
gymnasia, and sat together—all visible to one another—at the same theaters. Such 
interpresence does not immediately create ties of any kind between individuals—but it 
certainly offers entrepreneurial individuals the possibility for such.  
 One example of the relationship of social interaction, interpresence, information, 
and knowledge, is the oft-cited example of the monument of Eponymous Heroes in the 
agora, where much official information—such as the agenda of the assembly, notifications 
about upcoming trials, new laws to be approved, and extraordinary or emergency 
meetings—would be posted in writing on wooden boards in advance of assemblies, trials, 
and tribal events.304 There are several ways to think about the relationship of the 
Eponymous Heroes—a method of official dissemination of information—to the social flow 
of information. One would be to consider it, as does Camp, a “crucial element in the 
dissemination of official information and yet another reason why the average citizen who 
lived in the city itself would have occasion to visit the agora almost every day.”305 In theory, 
                                                            
303 Ober (2008): 199. 
304 Camp (1992): 99.  
305 Camp (1992): 99.  
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coming to the monument and reading the notices there would require no social interaction 
at all. Most of the citizens (who, if we are to believe Demosthenes’ exaggerated take on the 
situation) would pass by the agora for some reason or another, and they could check the 
monument, and consider themselves informed. Indeed, Athens was particularly known for 
its “epigraphic habit” of posting laws, inscribed documents, and official lists on stelai in 
public spaces, on buildings, or in frequently habited religious sites. Such information is 
fixed, visible, and not particularly social in its means of transmission.306 The jury may 
always be out regarding the question of whether all Athenians could read.307 If Athenian 
literacy was high, then the relationship of epigraphy and posted information is less 
germane to this argument. If, on the other hand, there was a mixture of literate, non-
literate, and semi-literate individuals in Athens, the social nature of knowledge becomes a 
factor.  
 Rosalind Thomas argues that Athenian culture was primarily an oral culture—a 
distinction that is different from literate and non-literate cultures—that prioritized the 
                                                            
306 Hedrick (1999): 389 takes the term “epigraphical habit” from an article by Ramsay 
MacMullen; he uses it to simply mean the practice of erecting inscriptions. Various uses for 
erecting monumental writing under a democracy include: functional accountability and 
publication of the “people’s business” (397), the ideological aspect of promoting and enshrining 
democratic values (425), and purely informational, enabling individuals to have effective 
knowledge of politics as well demonstrating what laws to observe (425-6). 
307 For a limited set of individuals participating in a “literate culture” of recreational reading 
and writing, and perhaps a larger group of semi-literates and functional literates see Harris 
(1989) and Morgan (1999) who argued that lack of literacy impaired the ability of certain 
individuals to participate in Athens’ democratic processes. Incidentally, Harris also argues for a 
lower amount of people participating in Athens’ democracy than most others. Missiou (2011) 
argues for a high level of literacy in Athens, given the assumptions that many lower class 
individuals (thetes) participated, and that many of the functions of Athenian government 
required writing of some kind.  
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spread of information through speech and pronouncement. 308 In her view, even knowledge 
and material that was written (such as the Homeric poems) was often meant to be spoken 
aloud by individuals, a conception which perhaps allows for the easy coexistence of those 
functionally literate (in terms of literate culture) and those semi- or illiterate participating 
in government. In light of that theory, one way to think about the social nature of 
knowledge affecting how Athenian citizens gained information—even if they were illiterate 
or only semi-literate—is through the basic social fact of simply being present in the same 
space as another individual at the same time. Illiterate individuals could have had passerby 
or fellow onlookers read out the notices on the monument of Eponymous Heroes to them. 
Demosthenes notes that Athenians were commonly to be found running around asking 
each other “what’s the news?” (Dem. 4.10).309 He also notes that news announced officially 
at places like the council could be spread socially by individuals through the workshops of 
the agora even before any herald had announced it or posted it officially.310 To return to 
Theophrastus’ portraits, the chat and the gossip seem to be likely candidates. To think of 
the spread of information beyond the weakest of these “weak ties,” such as the ones 
generated between readers, non-readers, and passersby at a public monument in Athens, 
one can consider as evidence the offhand comment of Theophrastus’s account of the rustic 
who asks for news from whomever he might meet, as well as telling all of the news of the 
                                                            
308 Thomas (1989): 15: “In fact the society of classical Athens was still heavily dependent on the 
spoken word even in the fourth century B.C.” She further notes “We must extend discussion of 
literacy to the ‘mixture’ and interaction of literate and oral processes” (16). 
309 Lewis (1995): 433. 
310 Dem. 18.169 describes the councilors on evening duty in the Tholos upon hearing of the fall of 
Elatea as having immediately left and spread the news in the workshops so effectively that by 
the next morning, the citizens were assembled on the Pnyx before the Council had even 
introduced the agenda.  
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events at the assembly to his workers on his farm. In this case, the comedy of the situation 
perhaps comes from the fact that the workers on his farm could have been slaves or metics, 
or even poorer citizen workers who had no ability (due to lack of remuneration or a lack of 
rights) to go to the assembly in the city. One can certainly see the idea of strong ties as 
embodied by the farmer’s connection with the workers (or more broadly, those that live 
nearby in his locality), as well as the weak ties present in the contacts that might be made 
when in the city and the agora, even if the visits are infrequent at best.311 Even if 
infrequent, such visits of rural-to-urban citizens may develop connections, as they are not 
irregular but often scheduled. Visits by rural dwellers to the city center might occur on a 
regular basis, scheduled with certain market days when individuals could be expected in 
the city, or timed with the four-times-a-prytany regular assembly meeting. For example, 
Lysias mentions specifically that the Plataeans (both urban and rural dwellers) would meet 
together at the fresh-cheese market on the last day of every month (Lys, 23.6). For the 
individual who lives outside the city, it is not only the information that is spread via official 
means at the assembly meeting itself, or at the Eponymous Heroes, that might have value, 
it is the information that a rural demesperson too might gain from socially calling at a 
barbershop or a workshop while stopping in the city.   
 The weak ties and associational contacts developed by the πολυπράγμων by virtue 
of their interpresence and intervisibility in the common spaces of the city are not only 
useful for accumulating and accessing politically useful knowledge from social sources. They 
                                                            
311 Jones (2004): 274: “But these exchanges tended to be periodic, and periodic at wide 
intervals—from the four-times-per-prytany meeting of the assembly, to seasonal visits to 
market, to the annual phratric Apatouria, to the once-in-a-lifetime ephebic training and tour of 
Attica.”  
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are also useful in developing purely social knowledge, particularly of people and 
characteristic social practices. Although the discussion of weak ties above had focused on 
how individuals access knowledge from other individuals, the kind of behavior exhibited by 
the πολυπράγμων is also important for permitting the conditions to develop knowledge of 
individuals, and particularly, knowledge of whom one should trust and distrust.312 Modern 
theorists of social capital and democratic governance seize on the concept of social trust 
and trustworthiness—joint knowledge of and respect for communal norms of behavior 
between members of a society313—as being crucial to developing the kind of “generalized 
reciprocity” and “generalized trust” that helps to “build large scale, complex, and 
interdependent social networks and institutions.”314  
Some scholars doubt that generalized reciprocity and personal trust existed 
between social groups and outside of personal “strong tie” relationships in Athens. 
Matthew Christ has in fact argued that if an ethos of Athenian reciprocity (what he calls 
“helping behavior”) did exist, it was considered more in the relationship between the 
citizen and the state, rather than in a citizen/citizen context.315 It is not my goal to 
overturn that argument. Yet, a crucial part of developing any type of trust amongst 
members of a society—whether it is thin and generalized to a whole society, or thick and 
particular to a given social group—is increased knowledge of whether individuals hold 
                                                            
312 Ober (2008): 91 claims that social knowledge “includes answers to questions like these: Who 
is my friend/foe? Whom should I trust/distrust and under what circumstances?” 
313 Fukayama 1995: 26: “Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, 
honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other 
members of that community.”  
314 Putnam (2000): 135 uses the term “generalized reciprocity”; Warren (1999): 9 uses 
“generalized trust”.  
315 Christ (2010): 285. 
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themselves to similar norms and standards of social interaction. The more time that an 
individual spends with the marginal figures in one’s social networks (those who eventually 
become “weak ties”) the more they will have knowledge of whether they are able to trust 
those individuals. In Athens, as in the modern day, the implications of such knowledge 
could be economic, such as a means of facilitating business relations; Millet notes that the 
pseudo-Aristotelian Problems states that “no man makes a deposit with a man he does not 
trust” (Arist. Pr. 950a28).316 Yet, in an environment of direct democracy—where citizens 
would often debate and craft policy alongside the individuals that they saw in the 
marketplace or at the barbershop—establishing whether an individual’s opinion is 
trustworthy is a crucial part of deciding whether to be persuaded by their arguments in the 
assembly or council-chamber. Knowledge of an individual’s reputation, personality, and 
technical experiences could indeed be politically useful as part of judging policymaking in 
an environment where all citizens had a hand in governance.  
It is by looking at the ways in which the movement and accumulation of knowledge 
by individuals occurs on ground level, on the street level, and at the level of the individual 
citizen, rather than simply at the institutional level that one begins to finally complete the 
fourth category that I had seen as lacking in my chapter—a praise of a kind of positive 
polypragmatic democratic behavior in Athens. In this section I have sought to build a 
theoretical basis for considering the behaviors of the πολυπράγμων, and in such a way 
consider individual (and often, non-elite) citizen behavior from beyond the rhetoric-laden 
portrayals of the orators and the caricatures of the comedians. In a situation where 
                                                            
316 Translation and attribution to the peripatetic school that followed Aristotle comes from 
Millett (2002): 99.  
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information, expertise, and “politically relevant knowledge” is not centralized or easily 
accessible by individuals means the behaviors described negatively as πολυπραγμοσύνη 
actually become an asset to the citizen, rather than something to be berated (in the 
orators) or proscribed (as in Plato).  
I particularly connected Plato’s abolishment of πολυπραγμοσύνη—of doing many 
things and functions not proper to one’s role—in the Republic and (albeit without using the 
term) in the Laws with the active, restless, innovative, and toilsome seekers of information 
that come from the negative portraits of the behaviors in popular rhetoric and comedy. 
Plato’s broader epistemic critique of Athenian democracy—of how democracy was, in his 
mind, a clearly inferior form of government due to a lack of information and expertise on 
the part of mass decision-making bodies staffed by part-time citizen-rulers—led me in turn 
to investigate ways that modern democratic theorists have sought to explain the virtues 
and weaknesses of participatory democracy, particularly in its ability to generate and 
marshal information and individual expertise effectively for use by the citizen body as a 
whole. The concept raised by some of these scholars—that knowledge is embedded and 
dispersed throughout society, and can be organized through not only institutions, but 
through social relations as well—seemed to be particularly applicable to the Athenian 
situation, and was one that seemed to give great agency as well as benefits to the individual 
who acted as did a πολυπράγμων. By introducing Granovetter’s theories of weak ties, and 
Burt and Putnam’s concepts of social capital, I have laid out the theoretical foundations for, 
first, one of the ways that modern theorists consider that dispersed information can be 
spread throughout a society, and, second, how (from both a situational and incentive 
perspective) such ties can come into being. Finally, I hope to have more fully explicated the 
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ideas that I had teased at when discussing the rigidity of Plato’s spatial and social 
construction of the city of Magnesia in the Laws. The ways in which the structure of the 
Athenian agora and other public spaces in the city fostered interpresence, intervisibility, 
and social interactions also simultaneously fostered the conditions necessary for the 
creation of “weak ties” and acquaintance networks that allowed ordinary citizens to gain 
access to socially-embedded information through social means, rather than institutional 
ones. The Republic had explicitly abolished πολυπραγμοσύνη as an institutional and 
political phenomenon by removing from positions of power those who were not capable of 
good rule. On the other hand, the rigidity of the Laws rendered moot the processes that 
enabled the social aspects of πολυπραγμοσύνη and many other typical Athenian social 
interactions, reorganizing citizen life so as to limit the associative freedom between castes 
and classes (such as between citizens, banausic tradespeople, and metics) and to severely 
diminish the open and freewheeling nature of the “free spaces” of the city. The fact that 
Plato takes aim not only at the direct manifestation of popular rule, but also the behaviors 
that I have determined to be crucial in spreading information through that populous and 
non-elite citizen body, is telling. 
 Josiah Ober has made a persuasive argument that the structure of Athenian political 
institutions such as the Council of Five Hundred and the Assembly were crucial in 
aggregating the dispersed knowledge of the Athenian population and bringing it to bear on 
complex issues of decision-making. Institutions like the Council and the Assembly not only 
gathered information, but they disseminated it to the rest of the population as well. 
Common experiences of governing and working closely with others on committees, boards, 
and in the Council not only gave the Athenians access to the specific technical knowledge 
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of their fellow citizens, but also “social knowledge,” knowledge of individuals, norms, 
procedures, and activity of actual governance. In this way, he seeks to combat Plato’s claim 
that the Athenians were amateurs and incompetents—in his reading they were frequent 
fliers in the art of self-governance. In this chapter, in complement rather than in 
contradiction to Ober’s efforts, I have sought to understand how certain knowledge in a 
democracy may be spread by purely social means. I assert that the figure of the 
πολυπράγμων in Athenian literature was especially representative of such an environment 
where knowledge is socially embedded and dispersed. I also hope to have argued that the 
social behaviors pilloried by the orators and comedians as πολυπραγμοσύνη were neither 
purely anti-social behaviors limited to a small group of the population, but instead, as 
Thucydides and Plato presented it, attributes of Athenian social life in general. In studying 
the πολυπράγμων in light of some modern social science theories, I hope to have contested, 
or at least complicated Plato’s assertion of what is valid political knowledge in a politically 
useful context. It is not only that the information, expertise, and talk between members of 
the banausoi at Athens does not have any validity in Plato’s epistemic conception of good 
governance—he also actively seeks to minimize those kind of informal social institutions of 










 I would like to end this paper by focusing on several points made by Aristotle. 
Aristotle, like Plato, was a critic of the mix of business, politics, and social engagement that 
occurred in the agora.317 Aristotle too rated Athens very poorly in the gradients of 
democracy that he laid out in the Politics. Notably, his first form of democracy, the most 
moderate and ideal one (Arist. Pol. 1291b30-40), is one where the majority will be composed 
of farmers. Aristotle makes the direct political claim that Aristophanes and Euripides only 
hint at when they had praised the ἀπραγμοσύνη of the rural farmer in my first chapter: if 
they have to work for a living, they will have little leisure and will therefore hold few 
assemblies, and the laws, rather than the people, will rule.318 Such a regime lacks the 
characteristics of πολυπραγμοσύνη characterized by Plato, while also being very different 
from the Athenian regime. On the other hand, Aristotle’s “final democracy” (τελευταία 
δημοκρατία), the most degraded and socially unstable form of democratic government, 
involved rule by all of the citizens in mass bodies, with magistrates solely executing the 
decrees rather than deciding them (Arist. Pol. 1298a28-30).319 Such democracies include the 
banausoi, the artisans, laborers and craftsmen amongst their magistrates and assemblymen 
(Arist. Pol. 1277b). Numerous authors have commented on the similarities to this final form 
                                                            
317 Vlassopoulos (2007): 40; Arist. Pol. 1331a-b calls for the establishment of separate agorai for 
business, politics, and leisure in the manner of the Thessalians.  
318 Arist. Pol. 1292b26-28: “ἔχουσι γὰρ ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν, ὥστε τὸν 
νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες ἐκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας.” 
319 Ober (1998): 294.  
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of democracy to democratic Athens.320 In many ways, Aristotle’s critiques are similar to 
Plato’s, the Old Oligarch’s, and Thucydides’ critiques of Athens.  
 As I noted above in a quote seized on by modern and ancient epistemic democracy 
theorists, however, Aristotle also famously noted that there were situations where the 
numerical superiority of mass bodies could actually enhance their collective wisdom. Many 
modern democratic theorists seek to conjoin such a claim to Condorcet’s jury theorem to 
make their cases about democratic wisdom. My review of political and social behavior as 
occurred in Athens, particularly in respect to how institutions and individuals gathered 
and employed information, seems to speak to these dual aspects of human existence. I 
would argue that one of the clear ways that the desire to know can be satisfied is through 
the interactions of the social community. The stereotypical πολυπράγμων is a character 
who seems particularly given over to that human concern with knowing, and it seems that 
the institutional and social conditions with regard to politically useful information in 
Athens might have presumed (or at least enabled and rendered beneficial) those 
individuals who took it upon themselves to act on such yearnings for knowledge within the 
communal and social life of the ancient city state.  
Aristotle actually differs from Plato in his own assessment of πολυπραγμοσύνη. He 
declares in the Nicomachean Ethics—citing Euripides—that it is assumed by many that those 
actively involved in politics are busybodies, and therefore the wise are those who stay 
quiet, reserved, and seek their own good (Arist. Nic. Eth. 1142a2-7).321 Yet, in Aristotle’s 
                                                            
320 Hansen (1999): 71; Ober (2008): 294.  
321 Leigh (2013): 24: Aristotle cites Euripides’ lost play Philoctetes, in which Odysseus ponders 
between living a quiet life, or to be a restless, aspiring man of action. 
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mind, such a policy is largely untenable when considering individuals as part of a broader 
community. He states that it is impossible for an individual to tend to his or her own affairs 
without engaging in things of the community and the state; what we would call politics. 
Following one’s individual good often comes in tandem with the good and interest of the 
political community—to call it πολυπραγμοσύνη and dismiss it as meddlesomeness would 
do injustice to the contribution to the community that such behaviors might entail.322  
While here it seems that Aristotle is referring to specifically political participation 
through institutions, I believe that his line of argumentation can be linked to the nature of 
human desire to know, as well as the ability of each individual to contribute to a political 
decision-making process. Aristotle had too noted in the Metaphysics when speaking of truth, 
that no one person can obtain all of it, but neither can each individual amongst all fail 
entirely. While individuals might make a small and limited contribution to the total inquiry 
alone, when brought together, their common knowledge might be of great magnitude 
(Arist. Metaph. 993a30-b3). Such logic informs the epistemic argument made by modern 
democratic theorists, and tied together with Aristotle’s other comments, cements a basis 
for the role of the πολυπράγμων in the community. If all those who engage in inquisitive, 
searching, restless activity, be it through institutional politics, or through social 
interactions in the city of Athens, are labeled as πολυπράγμων, and simply discounted, 
something will be lost from the epistemic conversation. This is especially true if one agrees 
with the premise that politically relevant information is not solely something gained from 
institutional, educational, or hierarchical sources of learning, but can also be embedded in 
and accessed through social relationships. Those individuals who satisfy their desires to 
                                                            
322 Leigh (2013): 23.  
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know by exploring them through social interactions are better able to contribute to the 
common pool of knowledge when enabled to participate in mass decision-making 
institutions such as the ones that existed in Athens in the fourth century B.C. By Aristotle’s 
criteria, πολυπραγμοσύνη of this type appears to be tapping into some of our deeper 
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